



UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE

2013



TRENDS / CONTEXTS / DATA

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Vienna

GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE 2013

TRENDS, CONTEXTS, DATA



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PREFACE

The *Global Study on Homicide 2013* seeks to shed light on the worst of crimes — the intentional killing of one human being by another.

Beyond resulting in the deaths of nearly half a million people in 2012, this form of violent crime has a broad impact on security — and the perception of security — across all societies. This study, which builds on the ground-breaking work of UNODC's first *Global Study on Homicide* in 2011, is particularly timely as the international community is engaged in defining the post-2015 development agenda. As United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has made clear, development progress cannot be achieved or sustained amid violence, insecurity and injustice.

By improving understanding of the underlying patterns and trends related to different forms, settings and risk factors of homicide at the global, regional, national and sub-national levels, this study can be a strategic tool in supporting governments' efforts to address root causes and enhance criminal justice responses.

Alongside intentional homicide related to other criminal activities and socio-political agendas, the study examines homicide related to interpersonal conflict, which includes homicides perpetrated by intimate partners or family members. Unlike other forms of homicide, which vary significantly across regions and from year to year, intimate partner and family-related homicide remains persistent and prevalent.

While the vast majority of global homicide victims are men, it is overwhelmingly women who die at the hands of their intimate partners or family

members. Normative standards for improving criminal justice responses to eliminate violence against women have been agreed by all United Nations Member States; clearly more must be done to improve States' capacities to effectively prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish all forms of violence against women.

With regard to different settings in which lethal violence occurs, the study indicates that homicide and violence in countries emerging from conflict can become concurrent contributors to instability and insecurity. If we want to build peace, interventions must address not only the conflict itself but also surges in homicide resulting from organized crime and interpersonal violence, which can flourish in settings with weak rule of law.

Specific risk factors such as alcohol and drug use and the availability of weapons are also examined in the study in order to improve understanding of how they shape patterns and prevalence of lethal violence. Deeper understanding of these enablers can inform and enhance policies aimed at preventing intentional homicides from happening in the first place.

Ultimately, efforts to prevent unlawful homicide will not be effective unless governments and the international community address those who are most at risk, of both offending or becoming a victim of homicide. More than half of all global homicide victims are under 30 years of age. Much of this violence takes place in urban areas. Effective policies and strategies must not only target at-risk young people but involve them and local communities to work together to break the cycle of violence.

I hope that the data and analysis contained in this study, along with the extensive tools developed by my Office to support States in preventing crime and improving criminal justice systems, can provide a solid basis to meet these challenges.



Yury Fedotov
Executive Director
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



EXPLANATORY NOTES

Regions: In various sections, this study uses a number of regional and sub-regional designations. They are not official designations and they do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNODC concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The assignment of countries or areas to specific groupings is for statistical convenience and does not imply any assumption regarding political or other affiliation of countries or territories by the United Nations. The designations used in this study are based on the United Nations M.49 geographical regions for statistical use, which have been developed, used and maintained by the United Nations Statistical Division. They are defined as follows:

Africa

- Eastern Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, *Mayotte*, Mozambique, *Réunion*, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
- Middle Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe.
- Northern Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.
- Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.
- Western Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,

Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

Americas

- Caribbean: *Anguilla*, Antigua and Barbuda, *Aruba*, Bahamas, Barbados, *British Virgin Islands*, *Cayman Islands*, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, *Guadeloupe*, Haiti, Jamaica, *Martinique*, *Montserrat*, *Puerto Rico*, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, *Turks and Caicos Islands*, and *United States Virgin Islands*.
- Central America: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama.
- Northern America: *Bermuda*, Canada, *Greenland*, *Saint Pierre and Miquelon*, and United States of America.
- South America: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, *French Guiana*, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

Asia

- Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
- Asia: China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, *Hong Kong, China*, Japan, *Macao, China*, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, and *Taiwan Province of China*.
- South-Eastern Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar,

Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam.

- Southern Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
- Western Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, *State of Palestine*, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

Europe

- Eastern Europe: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, and Ukraine.
- Northern Europe: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (sometimes disaggregated to United Kingdom (England and Wales), United Kingdom (Scotland), and United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)). Baltic countries refer to a sub-region which includes Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
- Southern Europe: Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, *Kosovo (in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99)*, Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
- Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, and Switzerland.

Oceania

- Australia and New Zealand: Australia, and New Zealand.
- Melanesia: Fiji, *New Caledonia*, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.
- Micronesia: *Guam*, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, and Palau.
- Polynesia: *Cook Islands*, *French Polynesia*, *Niue*, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu.

Maps: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. A dotted line represents approximately the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Population data: The data on population used in this study come from: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*.



INTRODUCTION


Many types of killing exist, but not all of them are considered intentional and/or unlawful. Defined as “unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person”,¹ intentional homicide is the main focus of this study. For the sake of simplicity, however, the term “homicide” is used throughout as shorthand for “intentional homicide”.

The study of intentional homicide is relevant not only because the impact of the intentional killing of one human being by another is the ultimate crime, whose ripple effect goes far beyond the initial loss of human life and can create a climate

of fear and uncertainty. Intentional homicide also victimizes the family and community of the victim, who can be considered secondary victims,² and when justice is not served, impunity can lead to further victimization in the form of the denial of the basic human right to justice.

Moreover, as the most readily measurable, clearly defined and most comparable indicator for measuring violent deaths around the world, homicide is, in certain circumstances, both a reasonable proxy for violent crime as well as a robust indicator of levels of security within States.

Classifying violent deaths



Source: UNODC.

¹ UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). More in-depth explanations of the definition of intentional homicide is given in chapter 6 (Data challenges) of this study.

² According to the *Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power* (Annex, Para. 2), “victims” also include (where appropriate) the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist the victim. (United Nations General Assembly (1985). A/RES/40/34.).

Within the broad range of violent deaths, the core element of intentional homicide is the complete liability of the direct perpetrator, which thus excludes killings directly related to war or conflicts, self-inflicted death (suicide), killings due to legal interventions or justifiable killings (such as self-defence), and those deaths caused when the perpetrator was reckless or negligent but did not intend to take a human life (non-intentional homicide).

Due to the sheer magnitude of its violence, as well as the perceived number of lives lost, violence stemming from armed conflict receives a great deal of attention from the international community. Yet intentional homicide exists in every country, and as in many countries with high homicide levels it accounts for far more lives lost than those attributable to, for example, war or conflict, it also represents a major threat to civilian security.

The right to life is a supreme normative imperative, enshrined in both constitutional and international law.³ The process and criteria for protecting against the unlawful taking of life, taking steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction, and of assigning responsibility for violent deaths within that jurisdiction are key obligations of the State, predominantly through its criminal justice system. More broadly, the obligation to protect human life is the cornerstone of countries' efforts to develop crime prevention policies. The provision of analytical tools for monitoring trends and patterns of homicide therefore plays a vital role in increasing the capacity of national authorities and the international community to understand and respond adequately to intentional homicide.

As this study shows, homicide is not merely a tool employed by violent criminals to achieve their material goals, and is not only restricted to fringe elements of society. As homicide affects people from all walks of life there is a need to look at lethal violence from different angles. For that reason, the *Global Study on Homicide 2013* takes up the mantle of its 2011 predecessor by not only updating the global overview of intentional homicide, but by also delving deeper into the understanding of its very nature. It benefits from the availability of new homicide data to provide fur-

ther statistical evidence and analysis to help improve the understanding of trends and patterns in lethal violence and aid the development of policies to curb it.

The circumstances, motivations and relationships that drive homicide are multiple and often overlapping. But though the borders between these factors are often blurred, this study employs a comprehensive approach to broaden the field of study by classifying intentional homicide into three main typologies: homicide related to other criminal activities; to interpersonal conflict; and to socio-political agendas.

It also looks at homicide and violence in the wake of conflict and in countries with a recent history of civil unrest, and examines the roles played in homicide by various mechanisms, including weapons, and enabling factors, such as psychoactive substances, in order to assess how they can facilitate lethal violence. Last but not least, data on the criminal justice response to homicide are also presented as they can assess the capacity of the State to respond to homicide. Indeed, a relationship exists between levels of impunity and rates of homicide, and while the relationship between security, justice and development may not necessarily be linear, there is increasing evidence that a lack of security, which is often associated with a weak criminal justice system, can block the path to development of countries and their populations.

Such analyses have been made possible due to the gradual expansion and consolidation of the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset, though a number of challenges still exist, particularly in terms of enhancing the coverage of country data and its disaggregation. In this area, cooperation with other international and regional organizations is fundamental, and the concrete measures taken for implementing joint data collections and developing common methodological standards, as well as coordinating technical assistance activities, are big steps in the right direction.

³ United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (1982). General Comment No. 06: *The right to life* (article 6). Para. 1; *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, article 3; *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, article 6.1; *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, article 6; *Geneva Conventions*, Common article 3.1.a.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Through the filter of data from the global to the sub-national level, the *Global Study on Homicide 2013* gives a comprehensive overview of intentional homicide across the world. As homicide is one of the most comparable and accurate indicators for measuring violence, the aim of this study is to improve understanding of criminal violence by providing a wealth of information about where homicide occurs and with what intensity, about who is most at risk, why they are at risk and exactly how their lives are taken from them. Additionally, homicide patterns over time shed light on regional differences, especially when looking at long-term trends.

As the international community looks towards the post-2015 development agenda, the connection between violence, security and development, within the broader context of the rule of law, is an important factor to be considered. Since its impact goes beyond the loss of human life and can create a climate of fear and uncertainty, intentional homicide (and violent crime) is a threat to the population. Homicide data can therefore play an important role in monitoring security and justice.

Likewise, homicide data can enable the international community to gain a better understanding of the complexity of homicide and the different ways it affects the population, which is why this study delves deeply into the very nature of intentional homicide. In so doing, it posits a unique typology of homicide: homicide related to other criminal activities; interpersonal homicide; and socio-political homicide. The influence of cross-cutting and enabling factors, such as killing mechanisms and the use of psychoactive substances (alcohol and illicit drugs), is also examined in

order to gain a better understanding of the role they play in lethal violence.


This analytical framework will help governments to develop strategies and policies for protecting those most at risk and addressing those most likely to offend. To that end, the criminal justice response of countries to homicide is also analysed here for the first time, as is violence in countries emerging from conflict, where violence related to crime and interpersonal issues can be just as devastating as violence relating to the conflict itself.

The increasing availability of sub-national data has also broadened this study's capacity to show variations, which are often marked, in the intensity of homicide within countries and to enable the identification of homicide "hot spots", which warrant further monitoring, both within countries and sub-regions. Indeed, as this study shows, the study of intentional homicide is, to a large extent, the study of contrasts. For example: almost half of all homicides occur in countries that make up just over a tenth of the global population; some 95 per cent of homicide perpetrators at the global level are male; males also account for almost 8 out of every 10 homicide victims; two thirds of the victims of homicides committed by intimate partners or family members globally are female; and half of all global homicide victims are under 30 years of age.

The polarization of homicide

Intentional homicide caused the deaths of almost half a million people (437,000) across the world in 2012. More than a third of those (36 per cent) occurred in the Americas, 31 per cent in Africa and 28 per cent in Asia, while Europe (5 per cent) and Oceania (0.3 per cent) accounted for the lowest shares of homicide at the regional level.

Homicide victims and population, by countries' level of homicide per 100,000 population (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).


The global average homicide rate stands at 6.2 per 100,000 population, but Southern Africa and Central America have rates over four times higher than that (above 24 victims per 100,000 population), making them the sub-regions with the highest homicide rates on record, followed by South America, Middle Africa and the Caribbean (between 16 and 23 homicides per 100,000 population). Meanwhile, with rates some five times lower than the global average, Eastern Asia, Southern Europe and Western Europe are the sub-regions with the lowest homicide levels.

Almost three billion people live in an expanding group of countries with relatively low homicide rates, many of which, particularly in Europe and Oceania, have continued to experience a decrease in their homicide rates since 1990. At the opposite end of the scale, almost 750 million people live in countries with high homicide levels, meaning that almost half of all homicides occur in countries that make up just 11 per cent of the global population and that personal security is still a major concern for more than 1 in 10 people on the planet.

A widening gap in homicide levels exists between countries with high homicide rates and those with low homicide rates. There are also notable disparities in homicide within regions and sub-regions, as individual countries follow different paths over time. For example, homicide rates in the southern part of South America are closer to the relatively low rates recorded in Europe, while the rates in the north of the sub-region are closer to the relatively high rates recorded in Central America. Likewise, at the sub-national level, the most populous city in the vast majority of countries generally records higher homicide rates than elsewhere, with notable exceptions being certain countries in Eastern Europe.

Certain regions and sub-regions have experienced sustained high levels of homicide. This is particularly notable in the Americas, where homicide levels have been high, and in some cases increasing, over the past decade. But this is not a new

Homicide rates, selected regions (1955-2012, three-year moving average)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and WHO Mortality Database.

pattern, as the Americas have had homicide rates five to eight times higher than those in Europe and Asia since the mid-1950s. The continuing high levels of homicide in the Americas are the legacy of decades of political and crime-related violence, which has hindered a decline in homicide levels in certain countries. However, homicide levels in some countries in the Americas, such as Brazil, are now stabilizing, albeit at a high level, while in other regions, countries with historically high homicide rates, such as South Africa, Lesotho, the Russian Federation and countries in Central Asia, are managing to break their own cycle of violence and have recorded decreases in their homicide rates.


At the opposite end of the spectrum, in countries with some of the lowest homicide rates in the world, mostly located in Europe and Eastern Asia, homicide levels continue to decline. Many of those countries had low levels of homicide in 1995 and have subsequently recorded continuous decreases in their homicide rates. On the other hand, a worrying development is that homicide levels in Northern Africa are rising, probably as a result of political violence, which may in turn foster lethal violence related to criminal activities, and should be monitored. The same can be said for parts of Southern Asia and Eastern Africa.

The gender bias

Polarization not only exists in terms of where homicide occurs, but also in the sex of its victims and perpetrators. In the context of family and intimate partner relationships, women are considerably more at risk than men, yet 79 per cent of all homicide victims globally are male. Moreover, some 95 per cent of homicide perpetrators at the global level are also male; a share that is consistent across countries and regions, irrespective of the homicide typology or weapon used.

The global male homicide rate is almost four times that of females (9.7 versus 2.7 per 100,000) and is highest in the Americas (29.3 per 100,000 males), where it is nearly seven times higher than in Asia, Europe and Oceania (all under 4.5 per 100,000 males). This is due in large part to the higher levels of homicide related to organized crime and gangs in the Americas than in other regions. When factoring in the finding that 43 per cent of all homicide victims are aged 15-29, this means that more than one in seven of all homicide victims globally is a young male aged 15-29 living in the Americas.

Percentage of male and female homicide victims and of males and females convicted of intentional homicide, by region (2011 or latest year)




Note: Data on four countries in Africa and Oceania are included in the global total but not shown separately.

Source: UN-CTS.

There is a regional and gender bias towards male victims in homicide related to organized crime and gangs, but interpersonal homicide in the form of intimate partner/family-related homicide is far more evenly distributed across regions and is, on average, remarkably stable at the global level.


Number of women killed by intimate partners and family members, by region (2012 or latest year)



Note: Estimates are based on data for 4 countries in Africa, 15 countries in the Americas; 9 countries in Asia; 21 countries in Europe; and 3 countries in Oceania.

Source: Elaboration based on UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Percentage distribution of victims of homicide, by sex and selected age group (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

However, intimate partner/family-related homicide disproportionately affects women: two thirds of its victims globally are female (43,600 in 2012) and one third (20,000) are male. Almost half (47 per cent) of all female victims of homicide in 2012 were killed by their intimate partners or family members, compared to less than 6 per cent of male homicide victims. Thus while a large share of female homicide victims are murdered by people who are expected to care for them, the majority of men are killed by people they may not even know.

Youth at risk

Something that the majority of male and female homicide victims do have in common is their relative youth. The 15-29 and 30-44 age groups account for the vast majority of homicides globally, with almost half of all homicide victims aged 15-29 and slightly less than a third aged 30-44. The homicide rate for male victims aged 15-29 in South America and Central America is more than four times the global average rate for that age group. The 30-44 age group is, however, at higher risk in some countries in Central America, the Caribbean and all sub-regions in Europe. The impact of this dynamic can be devastating for

security and the economy, as the deaths of males in the 30-44 age group can have a disproportionate impact on families, the working population and perceptions of security.

At the youngest end of the age spectrum, 36,000 children under the age of 15 were the victims of homicide worldwide in 2012. Equating to 8 per cent of all homicide victims, this coupled with the share of victims in the 15-29 age group (43 per cent) means that more than half of all global homicide victims are under 30 years of age.

The many faces of homicide

Based on elements including premeditation, motivation, context, instrumentality and the relationship between victim and perpetrator, this study identifies three distinct homicide typologies in order to shed light on different types of lethal violence: homicide related to other criminal activities; homicide related to interpersonal conflict; and homicide related to socio-political agendas.

Homicide related to other criminal activities registers very different levels across the world's regions, but there are currently very high levels of killings of that nature in areas of Central and South America, which are often linked to violence between

organized criminal groups. Overall, organized crime/gang-related homicide accounts for 30 per cent of homicides in the Americas, compared to less than 1 per cent in Asia, Europe and Oceania, but that does not necessarily mean that organized crime or gangs are more prevalent in the Americas than in other regions. Moreover, levels of organized crime/gang-related homicide can fluctuate dramatically, even in the short term, to the extent that they actually drive changes in homicide rates in some countries in Central America and the Caribbean. On the other hand, homicide committed during the course of other criminal acts appears to be more stable across the world, with homicide linked to robbery accounting for an average of 5 per cent of all homicides in the Americas, Europe and Oceania each year.

Not all homicide in the Americas is linked to other criminal activities, however: homicide related to interpersonal conflict also accounts for a significant share of homicides. In Montevideo, Uruguay, for example, the share of interpersonal homicides is higher than the share of crime-related homicides; and in Quito, Ecuador, the shares of those two different typologies are almost identical.¹ Interpersonal homicide accounts for a significant share of homicides around the world (for example, Costa Rica: 47 per cent; India: 48 per cent; Sweden: 54 per cent), and it has completely different drivers to homicide related to other criminal activities, often being a means of resolving a conflict and/or punishing the victim through violence when relationships come under strain. Intimate partner/family-related homicide is one form of interpersonal homicide that affects every country, irrespective of affluence, development and both risk and protective factors, which can mitigate levels of lethal violence. Accounting for 14 per cent of all homicides globally, intimate partner/family-related homicide has the greatest intensity in the Americas, whereas it accounts for a larger share of all homicides in Asia, Europe and Oceania, where those most at risk are women aged 30 and over. Other types of interpersonal homicide, such as property disputes or revenge-type killings, also occur all around the globe.

More difficult to quantify than the other two typologies, homicide related to socio-political agendas is committed in order to exert influence over power relationships and to advance a particular agenda. This type of homicide can draw a lot of

attention due to its often shocking nature — as in the case of acts of terror leading to death — and can represent a substantive share of total homicides in specific contexts or regions, such as in post-conflict settings or during periods of instability. War and conflict-related killings are also considered socio-political violence, but are not included in this category as they are outside the realm of intentional homicide.

External cross-cutting factors

A number of factors intervene in the process that leads to the commission of homicide. Ranging from the availability of a weapon (or lack of one) to the use of psychoactive substances, which may act as homicide “enablers”, such elements can shape patterns and levels of homicide, and when they are targeted by prevention policies, homicide can be reduced.

Not all homicides involve them, but weapons do play a significant role in homicide. With their high level of lethality,² firearms are the most widely used weapons, accounting for 4 out of every 10 homicides at the global level, whereas “other means”, such as physical force and blunt objects, among others, kill just over a third of homicide victims, while sharp objects kill a quarter.


The use of firearms is particularly prevalent in the Americas, where two thirds of homicides are committed with guns, whereas sharp objects are used more frequently in Oceania and Europe. However, not all high homicide areas are associated with a high prevalence of firearm homicide. For example, some sub-regions with relatively high homicide rates, such as Eastern Europe and Southern Africa, have a relatively low share of homicides by firearm, while others, such as Southern Europe and Northern Africa, have lower homicide rates but higher shares of homicides committed by firearm.

In addition to weapons, the consumption of alcohol and/or illicit drugs increases one’s risk of becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence. In Sweden and Finland, for example, over half of all homicide offenders were intoxicated with alcohol when they committed homicide. In Australia, recent data suggests that nearly half of all homicide incidents were preceded by alcohol consumption

1 Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013).

2 Lethality of a weapon depends on the type and calibre of firearm. Whether or not a victim survives a gunshot wound is often dependent on other factors, such as the availability and efficiency of health care systems. For more, see Alvazzi del Frate, A. (2012). *Small Arms Survey, Moving Targets: chapter 3*.

Homicide mechanism, by region (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and IHME (2010).

by the victim or the perpetrator, or both. Illicit drugs can affect homicide levels in different ways, but the psychopharmacological effects of certain illicit drugs, such as cocaine and amphetamine-type stimulants, are more linked to violence than others and can have an impact on homicide similar to that caused by alcohol, as indicated by data from some countries.

As well as violence associated with the consumption of illicit drugs, violence associated with the functioning of illicit drug markets can also drive homicide levels, often due to competition between involved parties. Studies and available data indicate that the cultivation, production, trafficking and sale of illicit drugs may be accompanied by high levels of violence and homicide. However, this relationship does not hold in all situations because the modus operandi of organized criminal groups, as well as the response by State authorities, can determine actual levels of homicidal violence involved in drug trafficking.

Homicide, violence and conflict

In countries emerging from conflict, it is often difficult to disentangle lethal violence that is an after-effect of conflict, or a lower-intensity continuation of conflict, from violence of a different nature, particularly if the conflict has not been fully resolved. Reducing violence in countries emerging from conflict goes beyond the need to address the roots of the conflict, to include the prevention of surges in violence resulting from organized crime and interpersonal violence, which can flourish in settings with weak rule of law.

This study presents findings from selected countries based on the availability of data, which show that crime is an important component of violence in countries emerging from conflict, and that violence related to crime can become a significant factor in the overall security situation in such countries. The analysis is based on the situations in Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Sudan, which have all had different experi-

ences in the years following conflict on their soil, yet all struggle with crime and its enablers.


In Afghanistan and Iraq, the conflict may be facilitating other types of violence, or masking the differences in the violence perpetrated by non-parties to the conflict. In Afghanistan, civilian casualties related to the conflict have been decreasing since 2010, while homicides have been increasing. Iraq, which had an estimated homicide rate of 8.0 per 100,000 population in 2012, has been experiencing a surge in conflict-related violence since early 2013, with most of the resulting deaths being of civilians.

Data for Haiti and South Sudan show that volatility caused by the conflict can undermine the implementation of the rule of law and can present opportunities for crime (whether organized or not) to take root. Haiti's homicide rate doubled from 5.1 in 2007 to 10.2 per 100,000 in 2012, much of it driven by high levels of violence and gang activity in the capital, Port-au-Prince, where 75 per cent of all Haiti's homicides occurred. In South Sudan, high levels of firearm availability have increased the lethality associated with cattle raiding, particularly in the Wunlit Triangle, where the homicide rate in 2013 was, at over 60 per 100,000 population, among the highest in the world.

A gradual improvement in security is an encouraging development in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where reconciliation processes and dedicated policies to tackle crime are resulting in a gradually improving security situation. Both countries continue to suffer homicide "hot spots" — particularly in their capital cities — and much of the killing is linked to interpersonal violence. Respondents to recent victimization surveys feared violent crime, but in Sierra Leone, although over 50 per cent of the surveyed population had experienced assault, most felt that the level of violent crime had decreased in the last three years. Liberians surveyed also felt that the Government had been successful in reducing crime, though mob justice was cited as a motivator for 15 per cent of homicides recorded there in 2012.

Addressing crime and homicide in all its forms is crucial for countries emerging from conflict, as crime-related violence can escalate to levels similar to those of violence in times of conflict. Organized criminal groups can exploit power vacuums left when conflict ends and before strong institutions take hold, and impunity for crimes can further undermine the public's trust in justice authorities.

Homicide rates in selected countries emerging from conflict (2007-2013)



Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan (2013); WHO (2014); Ministry of Interior, South Sudan (2012); UNDPKO-UNMISS (2013); UNDPKO-MINUSTAH (2013); Sierra Leone Police (2011); UNDPKO-UNMIL (2013).

Justice and prevention

Analysing the capacity of criminal justice systems to bring perpetrators of homicide to justice is an important element in the assessment of a core responsibility of the State, as well as in the understanding of a factor that contributes to homicide levels and trends. An effective criminal justice system that ensures rigorous investigation and fair adjudication of suspected homicide offenders is a pre-requisite for upholding the rule of law and achieving justice for homicide victims, while, conversely, the impunity of perpetrators can actually contribute to the perpetration of more homicides.

The efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice response can be measured by a number of indicators, such as homicide cases solved by the police, persons arrested for and persons convicted of homicide. These indicators are quantitative, however, and data of this type do not provide information about fundamental qualitative aspects of criminal justice administration, such as the

quality of investigations, the right to legal aid, the fairness of procedures or the duration of trials.


At the global level, police forces tend to respond promptly to homicide offences, to the extent that in a little over 60 per cent of cases they are able to identify and arrest one or several suspects for a particular homicide, allowing the case to be turned over to the prosecution service. Significant regional disparities do, however, exist: 80 and 85 per cent, respectively, of homicide cases are “cleared” in this way in Asia and Europe, and some 50 per cent in the Americas.

An important indication of the criminal justice response to homicide is the conviction rate, which, at the global level, leads to 43 perpetrators being convicted for every 100 victims of intentional homicide. However, disparities across regions are even greater than in the case of the clearance rates mentioned above, with a conviction rate of 24 per 100 victims in the Americas, 48 in Asia and 81 in Europe.

The level of impunity for homicide in the Americas is thus rather high, which may be partly due to the fact that the region’s high intensity of homicide is a drain on criminal justice resources. Moreover, homicides in the Americas are often connected to organized crime or gang activity, which usually have lower clearance and conviction rates in comparison to other homicide typologies like intimate partner/family-related homicide, or other types of interpersonal homicide. The downward trend in the conviction rate in the Americas in recent years is particularly alarming as rising homicide trends since 2007 have not been paralleled by similar levels of convictions, meaning that impunity related to homicide has grown in the Americas in recent years.

Homicide and violence also play an important role in the final stage of the criminal justice process. Irrespective of their different levels of homicide, the share of homicide offenders among the total prison population is not markedly different across regions: in Europe and the Americas it is between 7 and 10 per cent, whereas it is slightly lower in Asia (4 per cent). In terms of overall prison populations, shares of homicide offenders are conspicuous and they pose specific management challenges to prison administrations. For example, in countries with available data in the Americas, the homicide rate per 100,000 prisoners is three times higher than the homicide rate in the general population.

Persons suspected and persons convicted per 100 homicides, by region (2011 or latest year)



Note: Data on three countries in Africa and Oceania are included in the global total but not shown separately.
Source: UN-CTS.

Throughout this study, examples of policy and legislation are offered to demonstrate the effectiveness and impact of targeted intervention programmes and strategies for preventing and reducing homicide at various levels. For example, global treaties such as the Arms Trade Treaty, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in April 2013 and aims to regulate and improve the regulation of the global trade in conventional arms in order to prevent, disrupt and eradicate the illicit trade in such weapons, are enacted by the international community to contribute to the prevention of lethal violence.

At the national level, firearm and knife legislation restricting availability, accessibility and use has been implemented in various countries with varying degrees of success in preventing or reducing homicides committed with such weapons. Municipal policies, including those restricting the opening hours of premises licensed to sell alcohol, and others monitoring the victims of intimate partner/family-related violence, have proved effective at

reducing the number of homicides in the areas in which they have been implemented. Furthermore, policing strategies implemented at the neighbourhood level have also demonstrated great success in targeting violence “hot spots” and in improving community safety.

Data challenges

Policies and prevention strategies like those mentioned above benefit from the collection of reliable data and the analysis of homicide and other crime statistics, which deepen the understanding of the drivers of violence and can inform policymakers about how best to direct limited resources towards tackling violent crime.

The *Global Study on Homicide 2013* is based on the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset, compiled from a variety of national and international sources, covering 219 countries and territories. These data are derived from either criminal justice or public health systems, each of which records data on intentional homicide in different ways. As a result, data are of differing validity, accuracy, international comparability and coverage, but this study emphasizes the strengths of both sources.

Since the publication of the *Global Study on Homicide 2011*, there has been an improvement in the availability of data on intentional homicide. The number of countries and territories for which consistent data on the number of homicide victims, as well as the breakdown by age, sex, mechanism of killing and the context in which the homicide occurred, has increased and a longer time series is available in many cases. There is, however, more work to be done to continue this improvement.

Ongoing methodological work to develop the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS) will provide, for the first time, an internationally agreed definition and classification of intentional homicide, and therefore guide the production of homicide data by national statistical systems. At the national level, further efforts will be needed to coordinate and harmonize the production of homicide statistics by all relevant stakeholders, from both the criminal justice and public health sector.

The progress made over the last decade in producing and collecting data on homicide has made it possible for such data to be widely used to monitor security and crime at the global, regional and national levels. Further and focused efforts, espe-

cially in parts of Africa, Asia and Oceania, are now necessary to fill remaining gaps.

Chapter by chapter

The study is structured into six chapters, as well as two annexes that present the methodology and data, and a comprehensive list of references for each chapter.

Chapter 1 provides a snapshot of intentional homicide from the global to the sub-national level, as well as from the perspective of age and sex, and homicide trends from 1955 to the present day.

Chapter 2 posits a classification of homicide that splits homicide into three distinct typologies in order to shed light on different forms of violent crime: homicide related to other criminal activities; homicide related to interpersonal conflict; and homicide related to socio-political agendas.

Chapter 3 analyses homicide mechanisms and enablers by looking at various weapons and the role of psychoactive substances. It also presents an overview of the systemic violence associated with illicit drug markets.

Chapter 4 looks at homicide and violence in countries with recent experience of conflict so as to provide insight into the challenges associated with the legacy of violence and to understand the role of the different homicide typologies in such settings.

Chapter 5 focuses on the response of the criminal justice system to homicide in terms of cases solved by the police, persons arrested for and persons convicted of homicide. It also looks into homicide in prison settings.

Chapter 6 presents the challenges faced when researching homicide, particularly in relation to the availability, quality and comparability of homicide data.



1. THE BIG PICTURE

This chapter provides a snapshot of intentional homicide through an increasingly focused lens. Beginning at the global level and ending at the sub-national level, it subsequently looks at homicide from the perspective of age and sex before analysing homicide trends from 1955 to the present. Whether across regions, sub-regions and countries, age and sex groups, and even over time, the picture of homicide it reveals is one of marked contrasts.

The global and regional picture


UNODC estimates that deaths resulting from intentional homicide amounted to a total of 437,000¹ at the global level in 2012. The largest share of those was registered in the Americas (36 per cent) and large shares were also recorded in Africa and Asia (31 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively). Europe (5 per cent) and Oceania (0.3 per cent) accounted for the lowest shares of homicide by region.

Between 2010 and 2012 the number of homicide victims decreased by 11-14 per cent in Oceania and Europe, and increased by 8.5 per cent in the Americas, yet the fact that UNODC's 2012 global estimate is lower than its previous estimate in 2010 (468,000 victims) is almost entirely due to methodological revisions of the estimation procedure²

1 The global count of victims of intentional homicide, based on sources available at the country level, varies between a low estimate of 324,000 victims and a high estimate of 518,000 victims (see Methodological annex for more information on the calculation of estimate intervals).

2 Due to a lack of national data on homicides in many African countries and a number of countries in Asia, UNODC makes use of estimates produced by the World Health Organization (WHO). Such data result from indirect estimation methods of the number of deaths resulting from all causes, including homicide (see Methodological annex for further information). These methods were substantially reviewed by the WHO to

Fig. 1.1: Total number of homicides, by region (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). The bars represent total homicide counts based on the source selected at the country level, with low and high estimates derived from total counts based on additional sources existing at the country level.

of homicide victims in Africa and some countries in Asia.

The total estimated number of homicides in 2012 leads to an average global homicide rate of 6.2 per 100,000 population (see figure 1.2).³ But disparities in regional homicide rates are large and clearly point to a high intensity of homicidal violence in the Americas, whereas in Asia, Europe and Oceania, homicide rates fall below the global average.

produce the 2012 estimates.

3 The global homicide rate is provided with an interval estimate, with a low estimate of 4.6 and a high estimate of 7.4 victims of homicide per 100,000 population.

Criminal justice versus public health sources

Data on homicide stem predominantly from two main types of source. “Criminal justice” data on homicide are typically recorded by the police, based on information collected when they receive or investigate details about a crime. Depending on national legislation and practices, data on homicide can be directly generated by police forces or public prosecutors. “Public health” data reflect information collected by the public health or medical service of a country and, at the global level, from a dataset produced by the World Health Organization (WHO). In countries with accurate registration systems, the two sources provide very similar results, but discrepancies do exist where coverage and quality of administrative records are poor. UNODC homicide estimates are built by selecting a source at the country level as the basis for sub-regional, regional and global estimates (see Methodological annex). The discrepancy between criminal justice and public health data is used to create the high-low estimates represented by the range intervals in the graphs depicting regional homicide counts and rates.


The sub-regional and national picture

With averages of over 25 victims per 100,000 population, Southern Africa and Central America are the sub-regions with the highest homicide rates on record, followed by South America, Middle Africa and the Caribbean, with average rates of between 16 and 23 homicides per 100,000 population (see figure 1.3). This sub-regional picture has hardly changed since 2011. Likewise, as discussed later in this chapter, the fact that homicide rates are significantly higher in the Americas in comparison to other regions is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, according to available time series since 1955, the Americas have consistently experienced homicide levels five to eight times higher than those in Europe or Asia (see figure 1.17, page 35).

In addition to the entire region of Oceania, sub-regions with relatively low rates of homicide (less than 3 per 100,000 population) include all the sub-regions of Europe (with the exception of Eastern Europe, which has a medium rate of homicide) and Eastern Asia.

Sub-regional averages can, however, hide disparities in homicide rates at the national level. As map 1.1 demonstrates, for example, countries in the southern part of South America, such as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, have considerably lower levels of homicide than countries further north, such as Brazil, Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Asia are other examples of sub-regions that show large disparities at the national level (see figure 1.5). For example, in the former, though

Fig. 1.2: Homicide rates, by region (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). The bars represent population-weighted homicide rates based on the source selected at the country level, with low and high estimates derived from homicide rates based on additional sources existing at the country level.

decreasing, the Russian Federation has a homicide rate slightly less than double the sub-regional average (9.2 versus 5.8 per 100,000 population); in the latter, the Philippines has a homicide rate slightly more than double the sub-regional average (8.8 versus 4.3 per 100,000 population).


Countries with high levels of homicide bear a disproportionately heavy burden of homicide, as they are home to only 11 per cent of the 2012 global population yet they account for 46 per cent of all homicide victims (200,000 homicides out of a population of 750 million). This means that three quarters of a billion people live in countries with serious security concerns, all of which are located in either Africa or the Americas (see figure 1.4). Some of those countries actually have very high homicide rates, above 30 per 100,000 population, which are higher than rates of conflict-related killings in some conflict zones. For example, in 2012, the rates of intentional homicide and of civilian casualties were 6.5 and 9.3⁴ per 100,000 population in Afghanistan, and 8.0 and 10.0⁵ per 100,000 in Iraq, both situations of ongoing conflict. Even when combining these two rates, the levels of killings recorded in both countries in 2012 were well below 30 per 100,000 population.⁶

4 Based on United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). *Afghanistan 2013 Annual Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*.

5 Based on data from United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Division.


6 Rates of intentional homicide and of civilian casualties are not directly comparable in both Afghanistan and Iraq, since a cer-

Fig. 1.3: Homicide rates, by sub-region (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). The bars represent population-weighted homicide rates based on the source selected at the country level, with low and high estimates derived from homicide rates based on additional sources existing at the country level.

Map 1.1: Homicide rates, by country or territory (2012 or latest year)




Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).


tain degree of overlap between the two respective counts may exist (i.e. certain killings can be counted both as intentional homicide and as civilian casualties).

Fig. 1.4: Homicide victims and population, by countries' level of homicide per 100,000 population (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Fig. 1.5: Homicide rates at the national level, selected countries, by sub-region (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Accounting for security and justice in the post-2015 development agenda

As their impact goes far beyond the loss of human life and can create a climate of fear and uncertainty, intentional homicide and violent crime represent a threat to civilian security, which is additional to any threat caused by violence stemming from armed conflict. There is increasing evidence that a lack of security, which is often associated with a weak criminal justice system, can block the path to development of countries and their populations. Indeed, statistical evidence indicates that countries with low homicide rates tend to attain higher levels of human development.^a

After the landmark experience of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) — the global framework for development in the 2000-2015 period — the international community is now engaged in the elaboration of the political and analytical basis for the post-2015 development agenda. The inclusion of security and justice in the new development framework, as seen in the broader context of the rule of law, has been recognized and promoted by the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda,^b the Rio+20 declaration^c and the United Nations General Assembly, as well as a variety of other initiatives.^d

Member States will soon define the political agenda and the goals that will form the basis of the post-2015 development agenda. If security and justice are to be part of the agenda, appropriate metrics are needed to create the evidence-based understanding of trends. To that end, a framework based on a shortlist of targets and a basket of indicators is needed. Those indicators could be selected on the basis of their applicability in international or specific national contexts, data availability and measurability of the relevant indicator, as well as the ability to demonstrate progress in a particular dimension of justice or security.^e Among existing ways to measure progress in security and justice, intentional homicide indicators could provide an important measure because of their potential for analysis relating to dimensions of security, including armed and gender-based violence, and their high degree of statistical feasibility. Homicide is the most readily measurable, clearly defined and most comparable indicator for measuring violent deaths around the world.^f

a See, for example, World Bank (2011). *World Development Report*; and UNODC (2011). *Global Study on Homicide*.

b High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2013).

c United Nations General Assembly (2012). A/RES/68/288; United Nations General Assembly (2013). A/RES/68/188.

d See, for example, Muggah, R. and G. Milante (2013); and Saferworld (2013).

e For more, see UNODC (2013a). *Accounting for security and justice in the post-2015 development agenda*.

f For example, in UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013), time series since 1995 are currently available for 106 countries, while time series data for nine African countries from 2004 are available.

By almost symmetrical contrast to the situation in countries with high homicide rates, 42 per cent of the global population lives in countries with low homicide rates that account for only 8 per cent of global homicide victims (34,000 victims out of a population of 2.9 billion).


The sub-national picture

Just as regional and sub-regional homicide rates and trends can disguise variations in levels of homicide at the national level, trends in national homicide rates can also mask differences at the sub-national level that are important from a policy and prevention perspective. For example, so-called homicide “hot spots”, which drive increases or changes in overall aggregated rates of homicide, can remain hidden in the overall national rate of homicide, which is why it is also important to bring homicide at the local level into focus.

Known factors that influence levels of lethal violence can have different manifestations at the local level. They include risk factors like unemployment, poor standards of education, the presence of youth gangs and organized crime, poverty and inequality, and accessibility to firearms, but also protective factors that may be enhanced through the implementation of prevention policies. These factors can lead to very different outcomes in terms of violence and crime, since they operate in different areas and in different ways within any given country.

Sub-national data are not available for all countries, but for those countries that do have such data, sub-national variations are particularly visible in the Americas, as well as in countries in other regions, such as India, the Russian Federation and South Africa (see map 1.2).

Map 1.2: Homicide rates at the sub-national level (2012 or latest year)




Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Brazil: Stability in the national homicide rate masks disparities at the sub-national level

Map 1.3: Percentage change in sub-national homicide rates, Brazil (2007-2011)




A good example of stability in a country's national homicide rate disguising disparities in homicide rates within its territory is Brazil, where, although the national homicide rate has changed little over the last 30 years, there have been significant changes within its different states. Homicide rates have declined in the States (and cities) of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, but they have risen in other parts of the country, particularly the north and north-east. As homicides in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo States decreased (by 29 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively) from 2007 to 2011, the homicide rate increased by almost 150 per cent in Paraiba and by half in Bahia.* An exception to these trends is the north-eastern State of Pernambuco, which experienced a decrease in its homicide rate during that time period, though it is still at a high level.

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

* Ministry of Justice, Brazil (2012). *Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública*.

Source: Ministry of Justice, Brazil (2012).

Map 1.4: Homicide rates at the sub-national level, Europe (2012 or latest year)

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries.

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Countries in Europe have some of the lowest homicide rates in the world, but sub-national data can paint some interesting pictures within those countries and in certain trans-border regions (see map 1.4). The most significant differences lie in the west-to-east geographical distribution of homicide, as homicide rates increase eastwards across Europe, and there are also higher homicide rates in certain parts of Northern Europe. Available data indicate that this phenomenon is associated with patterns of alcohol consumption (see chapter 3), among other factors.


While homicide rates are generally low in the rest of Europe, certain spots with consistently higher homicide rates over time can be noted. At the national level, they include Albania and Montenegro. Sub-nationally they can be found in the Algarve, the southernmost part of Portugal, which has a homicide rate of 2.5 per 100,000; in the southern tip of Italy, whose homicide rate is attributable to the prevalence of Mafia-related killings (see chapter 2.1); on the French island of Corsica; and in certain more densely-populated urban areas that have higher homicide rates than the rest of their respective countries, such as Amsterdam, Brussels, Prague and Vienna.

Urban homicide

Urban areas tend to have higher rates of homicide than rural areas, even though cities tend to be home to both homicide risk and protective factors. For example, cities can play host to many of the enablers of homicide, such as high levels of income inequality, the potential for anonymity within a dense population and the existence of gangs or organized criminal groups. But cities are also usually home to numerous factors that can help prevent homicide, such as higher levels of policing, better access to services like medical care and educational facilities, and even infrastructural elements such as street lighting and closed-circuit television, which allow for better monitoring of public safety. The presence of certain protective factors can often offset risk factors, but every city, and indeed every neighbourhood, has unique characteristics that can have an influence on homicide.


The urban nature of homicide is particularly noticeable in Central America, the Caribbean and much of Africa. For example, settlements of more than 50,000 inhabitants record a disproportionate number of homicides in countries in Central America. In Guatemala, 68 per cent of all

Fig. 1.6: National and capital city homicide rates, selected countries, Eastern Europe (2004-2011)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Fig. 1.7: Homicide rates, by region and by sex (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

homicides in 2008 took place in such settlements, which housed 58 per cent of the population, while in El Salvador, 63 per cent of all homicides in 2010 took place in such settlements, which housed 51 per cent of the population.⁷ In many cities in the Americas, high levels of the aforementioned risk factors converge and, given the concentration of homicide in large cities and particular sub-national areas, there is a resulting need to develop locally-oriented policies to target those risk factors and implement protective factors that specifically address those needs.

⁷ Nowak, M. (2012). *Urban Armed Violence, Research Note 23, Small Arms Survey.*

By contrast, some countries have higher national average homicide rates than their largest cities (see Statistical annex). For example, in selected countries in Eastern Europe, this phenomenon is also visible as a trend across time. Available data for four countries and their capital cities demonstrate that, from 2004 to 2011, the largest urban areas had homicide rates considerably lower than the national rate (see figure 1.6). An explanation could be that it is an inverted reflection of the situation regarding risk and protective factors in cities, in that rural areas often have lower levels of policing and less access to health and social services than cities. They also tend to be further from emergency and rescue services, and may be disproportionately affected in periods of social and economic change.⁸

The demographics of homicide victims

Globally, 79 per cent of all homicide victims are male and the global average male homicide rate⁹ is, at 9.7 per 100,000, almost four times the global average female rate (2.7 per 100,000 females). Both Africa and the Americas have male and female homicide rates above the global average, but the Americas has the highest male homicide rate, while Africa has the highest female homicide rate (see figure 1.7).


As maps 1.5 and 1.6 demonstrate, male homicide rates are consistently higher than female homicide rates in every country across the world. Yet, as discussed in chapter 2.2, some countries in Eastern Asia and Europe are nearing gender parity in terms of the share of victims killed, though many of those countries do have particularly low rates of both male and female homicide.

Probably due to regional differences in the prevalence of different homicide typologies, the age-related picture changes across regions. However, the 15-29 and 30-44 age groups account for the vast majority of homicides globally, with 43 per cent of all homicide victims aged 15-29 and 30 per cent aged 30-44.

It is in the Americas that the greatest concentration of victims is aged 15-29, both male and female. At the sub-regional level, the homicide rate for male victims aged 15-29 in South America and Central


⁸ For more, see Kaylen, M.T. (2012), in *Handbook of European Homicide Research: Patterns, Explanations and Country Studies.*

⁹ The male homicide rate is calculated based on a population of 100,000 males, while the female homicide rate is based on a population of 100,000 females.

Map 1.5: Male homicide rate, by country or territory (2012 or latest year)

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).


Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Map 1.6: Female homicide rate, by country or territory (2012 or latest year)

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Fig. 1.8: Global homicide rate, by sex and age group (2012 or latest year)




Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

America is more than four times the global average rate for that age group, which may be due to higher levels of gang-related homicide in the Americas than in other regions (see chapter 2.1). To put this into perspective, more than one in seven (15 per cent) homicide victims globally is a young male between 15 and 29 years of age living in the Americas (see figure 1.9).

In contrast to the regional average, the 30-44 age group in Central America and the Caribbean is at a higher risk of homicide than other age groups. For example, in El Salvador, Honduras and Jamaica, the male homicide rate in the 30-44 age group is higher than in the 15-29 age group and while the number of victims is greater in the 15-29 male age group, the rate indicates that the homicide risk for males aged 30-44 is higher (see figure 1.10).¹⁰ In Honduras, this means that almost 1 in every 280 males in the 30-44 age group falls victim to intentional homicide every year, compared to 1 in 360 males aged 15-29. The impact of this dynamic can be devastating for security and the economy, as the deaths of males in the older of the two age groups can have a disproportionate impact on families, the working population and perceptions of security.

In Europe, males aged 30-44 and 45-59 have a higher risk of falling victim to homicide than their younger counterparts (see figure 1.11). This difference may be explained by the relatively greater


Fig. 1.9: Percentage distribution of homicide victims, by sex and selected age groups (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

¹⁰ This is due to the population structure of those countries, which have a high proportion of youth aged 15-29, meaning that the denominator is a larger number for the younger age group when calculating rates by age group.

Fig. 1.10: Male homicide rate, by age group, selected countries, Americas (2012 or latest year)




Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

importance of interpersonal homicide than homicide related to other criminal activities in Europe (see chapter 2.2), as well as other risk factors such as alcohol consumption. By contrast, the pattern for female homicide victims remains quite stable throughout the older age groups in Europe, although women aged 30 and above are at a slightly higher risk than younger women. The uniformity of homicide rates for female victims aged 30 and above in Europe may be related to their exposure to the risk of intimate partner/family-related homicide, which disproportionately affects women (see chapter 2.2).

The pattern of older age groups being more at risk of homicide applies to a range of countries in Asia, Europe and Oceania (see figure 1.12). For example, in selected sample countries with available sex and age data, over three quarters of homicide victims are aged 30 and above, which largely holds for both male and female victims. However, within sub-regions there are outliers that have significantly different homicide age profiles from their neighbouring States. For example, over 90 per cent of male homicide victims in Hungary are aged 30 and above, whereas the share in Eastern Europe as a whole is 75 per cent.


At the youngest end of the age spectrum, 36,000 children under the age of 15 were the victims of homicide at the global level in 2012. Equating to

Fig. 1.11: Homicide rates, by sex and age group, Europe (2012 or latest year)




Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Fig. 1.12: Percentage distribution of homicide victims, by sex and age group, selected countries (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Fig. 1.13: Homicide rates of males and females aged 0-14, by region (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

8.2 per cent of all homicide victims, this coupled with the share of victims in the 15-29 age group means that more than half of all global homicide victims are under 30 years of age.

At the global level, the sex differentials are not as pronounced in the youngest age group as they are in older age groups. At the regional level, homicide rates are fairly similar for boy and girl victims in Asia, Europe and Oceania, whereas some disparities between the sexes are already evident at an early age in the Americas, with boys already being more at risk than girls (see figure 1.13).


Homicide trends

The overall trend in the global homicide rate may be a decreasing one, but it is actually an amalgam of very diverse, sometimes even opposing, regional and sub-regional trends. For example, trend analysis of the last five years shows the stability of homicide rates in much of Asia and Oceania, as well as in all of the sub-regions of Europe, with the exception of Eastern Europe, which has experienced a consistent decrease (see figure 1.14). On the other hand, homicide levels have increased in Eastern and Northern Africa, while the decrease in homicide levels in Southern Africa has also suffered a recent setback. In other sub-regions with relatively high homicide levels, the homicide rate appears to have stabilized in the Caribbean, albeit at a high level; in South America it has fluctuated; and the increasing trend in homicide in Central America has come to a halt.

Africa

Data for trend analysis in Africa are only available for a handful of countries and for a relatively short period of time (since 2004). The limited data available for Northern Africa point to a recent sharp increase in homicide in the sub-region, which is a new and alarming trend largely associated with increased social and political instability, and should be closely monitored. Increases in

Fig. 1.14: Homicide rates, by sub-region (2008-2012)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Note: Number of countries is denoted in brackets. Homicide trends are not available for any country in Central or Western Africa.


homicide rates have also been observed in Eastern Africa, with Kenya and Uganda both showing increases since 2004. Southern Africa has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, but the homicide rate in South Africa decreased steadily between 1995 and 2011 by more than 50 per cent (from 64.9 to 30.0 per 100,000 population), though it experienced a slight increase back to 31 per 100,000 population in 2012 (see figure 1.15). Time series data is only available for a shorter period in other countries, but Lesotho and Namibia have sustained elevated rates of homicide.

Americas

The overall regional increase in homicide in the Americas over the past few years has occurred despite diverging trends in the region's four sub-regions. With the exception of a spike in 2001 caused by the terrorist attacks of September 11, Northern America has experienced a continuous decline in homicide rates that has accelerated in the last five years. South America now has the same homicide rate as in 1995, which is the result of very different trends at the country level. For example, Colombia's homicide rate has been decreasing since 1996 but remains at a very high level, while the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the only country in South America that has had a consistently increasing homicide rate since 1995. Other countries in the region have quite stable homicide rates, but at different levels: Brazil's homicide rate is quite stable and high, while homicide rates in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are stable and lower, which gives them homicide profiles closer to those of European countries.

Central America experienced a declining homicide rate from 1995 to 2004, followed by a marked increase from 2007, often related to drug trafficking and high levels of organized crime-related violence, which has resulted in one of the highest sub-regional homicide rates in the world (26.5 per 100,000 population). Over the last 12 years, the Caribbean has experienced an increase in its homicide rate, whose fluctuations are also linked to changes in drug trafficking patterns and gang violence. Much of the high rate in these sub-regions can be attributed to very high rates of homicide in the "Northern Triangle" (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras), as well as in Jamaica.¹¹ In terms of addressing the escalating levels of violence in Central America and the Caribbean, recent


Fig. 1.15: Homicide rates, by sub-region, selected countries, Africa (2004-2012)



¹¹ See UNODC (2013b). *World Drug Report*; and UNODC (2011). *Global Study on Homicide*.

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Fig. 1.16: Homicide rates, by sub-region (1995-2012)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Lines represent population-weighted average homicide rate.

developments include the decline in El Salvador’s homicide rate by 40 per cent since 2012, following a gang truce in that country (see chapter 2.1).¹² Furthermore, Jamaica’s homicide rate has also decreased by 35 per cent since 2009, which may be attributable to a significant drop in crime-related homicides.¹³

Asia

The homicide rate in Asia has been steadily decreasing since 1995, with significant decreases in the continent’s various sub-regions. Central Asian countries have seen their homicide rates decline, from comparably higher levels, by one to two thirds in the past decade, but an isolated peak occurred in 2010, which coincided with a period of civil unrest in Kyrgyzstan. In Eastern Asia, the sub-region with the lowest homicide rates in the world, Japan and Hong Kong, China have consistently had rates below 1 per 100,000 population. Southern and South-Eastern Asia have also seen an overall decrease in homicidal violence in countries where data are available. The sub-regional rate for South-Eastern Asia peaked in 2003 due to an increase in Thailand associated with the fight against drug trafficking,¹⁴ while the decreasing trend in the Philippines has also helped drive the decrease in the sub-region’s homicide rate. In Southern Asia, the stability of the homicide rate in the most populous country, India, masks increases in the rates of other countries in the region, notably Afghanistan and Pakistan.


Europe

Homicide levels in Europe have decreased or remained stable at low rates in many countries over the time period in question, with the exception of the 1997 spike in Albania during a period of civil unrest. Significant developments are most notable in the decline in Eastern Europe’s homicide rate, driven largely by the rate’s decline in the Russian Federation since 2001. The improvement in socio-economic conditions in many Eastern European countries is likely to have contributed to the continual decrease in homicide rates in the sub-region. This phenomenon can also be seen in Northern Europe, where the Baltic countries have experienced a 50 per cent decline in their homicide rates in the past decade. Homicide rates in other countries in Europe have remained low and steady, and

12 Government of El Salvador (2013).

13 UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

14 Mutebi, A.M. (2004), in *Asian Survey* 44(1).

Fig. 1.17: Homicide rates, selected regions (1955-2012, three-year moving average)

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and WHO Mortality Database.

the sub-regions of Western and Southern Europe have very low rates of homicide, of around 1 per 100,000 population.

Long-term homicide trends

An additional perspective can be gained by situating levels of homicide within a historical context. The analysis of long-term homicide trends is also useful for identifying patterns which, irrespective of fluctuations in the short-to-mid-term, may point to the different drivers of violence in different countries.

Although not indicative of global trends, available data for a selected number of countries provide important insights into homicide levels since 1955 (see figure 1.17). On average, in five countries in the Americas with available data,¹⁵ homicide rates have been consistently and significantly higher than those recorded in European countries. Today, countries in the Americas with homicide rates significantly higher than the global average are revisiting the region's previous experience of lethal violence, whereas the countries in Europe with available data have long-term homicide levels in line with those in the few countries in Asia/Oceania for which trend data are available.

In the period under examination, individual countries followed different trajectories. In the Ameri-

cas, for example, Colombia's long history of violent political conflicts and struggles with organized criminal groups tended to coincide with periods of high homicide rates, especially in the 1950s and 1990s. But those rates have seen a sharp downward turn in the last decade, largely due to increases in stability and prosperity, as well as the decline in the threat from armed criminal and revolutionary groups. On the other hand, the sudden increase in Mexico's homicide rate since 2007 has come after a steadily declining trend, from comparably high levels in the mid-1950s.

The long-term experience of many of the countries in the Americas included here, though very different in levels, trends and timing, still indicates that they have rarely recorded homicide rates lower than 10 per 100,000. But one country in the Americas with a different story to tell is Chile, which has never recorded a homicide rate above 5 per 100,000 population since 1955 and, while the country experienced some peaks in homicide in the late 1960s and early 1970s, its homicide rate has never reached levels recorded elsewhere in the region (see figure 1.18).


The period of stability that most European countries entered after the mid-1950s is reflected in stable and low homicide rates (see figure 1.19), which have usually remained at a very low level (below 2 per 100,000). Some notable exceptions exist, both in terms of peaks recorded by individual countries (France: Algerian war around 1960;

¹⁵ The five countries are Chile, Colombia, Mexico, the United States of America and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Italy: years of terrorism and Mafia-related violence in the early 1980s and early 1990s) as well as in the overall trends of individual countries such as Finland and Hungary, two countries that have had parallel homicide trends but for two periods of major political change that affected Hungary (the civil revolution in 1956 and the regime transition in the early 1990s).


The few countries/territories in Asia and Oceania for which long-term data are available have been characterised by very stable social and economic situations, which are reflected in low homicide levels, although there have been some fluctuations in the case of Hong Kong, China and New Zealand, mostly due to low numbers of homicide victims and small population sizes (see figure 1.20).

Fig. 1.18: Homicide rate, selected countries, the Americas (1955-2012, three-year moving average)




Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and WHO Mortality Database.

Fig. 1.19: Homicide rate, selected countries, Europe (1955-2012, three-year moving average)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and WHO Mortality Database.

Fig. 1.20: Homicide rate, selected countries, Asia and Oceania (1955-2012, three-year moving average)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and WHO Mortality Database.

With no notable fluctuations, the homicide rate in Japan has decreased steadily since 1955 to reach one of the lowest levels in the world. The country's homicide rate is associated with a stable and prosperous society with low inequality and high levels of development. Young Japanese males now commit only a tenth of the homicides committed by their predecessors in 1955, and the age and sex distribution of victims tend to be uniform across age groups.¹⁶ This has been attributed by some researchers to, amongst other factors, extremely low levels of gun ownership (1 in 175 households),¹⁷ a greater chance of detection (according to police data, 98 per cent of homicide cases are solved),¹⁸ the rejection of violence after the Second World War, the growth of affluence without the accompanying concentrations of poverty common in many highly developed countries, and the stigma of arrest for any crime in Japanese society.¹⁹

16 Dai, M. (2013), in *Handbook of Asian Criminology*. P. 18.

17 Johnson, D.T. (2006), in *Social Science Japan Journal* 9.

18 This data includes attempted homicides. Ministry of Justice, Research and Training Institute, Japan (2011).

19 Park, W.K. (2006). *Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective*.



2. THE MANY FACES OF HOMICIDE


The study of why people kill other people is vital from a policy perspective, as without such knowledge it is very difficult to implement appropriate strategies and policies for the prevention and reduction of homicide. A number of homicide types can be identified on the basis of elements such as premeditation, motivation, context, instrumentality and perpetrator-victim relationship, which all play roles of varying magnitudes in different forms of homicide. That said, developing homicide typologies is a complex business, not least because they sometimes overlap and, in real life, homicide drivers can be multiple. Indeed, further research and methodological work is needed to help develop a comprehensive categorization of homicide,¹ but some of its typologies, which are particularly relevant from the crime prevention perspective, can already be identified in the following manner:

- Homicide related to other criminal activities
- Interpersonal homicide
- Socio-political homicide

Homicide related to other criminal activities

The first of the three typologies is homicide committed in relation to other criminal activities that are aimed, directly or indirectly, at obtaining illicit profits. Within such a broad category, two distinct types of homicide can be identified: those commit-

Fig. 2.1: A classification of intentional homicide



ted by organized criminal groups;² and those committed while perpetrating other, more conventional criminal acts such as robbery. Although the main goal of organized criminal groups is to generate illicit profit, they may commit homicide for a variety of reasons, from the elimination of rivals and State representatives, to shows of strength and territorial control. In such cases, homicides are instrumental to achieving longer-term criminal

¹ The International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS), currently under development in a process led by UNODC, will provide tools to build a consistent categorization of intentional homicide.

² An “organized criminal group” is defined by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) as a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences...in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. (See United Nations (2000). *Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, article 2.).

goals and are typically the result of premeditation and purpose. On the other hand, while organized criminal groups may also commit conventional crimes, homicides perpetrated during other criminal acts have different drivers: homicide does not represent the primary goal of most criminals, though it may be perpetrated in order to accomplish the original crime and/or avoid detection.

Interpersonal homicide

Central to the definition of the second homicide typology is the fact that homicide is not instrumental to the accomplishment of a secondary goal, but is rather a means of resolving a conflict and/or punishing the victim through violence when relationships come under strain (including from friction due to social and cultural norms). The two main categories in this typology are homicide related to intimate partner or family relationships, in which victim and perpetrator are relatives, share the same household and/or an intimate relationship; and other interpersonal homicide, in which the victim and perpetrator may or may not know each other. The relationship in intimate partner/family-related homicide is distinguished from the relationship in the other interpersonal homicide category by the level of emotional attachment and other links, often of an economic or legal nature, between victim and perpetrator. Homicides within this typology can be the result of a premeditated design or of a random act of violence, but the nature of the relationship between perpetrator and victim is a fundamental feature of this crime. Straddling the divide between the private and public spheres, much of this type of violence is attributed to the very nature of coexisting with and among others.

Socio-political homicide

The third typology encompasses homicides that originate in the public sphere and are typically committed as an instrument for advancing social or political agendas. Power relationships, including among social, ethnic and political groups, are involved and homicide is committed in order to exert influence over those relationships, whether directly or indirectly. People are killed for what they represent and/or for the message that such killings can convey to the general public or to specific sub-sectors. In contrast to interpersonal homicide, the victims of this typology are often anonymous to its perpetrators, or at least the nature of the relationship between them is not a consideration in the decision to kill. Often the

result of premeditation and organization, homicides of this type include those resulting from acts of terrorism and hate crime, amongst many others. War and conflict-related killings are also considered acts of socio-political violence, but are not included in this category as they are outside the realm of intentional homicide.

Homicide typologies: data challenges and regional patterns

Just as countries are affected by different types of violence, the three homicide typologies affect a country's overall homicide rate in different ways. Global analysis of such differences is hampered by insufficient statistical information as not many countries produce or disseminate data on motives for homicide, and important differences exist as to the criteria used for determining motivation when they do. This makes it difficult to identify homicide drivers and the relative prevalence of each of the homicide typologies in a comprehensive manner, whether at the country or regional level.

Where data is available, different types of homicide can be linked to the differences in homicide levels between some regions. For example, homicide related to other criminal activities seems to be largely a phenomenon in the Americas, with 30 per cent of homicides in the region being linked to organized crime or gangs. In five countries with available trend data in the sub-regions of Central America and the Caribbean, homicide linked to other criminal activities drives overall national homicide rates.

While homicide linked to robbery is a very stable share of all homicides (about 5 per cent of all homicides in the Americas, Europe and Oceania each year), homicides linked to gangs or organized crime tend to be more variable over time and more diverse across countries. This suggests that organized crime or gang-related homicides can produce sudden changes in the homicide level of a given country; an example being the sharp (40 per cent) decline in homicides in El Salvador in the course of a single year (see chapter 2.1), or the rapid increase in the homicide rate in Central America between 2007 and 2011. Those most at risk from this type of homicide are males, particularly young males aged 15-29 in the Americas.

By contrast, intimate partner/family-related homicide affects every region and country across the globe, accounting for one in seven (14 per cent) of all homicides in 2012. Although its intensity is


greater in the Americas, this type of homicide accounts for a greater share of total homicides in Asia, Europe and Oceania. Unlike other types of killing, it disproportionately affects women: two thirds of all victims of this type of homicide are women, and almost half (47 per cent) of all female victims of homicide are killed by their intimate partners or family members. Those most at risk from this type of homicide are adult women aged 30 and over.

Other types of interpersonal homicide may include those resulting from conflicts relating to issues such as property disputes or revenge-type killings, or even from random acts that may be solely the result of the victim being in the wrong place at the

wrong time. From limited available data, it appears that other interpersonal-type homicides occur at all latitudes, though for different reasons (such as land disputes or urban violence).

Very limited statistical information is available on killings motivated by social or political agendas (such as hate crimes or acts of terrorism). This typology of homicide can represent a substantive share of total homicides in specific contexts or regions, such as in post-conflict settings or countries experiencing social, economic or political upheaval. However, national definitions and recording practices may differ substantially and determine if and how such homicides are reflected in statistics.³

Fig. 2.2: Shares of homicide, by typology, selected countries (2001-2012)



Source: UNODC elaboration of data from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (2008-2011); UNODC elaboration of data from the Sección de Estadística, Departamento de Planificación, Costa Rica (2013); National Crime Records Bureau, India, (2001-2012); European Homicide Monitor (2003-2006).

³ Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013).

A sample of countries with available data on homicide by type (see figure 2.2) illustrates that the proportions of homicide related to the various typologies can differ greatly across countries and regions. Homicides related to other criminal activities make up the vast majority of homicides in Jamaica and less than half of all homicides in Costa Rica. The share of interpersonal homicides is high in selected European countries and in India, but a large share of unknown homicide contexts leaves room for uncertainty.

As demonstrated by the variety of regional and national experiences analysed in this study, there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to tackling homicide. Better understanding of motivations, contexts and relationships between perpetrators and victims will facilitate targeted strategies and policies to decrease homicide around the world.

2.1 HOMICIDE RELATED TO OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

Due to its direct impact on public security, homicide committed by “professional” criminals often attracts the full attention of law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system. But the relationship between other criminal activities, particularly the most clandestine among them, and homicidal violence is not a straightforward one. Homicides committed while perpetrating other crimes such as robbery (homicide is not the primary goal) show constant trends and levels across regions, while trends and levels of homicides related to organized criminal groups (homicide is instrumental and premeditated) vary over time and by region.

The share of homicides related to organized criminal groups out of total homicides is highest in the Americas and lowest in Asia. In developed countries with low homicide rates, homicides related to organized criminal groups are stable or decreasing, whereas they are on the increase in countries with high homicide rates. Also of note is the extreme gender bias towards male victims in homicides related to organized criminal groups. In the Americas, for example, 96 per cent of the victims of this type of homicide are male.

Organized crime/gang-related homicide

When looking at proportions of homicides related to gangs and organized criminal groups (according to national police statistics from several countries

Organized criminal group or gang?


Significant efforts have been made to distinguish between organized criminal groups, gangs and drug trafficking groups.³ They frequently overlap and it is often difficult to draw a distinction between them due to the heterogeneity and dynamics of the phenomena in different regions. Much of the debate centres on the degree of organization or sophistication in the operations of the group and how such groups use violence. Gangs are thought to be less sophisticated than organized criminal groups and to focus their use of violence on short-term, more tactical goals and delinquency, whereas organized criminal groups are characterized as profit-driven, relatively sophisticated criminal enterprises that use violence strategically in order to further their goals and to assert power. Despite the use of violence being a key characteristic of organized criminal groups, it is preferably used as a last resort, as violence tends to draw attention to their operations. Organized criminal groups aim to keep a low profile in order to protect their illicit activities from law enforcement attention, but will use violence instrumentally to protect their interests.

³ The *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* (2000) provides a definition of an organized criminal group (see article 2). For a more in-depth look at the theoretical distinctions between these groups, see also UNODC (2011). *Global Study on Homicide*. P. 48.

in three regions), a relatively clear pattern emerges. The median proportion of organized crime/gang-related homicides is highest in the Americas and lowest in Asia (see figure 2.1.1), though these figures should be interpreted with caution because of the existence of different criteria in the classification of homicides linked to organized crime.⁴ Moreover, the fact that organized crime/gang-related homicides are more prevalent in the Americas does not necessarily mean that organized crime or gangs are more prevalent there than in Europe or Asia. Rather, violence is often linked to competition between involved parties, such as organized criminal groups, or between them and the State, with regard to control over territory or illicit activities, including trafficking. Such groups in the Americas may be experiencing higher levels

⁴ The attribution of homicide to “organized crime” or “gang” depends on national penal legislation, practices by law enforcement agencies and accuracy in compiling statistics. For example, in one country, a homicide is defined as gang-related if the suspect is known to be a gang member, while in another country, the classification can be related to crime-scene criteria such as the modalities of killing, weapon used, number of perpetrators, etc.

Fig. 2.1.1: Percentage of organized crime/gang-related homicides out of total homicides, by region (2011 or latest year)



Note: The bars refer to the median percentage of homicides involving gangs or organized criminal groups, with the low and high estimates derived from the first and third percentage quartiles within each region.

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).


of conflict with each other, or with the State, than organized criminal groups in other regions, which, though they may also be active, may have reached a level of stability or control over their territory and resources that does not generate the same level of visible violence.

Across the world, trends in organized crime/gang-related homicide vary considerably. In selected developed countries (see figure 2.1.2), in a framework of relatively low homicide rates,⁵ the trend in such killings has been quite stable and slowly decreasing, and rates of organized crime/gang-related killings have decreased to below 0.3 per 100,000 population since 2006. In Italy, there has been a 50 per cent decline in this type of homicide since 2007, with organized crime-related rates of homicide decreasing from 0.2 to less than 0.1 per 100,000 population.

The picture is different in Central America and the Caribbean (see figure 2.1.3) where, in a context of high homicide levels, countries reporting on homicides linked to gangs and organized criminal groups often show increasing trends, particularly the Bahamas, Belize, El Salvador and Honduras.

⁵ The group of developed countries considered here has an average homicide rate below 0.8 per 100,000, with the exception of the United States, which in the last five years has had an average homicide rate of 4.9 per 100,000 population. (UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013)).


Fig. 2.1.2: Rate of organized crime/gang-related homicide, selected developed countries (2005-2011)




Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Levels of violence related to organized criminal groups and gangs have been linked to a variety of different dynamics across different countries. For example, while some countries in Central America and the Caribbean have had a strong presence of

Fig. 2.1.3: Rate of organized crime/gang-related homicide, selected countries, Central America and the Caribbean (2005-2011)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Fig. 2.1.4: Number of homicides in Italy, by Mafia-type association (1992-2012)

Source: Massari, M. (2013); Small Arms Survey; Ministry of Interior, Transcrime, Italy (2013).

organized criminal groups and gangs for years, the surge in homicide levels in Central America in recent years is largely a result of violence related to the control of drug trafficking routes, to turf wars between criminal groups and to conflict between organized criminal groups and the State.

Italy: Mafia-related crime

Although many of their activities take place outside the law, from the perspective of organized criminal groups, these activities are still business activities. As in conventional business, the main goal of organized criminal groups is to maximize their profits, which means being pragmatic and adaptable, particularly in terms of the amount of attention they draw from law enforcement agencies. The term “pax mafiosa” has been used to refer to situations when organized criminal groups maximize their efforts to avoid the use of violence, which can result in low levels of violent crime even though levels of other crime may be high. Indeed, the relationship between organized criminal groups and homicidal violence is not symmetrical and though a high level of violence caused by organized criminal groups is a clear indicator of their presence, a lack of such violence is more difficult to interpret.

A case in point is Italy, where the story of organized crime-related homicide is not only one of declining trends, but also of varying relationships between crime and the presence of Mafia-type associations.⁶ Despite having fallen by over 80 per

cent from 1992 to 2012 (see figure 2.1.4), Mafia-related homicides currently make up a significant proportion (approximately 10-15 per cent) of all homicides in Italy. In 2012, there were 70 reported Mafia-related homicides, all of which occurred in the southern regions of Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily, where Mafia-type associations are traditionally considered to have a foothold.⁷

A declining rate of Mafia-related killings does not mean, per se, that Mafia-type associations are necessarily loosening their grip in certain Italian regions. Such organizations typically operate in a covert manner, thus the assessment of the scope and intensity of their activities is extremely challenging. However, by using a number of direct and indirect indicators, a composite indicator of the presence of Mafia-type associations has been recently proposed. Using four variables to cover different dimensions of Mafia activity, including persons charged for being associated with the Mafia and assets confiscated from organized criminal groups, the “Mafia Index”⁸ measures the pres-

association ties, and of the resulting conditions of submission and silence (*omertà*), to commit criminal offences, to directly and indirectly acquire management or control of economic activities, licences, authorizations, public contracts and services, or to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or any other person, or with a view to preventing or limiting the freedom to vote, or getting votes for themselves or other persons, on the occasion of an election (Government of Italy (1930). *Italian Criminal Code, Article 416. Association to commit crimes*).

⁷ ISTAT, Italy (2012).

⁸ Ministry of Interior, Transcrime, Italy (2013). The Mafia Index is a composite index that measures the presence of Mafia-type associations in Italy, by covering various dimensions of a Mafia organization. Those dimensions include persons charged for Mafia associations, Mafia-related murders,

⁶ In Italy, an association is said to be of a “Mafia-type” when the participants take advantage of the intimidating power of the

ence of Mafia-type associations at the provincial level in Italy. By mapping the presence and activities of Mafia-type associations, it indicates that the infiltration of such groups is not limited to southern Italy, as areas in the centre and north of the country also show signs of Mafia activity (see map 2.1.1).⁹

Mafia-related homicides are still concentrated in areas where there is a strong Mafia presence (high Mafia Index). But while there is generally a link between homicide and organized criminal groups, there are areas with a significant presence of Mafia-type associations without Mafia-related homicides. As such, provinces with high levels of Mafia-related homicides have a high Mafia presence, but a high Mafia presence does not necessarily result in organized crime-related homicides.


El Salvador: the gang “truce” and decreasing homicide rates

The experience of Italy shows that organized crime-related homicide is not just a function of the presence of organized crime per se. In contrast to other types of homicide, trends in organized crime-related homicide are exposed to sudden changes as a consequence of power shifts between organized criminal groups, conflicts between those groups or between them and State authorities. But organized criminal groups are clearly also susceptible to the effect of specific policies aimed at fighting or mitigating violence stemming from their activities.

Central America’s gang-related homicides have been driving the extremely high levels of homicide in the sub-region. In El Salvador, major changes in homicidal violence took place after a “truce” between two major gangs was agreed upon in March 2012. The truce, brokered by local government, the international community and religious leaders, had an immediate impact on homicide levels (see figure 2.1.5).¹⁰

The long-term impact of the truce cannot yet be evaluated, but the most welcome effect has been the dramatic drop in the homicide rate. In 2011

Map. 2.1.1: Number of Mafia-related homicides and revised Mafia Index scores, by province (2010-2011)




Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

* Note: A revised Mafia Index, which excludes Mafia-related homicides for the calculation of the Mafia Index at the provincial level, is used in this map.

Source: ISTAT, Italy (2012); Ministry of Interior, Transcrime, Italy (2013).

and January-February 2012, prior to the truce, the average monthly homicide rate was 6.0 per 100,000 population, a value close to the global annual homicide rate, meaning that people were killed at the same rate on a monthly basis in El

Fig. 2.1.5: Monthly homicide rate, El Salvador (2010-2013)



Source: National Police of El Salvador (2013).

city councils that were dissolved for Mafia infiltration, assets confiscated from organized crime, as well as other variables derived from reports of the National Anti-Mafia Department and the Anti-Mafia Investigation Department from 2000-2011.

9 The map is based on a revised Mafia Index, which does not include Mafia-related homicides. This is to avoid autocorrelation effects in the analysis of Mafia-related homicides and Mafia presence, as measured by the Mafia Index.

10 Government of El Salvador (2013).


Salvador as in one year at the global level. After the truce, however, the monthly homicide rate was more than halved (averaging 2.8 per 100,000 population) from March 2012 to February 2013. This sudden reduction provides an indirect quantification of the homicidal violence that could be directly attributed to gang-related conflict in the period before the truce. In parallel with the decline in homicides since the truce, there also appears to have been a slight decline in some other criminal activities, according to data on crime reported (see figure 2.1.6).

For example, levels of extortion, a crime typically associated with gangs, appear to have decreased slightly since the truce but are still extremely high throughout the country, particularly its eastern region (see map 2.1.2).

Despite an overall decline in violent crime rates, especially the homicide rate, the situation remains fluid and fragile. According to surveys in 2012 and 2013, just over 50 per cent of the population felt that the truce had helped to reduce crime,¹¹ suggesting that the benefits of the truce have yet to be perceived by the population with an intensity reflecting the drop in the homicide rate.

Elsewhere in Central America, gang truces have seen mixed results. For example, in Honduras, a truce agreement has been in place since May 2013 but, in contrast to the situation in El Salvador, the


Fig. 2.1.6: Rates of selected crimes, El Salvador (2007-2013)



*Note: Data for 2013 based on data from January-August 2013. Source: National Police of El Salvador (2013).

number of homicides did not decrease in the period immediately following the truce.¹² This may be attributable to differences in the gangs themselves, as gangs in Honduras may be less organized and less hierarchical than those in El Salvador, possibly making it more difficult for gang leaders to impose their will over the various factions.

Map. 2.1.2: Homicide and extortion rates, by department, El Salvador (2011 and 2012)



Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: UNODC elaboration of El Salvador National Police (2013) data.

11 Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica (2013). Data relates to the sum of answers “a lot”, “some” and “a little” to the question “In your opinion, how much has the truce between gangs reduced crime?”

12 Instituto Universitario de Democracia, Paz y Seguridad (2013). In the month following the truce, there were 614 murders, an increase from the 599 murders in the month preceding the truce.


Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: progress in prevention

Brazil has made significant inroads in combating gangs and related violence in recent years. In particular, an innovative programme known as Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Units (UPPs)) has been instituted in favelas, or slums, in Rio de Janeiro, which have become the base of operations for many organized criminal groups and, with competing criminal factions vying for territory, are also traditionally the most violent parts of the city.

UPPs have been instituted in several favelas since 2008/2009 to provide traditional community “proximity” policing, while consolidating State control over those communities and linking them to State social services. As of November 2013, 34 units were in operation in 226 communities, benefiting over 1.5 million people. UPP officials are given specialized education and training, notably in human rights and modern policing techniques, with the aim of taking control back from the gangs and promoting long-term security.^a

Official data attest to a decrease in homicide rates, as well as robbery rates, since the UPP programme began. The trend in homicide incidents was decreasing in the areas now controlled by UPPs prior to their implementation (see figure 2.1.7), but those areas have experienced a continued decline in the number of homicides since the programme commenced and they all show a greater decrease than the one recorded in the city of Rio de Janeiro over the same period of time. It is noteworthy that the number of reported sexual assaults in the same period significantly increased in communities where UPPs operate (by almost 200 per cent). This latter trend may be attributed to higher rates of reporting of those crimes, which may be interpreted as growing trust in the police, or be due to better recording practices.

Fig. 2.1.7: Trend in homicides in UPP areas of operation and the city of Rio de Janeiro, (2007-2012)



Note: Data for UPPs starting in 2009 include Cidade de Deus, Batam, Chapeu Mangueira and Pavao Pavãozinho, as well as for Santa Marta (which commenced 19 December 2008); data for UPPs starting in 2010 include Andaraí, Borel, Formiga, Macacos, Providência, Salgueiro, Tabajaras and Turano; data for UPPs starting in 2011 include Coroa, Falset e Fogueteiro; Escondidinho e Prazeres; Mangueira; São Carlos; and São João Quietos e Matriz.

Source: Instituto de Segurança Pública, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (2013).

There is also broad support for the UPPs from favela residents. For example, 66 per cent of those surveyed in Santa Marta and Cidade de Deus approved of the programme in 2009. In 2010, 93 per cent of people resident in UPP areas felt safer, while 70 per cent of residents of communities without UPPs would have liked to have had the programme implemented in their neighbourhood.^b The installation of UPPs is an important acknowledgement that social inclusion and community development are key components in preventing crime. They facilitate or promote security and access to social services, as well as help create opportunities for social and economic development.

^a United Nations. Human Rights Council (2010). A/HRC/14/24/Add.4. Para. 21.

^b Getulio Vargas Foundation, in United Nations Human Rights Council (2010). Op. Cit. Para. 22.


Conventional crime and homicide

Despite the fact that homicide may be considered a possible outcome of a criminal action, it does not represent the primary goal of the majority of criminals. For that reason, homicides linked to more conventional types of crime such as robbery or

burglary are of a different nature from homicides linked to organized crime, for which homicide can often be a strategic element of its modus operandi.

In 37 countries with available data, roughly 5 per cent of all homicides were linked to robbery in 2012. This percentage holds true for the three

Fig. 2.1.8: Total homicide and homicide linked to robbery rates, selected countries (2005-2011)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and UN-CTS (2013).

regions for which data are available, the Americas, Asia and Europe, where, at 5.2, 5.2 and 5.3 per cent of all homicides, respectively, it is remarkably similar.

When looking at data from a smaller selection of countries for which trend data on homicide linked to robbery are available, the homicide rate generally decreased from 2005 to 2011, as per the global trend, whereas the rate of homicide linked to robbery bucked that trend by remaining stable (see figure 2.1.8). As such, the share of homicides linked to robbery slightly increased from 2005 to 2011. Contrary to fluctuations that are often recorded in trends in organized crime-related homicide, killings during robberies show a higher degree of stability.


Homicide in Latin American cities

Homicide linked to other criminal activities, and particularly to criminal groups, garners significant attention in the Americas, but considerable levels of other types of homicide also exist there. Based on data available for five cities in South America, homicide levels are lowest in the cities of Montevideo (Uruguay) and Santiago (Chile), in the southern part of the sub-region, but the proportion of homicides that the different typologies account for varies considerably. In Santiago, the vast majority of homicides are linked to other criminal activities, while the share of interpersonal homicides is higher in Montevideo. In Quito (Ecuador), the share of homicides attributed to the interpersonal and crime-related typologies are nearly identical^a (see figure 2.1.9).

In those cities, homicides due to assaults and robberies, as well as vengeance-related killings, are considered to be included in the typology of homicide linked to other criminal activities, while interpersonal homicide encompasses homicides resulting from inter-family and inter-couple homicide, femicide, and homicides linked to sexual crimes.

^a Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013).

Fig. 2.1.9: Average share of homicides, by typology; and homicide rates, by selected cities, South America (2008-2011)



Source: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013).

2.2 INTERPERSONAL HOMICIDE

Straddling the divide between the private and public spheres, much of this type of lethal violence is attributed to the very nature of coexisting with others. Central to its definition is the fact that interpersonal homicide is not instrumental to the accomplishment of a secondary goal, but is rather a means of resolving a conflict and/or punishing the victim through violence when relationships come under strain (including from friction due to social and cultural norms).

Its two main sub-types, intimate partner/family-related homicide and homicide related to other interpersonal conflicts are distinguished from each other by the nature of the relationship between perpetrator and victim. This means that in homicides related to intimate partners or family members, the relationship between victim and perpetrator is characterized by an emotional attachment, as well as other links, often of an economic or legal nature, whereas the perpetrator and victim in other interpersonal-related homicide may or may not know each other.

In contrast to the rates of other forms of homicide, which can vary significantly from year to year, the average rate of homicide by intimate partners or family members is relatively stable at the global level, though regional trends can differ remarkably. Although this type of homicide affects people in all regions, it disproportionately affects women to the extent that, in some countries, most female victims of homicide are killed by their intimate partners or family members. Indeed, at the global level, almost half of female homicide victims are killed by their family members or intimate partners, whereas the figure for men is just over 1 in 20 homicide victims. With bitter irony, women run the highest risk of being killed by those who are expected to care for and even protect them.

As clear and consistent data on other types of interpersonal homicide, including property- or revenge-related killings, are less readily available, such a broad category of lethal violence is difficult to examine. A snapshot of mass murder, which spans both types of interpersonal homicide is, however, provided.

Intimate partner/family-related homicide


Conflicts and violence within families and couples contribute significantly to shaping patterns of

homicide.¹³ Given the intimate nature of such relationships, and the daily interaction, stresses and intricacies of emotional, financial and cultural ties, it is not surprising that a large share of known-context homicides are of this type. Based on available data, rates of intimate partner/family-related homicide at the regional level range from 0.6 to 1.7 per 100,000 population, with some significant variations (see figure 2.2.1).

Although the rate of intimate partner/family-related homicide is higher in Africa and the Americas than in other regions, it accounts for a larger share of total homicide victims in Asia, Europe and Oceania than in Africa and the Americas (see figure 2.2.2). This is due to the fact that in regions with high homicide rates, other types of homicide (such as that related to other criminal activities) are more prevalent.

Unlike the rates of other forms of homicide, which can vary significantly from year to year, intimate partner/family-related homicide is, on average, remarkably stable at the global level, though more significant differences are visible at the regional level. In the 32 countries with available trend data, the average rate of intimate partner/family-related homicide remained constant from 2006 to 2011, whereas the total homicide rate in the same group of countries decreased by 15 per cent (see figure 2.2.3).

Fig. 2.2.1: Intimate partner/family-related homicide rate, by region (2012 or latest year)




Note: Rate estimates based on data for 4 countries in Africa, 15 countries in the Americas; 9 countries in Asia; 21 countries in Europe; and 3 countries in Oceania.

Source: Elaboration based on UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).


¹³ For more, see Campbell, J.C. (2007), in *Trauma, Violence and Abuse* 8(3); and Weizman-Henelius, G. (2012), in *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 27(8).

Fig. 2.2.2: Number and share of victims of intimate partner/family-related homicide out of total homicide victims, by region (2012 or latest year)


Americas




Asia




Africa






Europe



Oceania



 Victim of homicide
  Victim of intimate partner/family-related homicide
  = 1,000

Note: estimates based on data for 4 countries in Africa, 15 countries in the Americas; 9 countries in Asia; 21 countries in Europe; and 3 countries in Oceania.

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

The enduring risk factors for intimate partner/family-related homicide may explain some of the stability of its prevalence. When not addressed through non-violent mechanisms of reconciliation, conflicts and disputes between individuals living in family contexts or as couples can have violent outcomes, especially when certain concomitant factors or enablers are at play, such as power relations based on gender, or patterns of alcohol use (see chapter 3). Factors of that nature tend not to change in the short term.

Fig. 2.2.3: Total homicide rate and intimate partner/family-related homicide rate, selected countries (2006-2011)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

However, while intimate partner/family-related homicide appears to be very stable at the global level, this disguises nuances across regions (the Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Europe 2006-2011) (see figure 2.2.4). For example, female victim rates of intimate partner/family-related homicide are consistently higher than male rates for this type of homicide, and there is more fluctuation than can be seen at the global level. In promising trends, levels of intimate partner/family-related homicide for both sexes are decreasing in selected countries in Asia and Oceania for which data are available.

Intimate partner/family-related homicide as a component of violence against women

Violence against women is a very broad concept that encompasses forms of physical, sexual and

Intimate partner/family-related homicide: progress in prevention

In the United States of America, various programmes termed “high-risk team networks”^a or “lethality assessment programmes”^b have emerged at State-level to coordinate the sharing of information among law enforcement, social and health services about those experiencing intimate partner or family-related violence (mainly women) who are at risk of being killed at the hands of intimate partners or family members.^c These programmes are based on the concept that there are several predictors of intimate partner and family-related homicide; among them, previous physical abuse, attempted strangulation, threats with weapons, stalking, sexual assault, and obsessive jealous and controlling behaviour.^d When people experiencing such violence seek help from various services such as law enforcement or health care, those services screen them and, through a risk assessment tool, identify cases with a high likelihood of reoccurrence or of lethal assault. Individual intervention plans may involve everything from monitoring offenders to sharing information across the many disciplines of law, justice, health and social services, to working preventatively to protect those experiencing violence and their families. Such measures seem to show a good degree of effectiveness; for example, over the eight years this model has been in place in the State of Massachusetts, 92 per cent of the 106 high-risk individuals identified have reported no subsequent assault and there have been no homicides.^e

^a See, for example, Jeanne Geiger Crisis Center. *Domestic violence high risk team network*.

^b Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence. *Lethality Assessment Program – Maryland Model*.

^c Hanson, B. (2013). *Preventing and Reducing Domestic Violence Homicides*. United States Department of Justice.

^d Campbell, J.C., et al. (2003), in *American Journal of Public Health* 93(7).

^e Jeanne Geiger Crisis Center. *Op.Cit.*


psychological violence.¹⁴ According to the Beijing Declaration, violence against women “is a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of women’s full advancement.”¹⁵ There are multiple challenges to measuring all forms of violence against women because of its complexity, the high “dark figure” that affects data based on victim reports to authorities (law enforcement and public health), the different means and criteria for collecting data on victimization which may not be comparable, and the difficulty of accurately measuring certain types of violence against women (such as psychological violence).¹⁶

14 Violence against women means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. United Nations General Assembly (1994). A/RES/48/104.

15 United Nations (1996). *The Beijing Declaration*. Para. 73f.

16 For more information on those challenges, see Jansen, H.A.F.M. (2012). *Prevalence surveys on violence against women: Challenges around indicators, data collection and use*. UNWOMEN.

Fig. 2.2.4: Intimate partner/family-related homicide rate, by sex, Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Europe (2006-2011)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

The killing of women on the basis of their gender represents the ultimate form of violence against women. In some countries, legislation recognizes the vulnerability of women to violence and makes a link between homicide and violence against women.¹⁷ Terms such as “femicide” or “feminicide” have been used to define the gender-related killing of women, which itself can take many forms. For example, “honour”-related killings, dowry-related killings, as well as witchcraft or sorcery-related killings, are direct forms of gender-related homicide that almost exclusively target women, whereas more indirect forms include other types of killings that may not be counted as homicides.¹⁸ Such homicides are poorly captured by official statistics, which rarely provide information on homicide motives. But what does emerge from available statistical evidence relating to the relationship between victims and offenders is that a significant portion of lethal violence against women takes place in a domestic environment.

Given the aforementioned challenges of measuring gender-related violence in a comprehensive manner, exploring intimate partner/family-related homicide is one way of gaining a clearer understanding of the killing of women due to gender motives.¹⁹ In contrast to other types of homicide in which the victims are predominantly men, the percentage of female homicide victims resulting from intimate partner/family-related homicide is much higher than the corresponding percentage of male victims in all regions. Homicide of this type is the ultimate consequence of unequal power relationships between men and women in the private sphere, which it serves to reinforce and sustain.²⁰ Intimate

17 For example, in Mexico, the General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence (2007) defines femicide violence as “the most extreme form of gender violence against women, produced by the violation of their human rights in public and private spheres and formed by the set of misogynist actions that can lead to the impunity of society and the State and culminate in the homicide and other forms of violent death of women.” (article 21).

18 United Nations General Assembly (2012). A/HRC/20/16. Para. 15-16.

19 There are two main theoretical approaches in intimate partner homicide research, notably the “gender perspective” that sees intimate partner violence, particularly against women, as an instrument used by men to maintain their dominance in a patriarchal society, where gender roles and relationships are often crystallized in certain practices and where violence may be a tool to enforce them. The other perspective, the “violence perspective” suggests that the motivation for homicide against intimate partners is no different from the motivation for other types of violence, such as individual defiance or social disadvantage. For more, see Kivivuori, J. and M. Lehti (2012), in *Homicide Studies* 16 (1): 60.


20 Fulu, E. et al. (2013). *Why do some men use violence against women and how can we prevent it?* UNDP, UNFPA, UN

partner/family-related homicide represents a small share of total acts of violence against women, but its very nature, as well as the fact that data on intimate partner/family-related homicide are increasingly available and comparable, make such indicators extremely valuable for understanding and monitoring patterns of violence against women.

It is estimated that of all the women killed in 2012 (93,000 women), 43,600 (47 per cent) were killed by their family members or intimate partners, whereas 20,000 of all male homicide victims (6 per cent) were killed by such perpetrators. Thus, at the global level, more than twice as many women as men are killed by their intimate partners or family members. In absolute terms, the highest numbers of such killings of women take place in Asia and Africa (see figure 2.2.5), but their relative share in the total number of female homicides in each region tells a slightly different story.

Of particular note is the fact that most (over 50 per cent) female victims of homicide in Asia, Europe and Oceania (see figure 2.2.6) are killed by their intimate partners or family members. As such, the killing of women in those regions is effectively a function of intimate partner/family-related violence and, in some countries in those regions, the elimination of intimate partner/family member homicides would substantially reduce the total number of female homicides.

Fig. 2.2.5: Number of female victims of intimate partner/family-related homicide, by region (2012 or latest year)




Note: Estimates based on data for 4 countries in Africa, 15 countries in the Americas; 9 countries in Asia; 21 countries in Europe; and 3 countries in Oceania.

Source: Elaboration based on UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Intimate partner versus family-related homicide

A clearer picture of the burden of lethal violence borne by women can be drawn when sex-disaggregated homicide data are available that can distinguish homicides committed by intimate partners from those perpetrated by other family members. In 18 countries (mostly in Europe),²¹ almost equal shares of victims are killed by intimate partners (53

Fig. 2.2.6: Male and female victims of intimate partner/family-related homicide as a percentage of total male and total female homicide victims, by region (latest year)



Note: Estimates based on data for 4 countries in Africa, 15 countries in the Americas; 9 countries in Asia; 21 countries in Europe; and 3 countries in Oceania.

Source: Elaboration based on UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

South Africa: the enduring nature of intimate partner homicide

An example of the enduring nature of intimate partner homicide can be seen in the recent experience of South Africa, a country with a high homicide rate (31 per 100,000 population in 2012). The South African Medical Research Council conducted a study of female homicide for two points in time, 1999 and 2009, and found a substantial (50 per cent) decrease in the overall rate of female homicide over the 10-year period, but less of a decrease in the rate of females killed by their intimate partners.^a The rate of female homicide was 12.9 per 100,000 females in 2009, a little over half of the 24.7 in 1999, while the rate of women killed by their intimate partners decreased 36 per cent over the decade (8.8 to 5.6 per 100,000 females). The decrease is encouraging but South Africa's female homicide rate is still five times the global rate (2.6 per 100,000 women) and intimate partner homicide now accounts for 57 per cent of total female homicides in the country.


^aAbrahams, N. et al. (2012), in South African Medical Research Council Research Brief.

per cent) and by other family members (47 per cent). There is, however, far greater disparity in the sex distribution of victims killed by these perpetrators, with 79 per cent of victims killed by their intimate partners being women (see figure 2.2.7).

Homicide and gender parity

Available data suggest that in countries with very low (and decreasing) homicide rates (less than 1

Fig. 2.2.7: Average percentage of male and female victims of types of intimate partner/family-related homicide, selected countries (latest year)



Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database.

per 100,000 population), female victims constitute an increasing share of total victims and, in some of those countries, the share of male and female victims appears to be reaching parity. For example, in Japan and Hong Kong, China, which have some of the lowest homicide rates in the world (0.3 and 0.4 per 100,000 population in 2011-2012, respectively), females account for just over half of all victims of homicide (see figure 2.2.8).

“Honour killings”: there is no honour in homicide

“In the name of preserving family “honour”, women and girls are shot, stoned, burned alive, strangled, smothered and knifed to death with horrifying regularity.” — Navi Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 8 March 2010.^a

“Honour”-related homicides are the killings of (mostly) women or girls by a member of their family for an actual or presumed act of sexual or behavioural transgression (such as adultery, sexual intercourse or pregnancy outside marriage, refusal to enter an arranged marriage, wearing certain clothing or engaging in activities deemed unsuitable) that is perceived to bring shame upon their family. Such killings are the ultimate manifestation of discrimination against women and girls; the ultimate act of gender-based violence.

It is a challenge to differentiate statistics on “honour killings” from the broader field of statistics on female homicide, as data on this particular motive for homicide are not generated by most police forces. Qualitative studies and interviews on the dynamics and acceptance

of “honour killings” have been produced, but little reliable quantitative data is available.^b For example, in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, media coverage and the Crown Prosecution Service documented an average of 12 “honour killings”, which were investigated by the police, each year between 1998 and 2007.^c

“Honour” crimes may not be specific categories within legal systems, but in some countries they may be treated distinctly from non-“honour”-based violence against women.^d In the last few years, several countries have repealed aspects of their criminal and penal codes that provided for mitigated sentences for perpetrators of “honour killings”, and the practice is increasingly criminalized.^e

^a UN OHCHR (2010).


^b See, for example, UNDP and UNFPA (2007); Oberwittler, D. and Kassel, J. (2011); Eisner, M. and L. Ghuneim (2013), in *Aggressive Behaviour* 39(5).

^c Crown Prosecution Service (2007); Crown Prosecution Service (2007), in United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women.

^d United Nations General Assembly (2002). A/57/169.

^e United Nations General Assembly (2012). A/HRC/20/16.

Fig. 2.2.8: Percentage of total homicide victims, by sex, selected countries with homicide rates below 1.0 per 100,000 population in 2009-2011, Eastern Asia and Oceania (2000-2002 and 2009-2011)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).


In another group of countries with low homicide rates, made up entirely of European countries, the pattern is the same. The homicide trend is also a downward one, but the pace of the decrease is noticeably faster for rates of male homicide than for rates of female homicide, and the historical gender gap is closing (see figure 2.2.9). If such trends continue, in years to come, there could be more female homicide victims than male victims in a number of countries.

Yet while some countries with very low homicide rates are approaching gender parity in terms of homicide victimization, the same cannot be said for homicide offenders. There remains an imbalance from a perpetrator perspective, with the vast majority of formal suspects²² of intentional homicide being men (for more, see chapter 5). The overwhelming pattern is still that men kill both men and women (see figure 2.2.10), irrespective of the increasing gender parity of the victims in some countries.

Even in some of the world's safest and most developed countries, it appears that homicide is very much the tip of the iceberg when it comes to violence against women. Although the decrease in


²² Suspects brought into formal contact with the police may include persons suspected of, or arrested and cautioned for, a criminal offence by the police, at the national level.

Fig. 2.2.9: Average homicide rate, by sex, six European countries with homicide rates below 1.0 per 100,000 population in 2011 (2000-2011)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Fig. 2.2.10: Percentage distribution of suspects brought into formal contact with police for completed intentional homicide, by sex, selected low-homicide countries (2009-2011)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

female homicide victims (see figure 2.2.9) is a positive trend in itself, its slow pace highlights the difficulty of eradicating practices and behaviours that are all too often ingrained in cultural and societal norms around the world. Available data show that even in countries with very low homicide rates, a significant share of women have experienced physical and/or sexual violence. For example, at some point in their lifetime, roughly a quarter to a third of women in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom have experienced physical and/or sexual violence at the hands of their intimate partner.²³


²³ See UNWOMEN (2011).

Intimate partner violence in Japan

The experience of Japan indicates that in a context of very low levels of homicidal violence, additional efforts may still be required to address intimate partner and family-related violence. Every three years, the Japanese Cabinet Office conducts a “Survey on Violence between Men and Women.” In the 2002 survey, 4.4 per cent of female respondents reported that the spousal violence they experienced was severe enough to make them fear for their life.^a In subsequent surveys in 2005 and 2008, over 10 per cent of married women and approximately 3 per cent of married men reported that they experienced either “physical assault”, “mental harassment or frightening threats”, or “sexual coercion” by their spouse on many occasions.^b More than one in five married women and approximately 15 per cent of married men reported having experienced spousal abuse on one or two occasions (see figure 2.2.11).


In response to these new findings about the particular vulnerability of women, in the same period, Japan enacted several laws designed to protect women and prevent domestic violence.^c Since the enactment of those laws, more arrests for intimate partner violence have occurred. This could indicate that women who survive such violence feel more empowered by the protection provided by the laws, and, as a result, an increase in the number of arrests for non-lethal spousal violence has occurred (see figure 2.2.12). It is noteworthy that the homicide rate of women killed by their husbands and the corresponding number of husbands arrested for this crime was very stable over the time period, reaffirming the global trend in the stability of intimate partner homicide.

Fig. 2.2.11: Percentage distribution of victimization experience of spousal abuse, by sex, Japan (2008)



Source: Cabinet Office, Japan (2009). P. 34.

Fig. 2.2.12: Arrests for cases of spousal violence against wives by husbands, Japan (1996-2008)



Source: Cabinet Office, Japan (2009). P. 35.

^a Cabinet Office, Japan (2004). P. 31.

^b “Spouse” includes common-law partners, spouses living separately, and also ex-spouses. In the 2008 survey, this term was also expanded to include current partners (boyfriend/girlfriend).

^c For example, the Law on Proscribing Stalking Behaviour and Assisting Victims (enacted 2000), and the Act on the Prevention of Spousal Violence and Protection of Victims (enacted 2001).

Other interpersonal homicide

The previous section deals with homicide in the private or family sphere, but many forms of lethal violence, which are not connected to other criminal activities or socio-political violence, also exist outside domestic relationships. This type of lethal violence can be attributed to the very nature of coexisting with others and the concomitant frictions and differences that exist in some relationships. It may, for example, be rooted in disputes between neighbours, revenge-related killings or may result from random and seemingly unprovoked acts in which the victim is simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. Some types of interpersonal homicide particularly affect women, especially when linked with forms of sexual violence, and they should be considered a component of violence against women in general.

The division between what can be considered “other interpersonal” homicide or socio-political homicide (as discussed in the last section of this chapter) is not always clear, but the former is the case when killing is not instrumental to the achievement of a further goal, and when the personal dimension drives the homicidal act. Such acts can happen outside in the street, or inside public spaces or establishments, and even at the home of the perpetrator or victim. But the motives that lead to homicides in the public sphere are not often recorded, which is why specific data relating to much “other interpersonal” homicide are difficult to come by.

Mass murder

No other type of homicide generates such public fear or stupefaction at its meaninglessness as that involving multiple victims. Due to its often shocking and sensational nature, particularly of so-called “rampage killings”, mass murder also captures the attention of the public, the media and policymakers the world over, which no doubt colours perceptions of the prevalence and patterns of such events. Also affecting the view of mass murder is the fact that some such incidents bridge the divide between the “other interpersonal” and socio-political homicide typologies, since, depending on the number of victims, deaths due to acts of terror can also be considered mass murder.


Mass homicides may have a high profile, but they are actually low-frequency events, accounting, for example, for less than 1 per cent of all homicide cases in the United States and less than 3 per cent

in Finland and Sweden.²⁴ Despite the notoriety of this type of killings, there is no universal definition for what actually constitutes “mass murder”, but for most purposes the term denotes the wilful homicide of at least four persons. A common form of mass murder is familicide,²⁵ which, due to its relationship-driven nature, actually spans both components of interpersonal homicide. In available data for both Finland and the United Kingdom, for example, most murders of four or more people have been familicides.²⁶ Other, more public, acts of mass murder, often called rampage or “spree” killings, have occurred in schools and workplaces around the world.

Other interpersonal homicide in India

As denoted in figure 2.2 in the introduction to chapter 2, roughly one in every five homicides (21 per cent) in India is linked to selected forms of other interpersonal-type homicides. From 2000 to 2012, over half of all such homicides were the result of property-related disputes (54 per cent) and the remainder were associated with personal vendettas (46 per cent). Homicides motivated by personal vendetta have decreased by 40 per cent since 2000, while property-related disputes have decreased by 25 per cent.

Fig. 2.2.13: Rate of homicide motivated by personal vendetta or property-related disputes, India (2000-2012)



Source: National Crime Records Bureau, India. (2012).

24 Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013); and European Homicide Monitor.


25 “Familicide” refers to the killing of multiple family members. In its most common form, it is the killing of an intimate partner and child(ren), but may also include the killing of parents and/or siblings. While typically considered a form of intimate partner homicide, given the number of victims in such events, this type of homicide is often “mass murder”.

26 Government of the United Kingdom (2012); and National Research Institute of Legal Policy, Finnish Homicide Monitoring System (2011).

As technology now enables instant access to global news, awareness of mass murder events has increased, but mass murder is not a new phenomenon. In the United States alone, some 909 mass killings were documented between 1900 and 1999,²⁷ with the frequency of mass public shootings, the most visible form of mass murder, increasing in the 1960s. More recently, between 2002 and 2011, there was an average of 32 acts of mass


murder per year; a relatively stable trend in spite of the overall declining trend for all homicides. All those mass murder events resulted in more than 1500 victims over 10 years, which is a small fraction of all homicides that occur in the United States.²⁸ The fact that an average of 70 per cent of all mass murders in that time period involved firearms²⁹ points to the accessibility of firearms as being a decisive element in their perpetration.

Fig. 2.2.14: Number of homicide cases with four or more victims; and related number of victims, United States (2002-2011)



Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013).

Fig. 2.2.15: Average percentage distribution of homicide cases, by number of victims, United States (2002-2011)



Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013).

2.3 SOCIO-POLITICAL HOMICIDE

In contrast to the two other homicide typologies, this type of homicide can be seen to be the outcome of the socio-political agenda of its perpetrator(s). As its name implies, socio-political homicide may be politically motivated, or particular individuals or groups may be targeted due to their race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexuality or status, amongst others. For example, homicides linked to hate crimes or acts of terror are both considered to be part of this typology. In all such cases, a social dimension (such as the management of diversity in society) or a power-related struggle comes into play.

Data availability on socio-political homicide is very limited, either because some killings of this nature are often excluded from homicide counts at the country level or, when included, they cannot be statistically identified due to a lack of information about the motive and context of such killings. For these reasons, this section provides a snapshot of some of their manifestations.

Hate Crimes

Crimes motivated by the perpetrator's bias against the victim's race, religion, ethnic origin, sexual orientation or disability, amongst others, hate crimes can also be thought of as products of social prejudice. Ingrained attitudes may promote an atmosphere that condones violence against marginalized segments of society, often resulting in "message crimes" that instil fear or terror based on prejudicial attitudes.³⁰ As they not only affect indi-

28 Some mass homicides are not represented in the data because they have been reported by law enforcement agencies in separate records, with a maximum of 11 victims per record. For example, an incident with 32 victims was reported as 4 separate incidents, with 10 victims each in the "first" three incidents and two in the "fourth" incident. The net result is that these data somewhat over-count the number of mass murder incidents and somewhat undercount the average number of victims per mass murder incident.

29 Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013).

30 Mouzos, J. and S. Thompson (2000), in Australian Institute

27 Duwe, G. (2004), in *Justice Quarterly*, 21.

vidual victims, but also members of the victim's group and even society as a whole, such crimes are threats to social cohesion.³¹

Hate crimes can consist of a variety of violent and non-violent crimes, ranging from threats and robbery to rape, with homicide their most extreme manifestation. Accurately identifying, classifying and recording a homicide as a hate crime can be particularly challenging, as it requires the determination of a causal link between an offender's prejudice towards the victim and their act of lethal violence.

There are relatively few cases of known hate crime-related homicide, and studies of this issue are few in number. For example, gender-based killing due to sexual orientation and gender identity is a phenomenon that has only recently been documented and only very limited, often anecdotal, data are available.³² That said, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions has documented murders believed to have been committed on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity.³³ Furthermore, according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, homicides of transgender people were documented in 816 cases in 55 countries between January 2008 and December 2011.³⁴ Many of those homicides are believed to be the result of hate-based violence, but data on motivation are extremely limited, thus it is not possible to identify all of them as being specifically due to the victim's identification as transgender. In South Africa, information from case studies has indicated that 31 lesbians have been murdered in homophobic attacks since 1998.³⁵ An academic study in Australia that examined gay-hate related homicides in New South Wales identified approximately four gay men killed due to their sexual orientation each year over the 10-year period covered by the study (1989-1999).³⁶

of Criminology: *Trends and Issues in crime and criminal justice*. No. 155.

31 Bleich, E. (2007), in *American Behavioural Scientist*, 51. Also, for example, in some case law, family members of victims were also considered victims, and sometimes granted compensation. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (2009).

32 United Nations General Assembly (2012). A/HRC/20/16.


33 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2013) A/HRC/24/23.

34 United Nations General Assembly (2012). *Op.Cit.*

35 Wesley, T. (2012), in *BUWA! A Journal on African Women's Experiences*.

36 Mouzos, J. and S. Thompson. (2000). *Op.Cit.*

Fig. 2.3.1: Homicide rate among total population and among foreign residents, selected European countries (2010)



Source: UN-CTS (2011); data on Austria include attempted homicides.

Other social prejudices, such as those based on race, religion or ethnic origin, can also result in lethal violence. When looking at the scarce data available, it can be noted that in three European countries which do have data, foreign residents are over-represented among homicide victims (see figure 2.3.1). Such data cannot be strictly interpreted as hate crime-related, as it is not known whether those victims were specifically targeted due to their membership of a racial, ethnic or religious group, but it does indicate that foreign residents can face a higher risk of victimization than the general population.

As mentioned earlier, homicide is the most extreme manifestation of hate-related violence. Other than lethal violence, crimes motivated by bias or prejudice are also difficult to identify, as many victims of hate crimes are reluctant to report them, which means that many hate crimes remain invisible.³⁷

Acts of terror

Often resulting in multiple victims, acts of terror leading to death are a global phenomenon but also a challenging category to examine statistically, as very few countries produce data on such deaths. Those with multiple victims, which result in mass murder incidents, may be classified in different ways based on varying definitions.

37 For an overview of hate crimes in Europe, see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2012).

From a conceptual perspective, the label “intentional homicide” is certainly broad enough to encompass such deaths, and whilst perpetrators may face additional charges, such as acts of terrorism, acts against the State, or even crimes against humanity, the core act still concerns the unlawful intentional killing of another. That said, in national recording practices, such deaths are not always recorded and counted as intentional homicide, or in other cases, though considered as such, a specific statistical count is not available.³⁸

Unlawful killings by law enforcement authorities

Some of the most challenging incidents to identify and account for statistically as “intentional homicide” are unlawful killings by law enforcement authorities, including the police. The State has an obligation to safeguard life:³⁹ the use of lethal force by the police is strictly limited by international human rights law and relevant standards, and is to be applied only in situations where it is necessary to protect life.⁴⁰ Deaths occurring as a result of the necessary and proportionate use of force by law enforcement officers do not constitute unlawful killings. Unplanned killings that result from excessive use of force in law enforcement operations may be unlawful, although they would not qualify

as intentional homicides in the absence of any element of intentionality.

Among the special procedures of the Human Rights Council, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions holds the mandate for examining situations of unlawful killing by the police, among other situations of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.⁴¹ For example, killings by the police may occur in situations where the police are not pursuing law enforcement objectives, such as attempts at extortion that may escalate into extrajudicial killings; engaging in “social cleansing” operations and intentionally killing criminals or members of marginalized groups; or in even more extreme situations, where police are operating as a militia or death squad.⁴² All such cases should be counted as intentional homicides, consistently with the standard definition, but little statistical information is available on such homicides, often due to a lack of recording and tracking, as well as a lack of investigation into the nature of the killings, all of which hamper data collection efforts. Findings, conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations Special Rapporteur are submitted to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, and constitute both a source of data and examples.⁴³

Mob violence/Vigilantism

Cases of “vigilante” or “mob” violence have been reported in different places around the world. The nature of these acts can vary widely, but at their core they are “killings carried out in violation of the law by private individuals with the purported aim of crime control, or the control of perceived deviant or immoral behaviour.”⁴⁴

Although vigilantism has occurred across the world, recent studies have focused on this phenomenon in Africa, the Americas and Asia.⁴⁵ For example, in Uganda in 2010, there were 438 fatalities due to acts of mob justice, accounting for 25

38 Country practice varies as to whether such deaths are included in police homicide statistics. For example, neither the 3,000+ victims of the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, nor the nearly 200 killed in terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004 in Madrid were recorded as homicides in national criminal justice statistics. By contrast, the 52 victims of the 7 July 2005 London bombings and the 77 victims of the terror events of 22 July 2011 in Norway were included in official police statistics as homicides. Homicide statistics in India include murder related to “terrorist/extremist” violence.

39 This obligation of the State consists of three main aspects: a) the duty to refrain, by its agents, from unlawful killing; b) the duty to investigate suspicious deaths; and c) in certain circumstances, a positive obligation to take steps to prevent the avoidable loss of life. (For example, see European Court of Human Rights (2013); Ovey, C. and R. White (2002).

40 Principle 9 of the *Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials* (1990) provides for instance: “Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.” Article 3 of the *Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials*, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 34/169, states that “Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.” Principle 3 of the *Interpol Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials* states that “Officers must never knowingly use more force than is reasonable, nor should they abuse their authority.”

41 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2011). A/HRC/RES/17/5

42 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2010). A/HRC/14/24/Add.8. Para. 9.

43 See, for example, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council. *Reports of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions*. For example: A/HRC/21/49; A/HRC/22/67; A/HRC/23/51.

44 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2009). A/64/187. Para. 15.

45 See United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2009).

per cent of all homicides in the country.⁴⁶ The most common victims of mob violence are suspected criminals, generally young males, especially those suspected of committing theft.⁴⁷ Other targets of “vigilante justice” include suspected murderers, members of gangs or organized criminal groups, suspected or convicted sexual offenders, suspected “witches” and street children.⁴⁸

Mob violence can indicate a population’s lack of faith or trust in the rule of law and its implementing institutions to provide justice. If people feel the criminal justice system is not legitimate, is corrupt or unresponsive, they may feel obliged to take matters into their own hands to enforce laws. For example, in a study of formal and informal dispute resolution systems in poorer, rural areas of South America, vigilantism appeared to be five times greater in communities where informal mechanisms of justice were not functioning.⁴⁹


Shooting the messengers: the killing of journalists and humanitarian aid workers

As professionals who often work in insecure environments, mostly in response to natural or man-made disasters, journalists and aid workers are both prone to certain risks that can threaten their safety and even their lives.

Journalists, as purveyors of information who seek out and report the news from around the world, often venture into the darkest corners to shed light on current events. A considerable number of them are subjected to intimidation, physical violence, kidnapping or illegal detention in direct relation to their work and, in extreme cases, they can be killed because of their professional activity. Some are killed in war or conflict zones or in situations of civil unrest, while others are the specific targets of homicidal violence.

It is challenging to disentangle the various motives behind such killings, but some data are available. According to UNESCO, since 1992 there have been 984 documented cases of killings of journalists, with over 600 of them occurring in the last 10 years.⁵⁰ UNESCO has also drawn attention to the

Fig. 2.3.2: Number of journalists killed, by region (2006–2012)



Source: UNESCO. *Facts and Figures of Killed Journalists from 2006–2012*.

fact that there is often impunity for many of the abuses against journalists,⁵¹ which, in conjunction with a climate of violence, generates censorship, depriving citizens of the information they need to make informed decisions.

Besides UNESCO, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)⁵² also tracks events around the world in which journalists are killed because of their professional activities. The statistics kept by each organization differ due to varying definitions as to who exactly is considered a journalist and what is considered a “killing in the line of duty”⁵³

(2013). Para. 5; and UNESCO (2013). *UNESCO condemns the killing of journalists*.

51 See United Nations (2012). *Second Inter-Agency Meeting on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity*.

52 The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) is an independent, non-profit organization that promotes press freedom worldwide.

53 CPJ keeps statistics on the death of every journalist whom it is reasonably certain was killed in direct reprisal for his or her work; was killed in crossfire during combat situations; or was killed while carrying out a dangerous assignment such as coverage of a street protest. Journalists killed in accidents such as car or plane crashes are not included. UNESCO uses a broad definition and it refers to the killing of reporters, camera operators, photojournalists, television presenters, columnists, editors, broadcasters, radio presenters and other members of the media. Given these definitions, it is not always possible to differentiate between journalists who were victims of intentional homicide and those who were victims of war/conflict, based on these sources.

46 Ugandan Police Force (2011). P. 7.


47 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2009). Para. 58.

48 Ibid. Para. 64.

49 UNDP (2006). P. 14.

50 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council

Fig. 2.3.3: Number of journalists killed in the line of duty (2003-2012)



Source: UNESCO and Committee to Protect Journalists.

(see figure 2.3.3). In spite of these differences, the overall trends are similar, indicating an increase in the last year. According to UNESCO data, the number of killings of journalists reached a record high in 2012 (122 journalists killed) (see figure 2.3.2). Over half of those were killed in Asia, more than half of them in the Syrian Arab Republic alone.⁵⁴ Some 20 per cent of the journalists killed in 2012 were killed in Africa, two-thirds of them in Somalia. South America, Central America and the Caribbean each accounted for 8 per cent of all such killings.⁵⁵

Many journalists are killed in contexts of armed conflict, as demonstrated by the large share of deaths occurring in Asia (particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic), but a large amount of killings and attacks occur outside such situations. Most of those killed have been covering politics, war or corruption (see figure 2.3.4),⁵⁶ and, according to UNESCO, 95 per cent of all journalists killed since 2006 were local reporters, rather than foreign correspondents.⁵⁷ Print journalists made up the largest share of journalists killed between 2006 and 2012 (43 per cent), followed by television journalists (28 per

54 See UNESCO (2012).

55 Ibid.


56 See United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2013).

57 UNESCO. *Facts and Figures of Killed Journalists from 2006-2012*.

cent).⁵⁸ The killing of photojournalists has increased in the last few years, with over a third of the journalists killed in 2012 being camera operators or photographers.⁵⁹

A significant share of journalists have been killed by organized criminal groups (see figure 2.3.5): according to the CPJ, of all the killings that specifically targeted journalists between 1992 and 2013, some 13 per cent were committed by criminal groups. Investigative journalism can become a real threat for criminal groups, some of which do not hesitate to exert violence and intimidation on the media in order to maintain a climate of silence around their illicit activities. It is even more alarming that no perpetrator was convicted in 77 per cent of those cases: impunity has an incrementally negative effect on the freedom and independence of journalists.

Fig. 2.3.4: Topics covered by journalists killed (1992-2013)



Note: The sum is higher than 100 as journalists killed could have been covering multiple topics.

Source: United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2012). A/HRC/20/22, Para. 6.

Most humanitarian organizations are accustomed to operating in violent settings, and violence against aid workers has always been a challenge to humanitarian access. Like journalists, aid workers⁶⁰ can be subjected to physical attacks in direct

58 Ibid.

59 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2012). Para. 35.

60 Aid workers, as defined by the Aid Worker Security Database, are the employees and personnel of not-for-profit aid agencies, including both national and international staff, which provide material and technical assistance in humanitarian relief contexts. These include various locally contracted staff (e.g. transportation, security, etc.), as well as relief and multi-mandated (relief and development) organizations, such

relation to their work, which result in kidnapping, serious injury or even death. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), based on data from the Aid Worker Security Database,⁶¹ the magnitude of the violence and the types of threats faced by aid workers have changed over the years.⁶²

The Aid Worker Security Database does not disaggregate data by context and cannot provide information specifically on intentional homicides, but it does denote an increase in attacks against aid workers over the last decade (see figure 2.3.6), and a fluctuating though slightly increasing number of such workers killed in attacks. The increase in incidents against aid personnel has taken place in a period and context in which the number of humanitarian workers has also grown. However, the increase in attacks has surpassed the growth in numbers of aid workers, thus indicating an increased exposure to risk for humanitarian workers.⁶³

In 2008, 127 aid workers were killed; the highest number on record. The decrease in killings of aid workers between 2008 and 2012 can be attributed in large part to improvements by aid organizations in security awareness and management systems, which allow for more effective risk assessment and mitigation by staff in the field.⁶⁴ Since 2009, six countries (Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic) have accounted for 75 per cent of all aid workers killed. Attacks on aid workers have become more sophisticated in recent years, and the tactics and weapons used, such as heavy explosives and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), have become more lethal.⁶⁵ In 2013, attacks in Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan have accounted for a significant share

as non-governmental organizations, the International Red Cross/Red Crescent, donor agencies and the agencies of the United Nations that belong to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO), as well as the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The definition of "aid worker" does not include United Nations peacekeeping personnel, human rights workers, election monitors, or purely political, religious or advocacy organizations.

61 The Aid Worker Security Database collects data on deliberate acts of violence affecting aid workers all over the world, through systematic media filtering or through information provided by affected aid organizations.


62 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2011).

63 United Nations (2009). S/2012/376. Annex, Para. 32.

64 UNOCHA (2011).

65 Ibid.

Fig. 2.3.5: Number of journalist victims of homicide perpetrated by organized criminal groups, by region (1992-2013)



Note: Data for 2013 up to 13 November 2013.

Source: Committee to Protect Journalists.

of the increase in humanitarian workers killed during the course of the year.⁶⁶

The killing of journalists and humanitarian aid workers has consequences beyond the loss of individual lives. The killing of journalists can be considered an attack on the human right to free expression, the foundation of strong democracy and the need for an informed, active and engaged

Fig. 2.3.6: Number of aid workers attacked and number of aid workers killed (1997-2013)



Source: Aid Worker Security Database, 1997-2013.

66 Aid Worker Security Database.

citizenry to access the information necessary to reach their full potential.⁶⁷ Violence against aid workers greatly restricts access and mobility on the ground and often results in suspended, reduced or even terminated humanitarian activities, thus placing the lives and well-being of the hundreds of thousands of vulnerable people who depend on them at risk.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ UNESCO. *UN Plan of action on the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity*. CI-12/CONF.202/6.

⁶⁸ United Nations (2009). S/2012/376. Annex, Para. 38.



3. HOMICIDE MECHANISMS AND ENABLERS

As established in the previous chapter, homicide in all its types is the result of the specific internal motivations and objectives of its perpetrator(s). However, a number of intermediate factors that cut across all typologies can also play a role in the process that leads someone to commit homicide. To show how different homicide mechanisms, whether including a weapon or not, are used across the world, and to assess to what extent different types of homicide can be associated with different killing instruments, this chapter analyses how homicides are perpetrated. The role of psychoactive substances, such as illicit drugs and alcohol, as homicide “enablers” is also considered. A better understanding of the influence of such elements in facilitating homicide can be of great value for the development of homicide prevention policies, which, when appropriately targeted at such elements, can reduce violence before it becomes lethal.

Homicide mechanisms around the world

Not all homicides involve them, but weapons do play a significant role in homicide. With their high level of lethality,¹ firearms are the most widely used weapons, accounting for 177,000 (41 per cent) of the total 437,000 homicides globally in 2012. “Other means”, such as physical force and blunt objects, among others, killed just over a third of homicide victims, while sharp objects were responsible for just under a quarter (24 per cent).²

The type of mechanism used to commit homicide depends on a number of factors, including the will of the perpetrator(s), the socio-demographic characteristics of both perpetrator and victim, the accessibility of weapons and the legislation for controlling them, which tends to increase in severity according to the lethality of the weapon. This results in wide variations in the type of weapons used to commit homicide at the regional level (see figure 3.1). For example, in the Americas, firearms are the most prevalent killing mechanism, while in Oceania, sharp objects are the most widely used weapons in homicides. In both Asia and Europe, the “other” category of homicide mechanism, which includes blunt objects, poisoning, strangulation and physical assault,³ amongst others, accounts for the largest share of homicides. In Africa, firearms and sharp objects account for almost equal proportions of homicides, but this should be interpreted with caution as the share of homicide by type of weapon is estimated on the basis of statistical models.

High levels of homicide are not always associated with high shares of killings by firearm. For example, although firearms are consistently used in a large proportion of homicides in the Americas, where countries with the highest homicide rates also record the highest share of homicides by firearm, the picture is more varied in other regions. Indeed, some sub-regions with relatively high homicide rates have a relatively low share of homicides by firearm, such as Eastern Europe and Southern Africa, while others have lower homicide rates but


1 Lethality of a firearm depends on the type and calibre of the weapon. Whether a victim survives a gunshot wound is often dependent on other factors, such as the availability and efficiency of health care systems. For more, see Alvazzi del Frate, A. (2012) Small Arms Survey. *Moving Targets*, chapter 3.

2 Data calculated on the basis of UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Whenever data on homicide mechanism were not

available from criminal justice sources, estimates of the share of homicide by mechanism were based on IHME (2012).

3 WHO *International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems* 10th Revision (ICD-10).

Fig. 3.1: Homicide mechanism, by region (2012 or latest year)




Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and IHME (2012).

Homicide typologies and mechanisms in South Africa

A South African study examined homicide incidents from 2001-2005 in parts of three cities that were experiencing high homicide rates.^a Firearm homicide was more strongly associated with the killing of strangers, while sharp objects accounted for a higher share of homicides committed by intimate partners/family members and by acquaintances of the victims (see figure 3.2). In the same vein, a large majority (70 per cent) of homicides linked to interpersonal conflicts, such as those related to arguments or disputes, were committed with sharp objects. In another finding, firearm homicides outnumbered sharp object homicides by a factor of five in the case of homicides linked to other criminal activities.


^a Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), South Africa (2010).

Fig. 3.2: Percentage distribution of homicides, by perpetrator and mechanism, three cities, South Africa (2001-2005)



Note: the three cities included in the study are Cape Town, Durban and Gauteng.

Source: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, South Africa (2010).

Map 3.1: Percentage distribution of homicide mechanisms, by sub-region (2012 or latest year)

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

higher shares of homicides by firearm, such as Southern Europe and Northern Africa (see map 3.1). This seems to confirm that a complex mixture of factors influences homicide levels, the homicide mechanism being only one of many elements that combine to determine homicide levels and trends.

Homicide mechanism and typology

In the identification of patterns of association between types of homicide and weapons used, detailed and comprehensive statistical information is needed in order to disaggregate killing mechanism by type of homicide (or vice versa). However, from available information, it is not possible to derive a general understanding of patterns of association between homicide mechanisms and homicide typologies.

Studies conducted in high-income countries, which tend to have lower levels of homicide, have shown strong correlations between gun availability in the home and female homicide rates, but a slightly weaker correlation with male homicide rates.⁴ As a

result, having a gun in the home places women at a higher risk of victimization, particularly in the home, where they are more likely to be killed by their intimate partners or family members.⁵

The hypothesis that firearm homicide is not only prevalent in homicide related to other criminal activities is further supported when considering the respective trends in gun homicides and other violent crime in the United States. All forms of violent crime have significantly decreased in the United States in the last 20 years, but while the respective trends in firearm homicide, non-fatal firearm victimization,⁶ violent victimization and serious violent victimization⁷ followed a similar path in the 1990s, the pace of decline in firearm homicide has slowed remarkably since 2000 (see figure 3.3).


5 UNODC (2011). *Global Study on Homicide*. P. 58.

6 This refers to the victimization rate of people who have been the victim of violent crime (rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated and simple assault) during which the perpetrator(s) had showed or used a firearm (see Planty M. and J. Truman (2013), United States Bureau of Justice Statistics).

7 This refers to the victimization rate of people who have been the victim of serious violent crime, which includes rape, sexual assault, robbery and aggravated assault (see Lauritsen J.L. and M.L. Rezey (2013), United States Bureau of Justice Statistics; and Truman J., Langton L. and M. Planty M.(2013), United States Bureau of Justice Statistics).

4 See Hemenway, D., T. Shinoda-Tagawa and M. Miller (2002), in *Journal of the American Medical Women's Association* 57; Killias, M., J. van Kesteren, and M. Rindlisbacher (2001), in *Canadian Journal of Criminology* 43; Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011). P. 131; Shaw, M. (2013). *Small Arms Survey. Everyday Dangers, chapter 2*.

Fig. 3.3: Trends in firearm and non-firearm homicide rates, violent and serious violent victimization rates, and non-fatal firearm victimization rate, United States (1993-2012)



Note: Due to methodological changes in the 2006 NCVS, caution should be used when comparing 2006 estimates to other years.


Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013); Truman, J. Langton L. and M. Planty (2013); Lauritsen, J.L. and M.L. Rezey (2013); and Planty, M. and J. Truman (2013).

The above data indicate that homicide trends (both firearm and non-firearm homicide) do not necessarily follow similar trends and patterns to those of other violent crime. The various homicide types, as presented in chapter 2 of this study, can follow different trends and the overall evolution of homicide levels combines the respective trends in all homicide types. The divergence between trends in homicide and other violent crime in the United States suggests that while homicide may share some of the drivers of other forms of violent crime, it may also have enablers that are specific to it.

The role that firearm availability, accessibility or ownership may play in affecting levels of firearm homicide is a heavily debated research and policy issue. Hypotheses about the impact of the prevalence of firearm ownership and, more generally, of gun availability⁸ on homicide tend to fall into two

8 Availability, accessibility and ownership of firearms are closely related terms but with different connotations. In this study, firearm availability refers to the overall stock of firearms directly available to civilians, military, armed groups, etc. independently of the type of entitlement; firearm accessibility reflects the overall availability but also the existence of possible limitations to access and use of firearms (for example, due

Fig. 3.4: Firearm homicide rate and percentage of households owning at least one gun, selected European countries (2004 or 2005)



Note: Firearm homicide rate is based on the median homicide by firearm rate for each country grouping.

Source: European Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS) and International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS).

categories. One suggests that easy access to firearms may facilitate the commission of homicide in a variety of ways, including by fostering violent confrontations and by increasing their lethality, as well as, on a different note, by facilitating the commission of crimes and the execution of targeted killings. The second hypothesis suggests, on the other hand, that widespread availability of firearms may be a deterrent to assault and aggressions, in that it may reduce the leverage and motivation of an armed perpetrator. A number of methodological challenges, starting with the shortage of data on firearm availability, make it difficult to provide definitive answers in either direction.⁹

In some countries, available quantitative evidence points to the prevalence of firearm ownership as being positively related to the level of firearm violence. For example, the experience of several European countries, all of them characterized by

to prescriptions on storage or carrying of weapons); firearm (private) ownership refers to the percentage of households in a country owning at least one gun. Gun ownership is often measured through the permanent presence of a gun in the household.

9 There is a lack of specific data on how many firearms used in homicides were obtained legally and how many were obtained illegally. For more on these hypotheses and related methodological challenges, see UNODC (2011). *Global Study on Homicide*. P. 43.

International firearm control: the Arms Trade Treaty

The illicit trade in small arms is a serious problem that requires global action. Around the world, civilian populations are trapped in situations of violence, from conflict and crime, and they are often the ones suffering the misuse of arms by armed groups, including organized criminal groups.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in April 2013,^a is designed to regulate and improve the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms, with the intention of preventing, disrupting and eradicating the illicit trade in such arms and thwarting their diversion. The ATT will be closely linked to the successful implementation and provisions of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols, notably the Firearms Protocol, which obliges countries to establish strict transfer control measures and enforcement provisions, as well as to criminalize the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, their parts, components and ammunition, among several other measures.^b

The ATT introduces a set of measures designed to prevent diversions of conventional arms by prohibiting the authorization of arms transfers under certain circumstances, including where there is knowledge that arms would be used to perpetrate war crimes, genocide, attacks against civilians, and other grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Where the prohibitions do not apply, States must perform a comprehensive risk assessment and examine possible risk mitigation measures. The assessment explicitly requires States to evaluate whether there is a risk of serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law, or of contravening conventions relating to terrorism and organized crime.

International cooperation and assistance are emphasized throughout the ATT as means to ensure that all States can effectively implement and enforce its provisions. All relevant United Nations entities, international and regional organizations have made commitments to support the ATT's implementation and contribute to the achievement of its ultimate objectives: the eradication of violence and preservation of peace.

^a United Nations General Assembly (2013). A/CONF.217/2013/L.3.

^b For more on the Firearms Protocol, see United Nations General Assembly (2001). Resolution 55/255 *Annex*; and UNODC (2011). *Global Study on Homicide*. P. 42.

low firearm homicide rates, points to a certain level of association between firearm ownership and firearm homicide. When grouping the countries into low, medium and high levels of household gun ownership, results indicate that countries with higher levels of firearm ownership also have higher firearm homicide rates (see figure 3.4).

Homicide by sharp object

Instruments with sharp edges account for 24 per cent of all homicides globally. Many homicides result from cuts or slashes caused by sharp objects, such as knives, machetes, razors, swords and bayonets, as well as broken glass, but sharp objects, including less conventional examples such as screwdrivers, ice picks or stilettos, can also be used to stab or puncture. Such instruments are relatively easy to obtain and to conceal.

In some countries, especially those with low levels of homicide, sharp objects significantly outweigh other mechanisms of killing. For example, in Australia, the number of homicide victims who die

from stab wounds has been consistently higher than the number of victims killed by firearms,¹⁰ (see figure 3.5) and knife homicide also affects young people aged 18-24 more than firearm homicide.¹¹ In terms of homicide typologies, sharp objects account for the largest share of homicides in Australia committed by intimate partners/family members or by acquaintances, while beatings and physical violence accounts for the dominant share of homicides committed by strangers (see figure 3.6).


In the United Kingdom, sharp objects are the most common method of killing. In England and Wales they accounted for two out of every five homicides in 2011/2012¹² (see figure 3.7) and, similarly, sharp objects have been the most common method

¹⁰ Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013).

¹¹ Bartels, L. (2011a), in *Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*, Australian Institute of Criminology.


¹² Government of the United Kingdom. (2012). *Home Office Statistical Bulletin* 02/12.

Fig. 3.5: Homicide rates, by homicide mechanism, Australia (2001-2012)




Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012a).

Fig. 3.6: Homicide mechanism, by homicide perpetrator, Australia (2008-2010)



Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012b); and Australian Institute of Criminology (2013).

Fig. 3.7: Average percentage of homicides, by homicide mechanism, England and Wales (2001-2012)



Source: Home Office, Office for National Statistics, United Kingdom (2013).

of killing in Scotland for the last ten years (see figure 3.8).¹³ In the United Kingdom overall, firearms account for a very small percentage of all homicides, with victims being twice as likely to be killed by a blunt instrument, almost four times as likely to be punched or kicked to death, and more than ten times as likely to be stabbed or killed with a sharp object than with a firearm.¹⁴

Several small-scale studies on the phenomenon of knife-carrying by young people,¹⁵ indicate that its associated factors are similar to those relating to why people own firearms. For example, out of fear, a sense of vulnerability, and for self-defence. Other factors that influence knife-carrying include a history of victimization, exposure to violence, engaging in risky behaviour such as drug use or gang membership, socio-economic disadvantage, lack of employment and/or opportunities. A sense of fear, particularly regarding being in public spaces and at night, influence knife carrying in young people in Australia.¹⁶ In Scotland and Australia, the most common age at which youth begin to carry knives is 13-14, and this has a strong influence on youth carrying knives throughout their teens.¹⁷ Such

13 Scottish Government (2011).


14 Home Office, Office for National Statistics, United Kingdom (2013).

15 See for example Bannister, J. et al. (2010); and Phillips, A. and V. Chamberlain (2006).

16 Brown, J. and J. Sutton (2007), in *Australian Journal of Guidance and Counselling* 17.

17 McVie, S. (2010), in Scottish Government Social Research; Australian Institute of Criminology (2009).

Fig. 3.8: Average percentage of homicides, by homicide mechanism, Scotland (2003-2013)



Source: Scottish Government (2013).

results suggest that early intervention targeted at young people carrying weapons could have a strong preventative impact, as could crime prevention strategies that enhance the perception of safety of young people.¹⁸

Psychoactive substances

From death to chronic illness and addiction, the consumption of psychoactive substances outside of medical control can have a plethora of negative health effects. Moreover, the use of intoxicants can have consequences beyond the impact on the individual consumer, as the consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs are cross-cutting facilitators for all types of violence. Both can increase the risk of becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence, and several links exist between the consumption of psychoactive substances and interpersonal violence. The first of those is “psychopharmacological”: as a result of the ingestion of specific substances, such as illicit drugs or alcohol, individuals may experience changes in their physiological functioning that typically restrain behaviour. The second is “economic-compulsive”: addicted or dependent individuals commit crimes in order to fund their alcohol or illicit drug use.¹⁹ The illicit trafficking of drugs has an additional element that links violence with drugs, as “systemic” or “structural” violence is an inherent component of the

¹⁸ Bartels, L. (2011b), Australian Institute of Criminology.

¹⁹ These explanations are based on WHO (2009). *Interpersonal violence and illicit drug use*; and WHO (2006). *Interpersonal violence and alcohol*.

Measures to control knife-carrying in the United Kingdom

Noting the severity of knife-related homicide, particularly among young people, the United Kingdom enacted the *Violent Crime Reduction Act* in 2006. Among its many provisions, it included raising the minimum age for buying a knife from 16 to 18 years of age, and increasing the maximum sentence for carrying a knife without good reason from two to four years^a In addition, the United Kingdom launched the “Tackling Knives Action Programme (TKAP)” in 2008, in response to a number of knife homicides involving teenage victims. Police in areas of greatest concern introduced a range of enforcement, education and prevention initiatives aimed at reducing youth knife violence. The programme ran from June 2008 to March 2010 and demonstrated positive reductions in the number of homicide victims and suspects in the areas in which it was implemented, though the reductions were not proportionately higher in programme areas than elsewhere, as reductions of serious youth violence were noted across the country from 2007 to 2010.^b

^a Government of the United Kingdom (2006). *Violent Crime Reduction Act*.

^b For more on the TKAP, see Ward, L, Nicholas S. and M. Willoughby (2011).

illicit drug market and is used to enforce payment, resolve competition and to punish.²⁰

The psychopharmacological explanation relates directly to the interpersonal homicide typology, but economic-compulsive and systemic or structural violence are more closely tied to the typology of homicidal violence linked to other criminal activities. But it is often difficult to disentangle the relationship between these different explanations for spikes or drops in violence, as the use of psychoactive substances is commonly associated with other risk-taking behaviours and social conditions (such as poverty), making associations challenging to isolate. Individual, situational and socio-cultural factors also come into play, and very few countries have available data on the nature of the crimes committed while under the influence of alcohol or illicit drugs.

²⁰ Goldstein, P. (1985), in *Journal of Drug Issues* 14.

Alcohol


A serious threat to public health in many countries, alcohol can affect different types of interpersonal violence, including various types of interpersonal homicide. The link between alcohol and violence involves a causal chain that binds together alcohol consumption and other aforementioned factors to form a relationship that may be more conditional than deterministic.²¹ While violence levels, including homicide rates, are influenced by the volume of alcohol consumption, they are even more influenced by patterns of alcohol consumption, with a number of studies indicating, for example, that hazardous drinking patterns are strongly associated with homicide rates.²²

Findings made by the European Homicide Monitor suggest that 82 per cent of homicide offenders in Finland in 2003-2006 were intoxicated with alcohol when they committed murder, whereas that was the case for slightly more than half of homicide offenders in Sweden.²³ This research also suggests that the difference between total homicide rates in Finland and Sweden can to a large extent be attributed to alcohol-related homicides (see figure 3.9).²⁴

Australia also has available data on the consumption of alcohol by homicide victims and offenders. In 2008-2010, nearly half of all homicide incidents were preceded by alcohol consumption by the victim or the perpetrator, or both.²⁵ Elsewhere, in cases reviewed in the southern Indian State of Odisha from 2006-2011, 30.2 per cent of homicide victims were found to have a positive blood alcohol content.²⁶

The consumption of alcohol, particularly at “harmful” levels, is a major risk factor for homicides between partners. As an example, a Finnish study on intimate partner homicides between

Fig. 3.9: Annual victimization rates of alcohol-related and non-alcohol-related homicides, Finland and Sweden (2003-2006)



Source: European Homicide Monitor.

2002 and 2010 showed that 73 per cent of all male offenders and 77 per cent of all female offenders were under the influence of alcohol at the time of the homicide. The study also noted that 62 per cent of the victims of male offenders and 77 per cent of the victims of female offenders were also intoxicated with alcohol.²⁷

Links between these phenomena are manifold and research has suggested that the use of alcohol increases both the occurrence and severity of intimate partner violence for the following reasons: alcohol use has a direct effect on both cognitive and physical function, reducing inhibition and leaving people less capable of negotiating a non-violent resolution to conflicts within relationships; excessive drinking by one partner can exacerbate financial difficulties, childcare problems, infidelity or other family stressors, resulting in increased tensions in a relationships and the potential risk of violence between partners; and individual and societal beliefs that alcohol causes aggression can excuse or condone violent behaviour after drinking, and the use of alcohol can be an excuse for violent behaviour.

21 For a review of the many elements involved in the relationship between alcohol and violence, see Bye, E.K. (2012), in *Handbook of European Homicide Research: Patterns, explanations and country studies*.
 22 See Rossow, I. (2000), National Institute for Alcohol and Drug Research, Norway; Bye, E. K. (2008), in *Homicide Studies* 12(1); Rehm, J., et al. (2004), World Health Organization.
 23 *Homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden: A first study on the European Homicide Monitor data* (2011).
 24 Lehti, M. and J. Kivivuori, (2005), in *Nordisk alcohol- and narko-tikatiidskrift*, 22. Pp. 5-18.
 25 Australian Institute of Criminology (2013).
 26 Mohanty, S. et al. (2013), in *Forensic Medicine and Anatomy Research* 1(2).

27 Kivivuori, J. and M. Lehti (2012), in *Homicide Studies* 16 (1): P.60.

Alcohol-related policy strategies

Policy strategies that involve limiting the availability of alcohol have proved effective in reducing violence. Studies have demonstrated that licensed premises can become “hot spots” for violent behaviour, and strategies to prevent heavy consumption in bars and pubs are particularly relevant for the reduction of violence. This has proved to be the case in cities that have experienced high levels of violence. Starting with Bogota, in 1995, several cities in Colombia that were experiencing high levels of violence adopted so-called “dry laws” that restrict the sale of alcohol in bars and restaurants during certain hours. For example, Cali had a very high homicide rate, with alcohol being associated with an increase in the number of homicides.^a A variety of policies, from relatively lax to very restrictive, limiting the sale of alcohol in public places were enacted over several different periods throughout 2004–2008. Research demonstrated an increased risk of homicide during periods when the less restrictive policies were in effect, which was consistent across all homicides, including those by firearm and by sharp object.^b


Similar policies in the Americas and Europe have had similar effects,^c suggesting that longer alcohol sales hours may lead to increased levels of alcohol consumption and subsequently to more violence.

^a Concha-Eastman, A. et al. (2002), in *Pan American Journal of Public Health* 12.

^b Sanchez, A. I. et al. (2011), in *International Journal of Epidemiology* 2011.

^c Biderman, C., J. M.P. de Mello and A. A. Schneider (2006), in *The Economic Journal* 120 (543); Duailibi, S. et al. (2007), in *American Journal of Public Health* 97(12); Pacific Institute

Fig. 3.10: Homicide rates during various time restrictions on alcohol sales, Cali, Colombia (2004–2008)



Source: Sanchez, A.I. et al. (2011).

for Research and Evaluation (2004); Rossow, I. and T. Norstrom (2011), in *Addiction* 107.

Illicit drugs

As with alcohol consumption, the use of illicit drugs can increase the risk of becoming a victim or a perpetrator of violence. However, different drugs have different psychopharmacological effects, with some, such as cocaine and amphetamines, being more related to violence than others.²⁸ In addition, in contrast to alcohol, the production and distribution of illicit drugs can also generate a great deal of violence.


It is particularly challenging to disentangle the various components of illicit drug-related homicide, as this type of violence is the product of the

interaction of a variety of different complex causes and underlying factors. The mechanisms linking illicit drugs to homicide are not universal and they vary, not only from one drug type to another but also across nations and communities. Efforts to intervene will often also affect other components of the interactive system (supply and demand),²⁹ but a review of all aspects of the drug-related illicit economy (cultivation, production, distribution, transit and sale) would be necessary for a comprehensive assessment, as these components also trigger other crimes and violence in connection with the safeguarding of criminal activities, including disputes between rival criminal factions.

28 WHO (2009). *Interpersonal violence and illicit drug use*.

29 Office of National Drug Control Policy, United States (2013). P. 31.

Fig. 3.11: Percentage of adult homicide victims and offenders under the influence of drugs at time of crime (2003-2006)




Source: European Homicide Monitor.

Very few countries produce data on the nature of crimes committed while under the influence of illicit drugs. But when looking specifically at the influence of drug intoxication on homicide, about 20 per cent of male homicide offenders in Finland and Sweden in 2003-2006 were under the influence of illicit or psychosomatic drugs, often combined with alcohol, when they committed homicide (see figure 3.11),³⁰ whereas the percentages of female perpetrators intoxicated with illicit drugs were lower. Moreover, the fact that significant percentages of homicide victims were under the influence of illicit drugs is indicative of the multiple effects that illicit drugs can have on violence.

In addition to the pharmacological link between illicit drug consumption and homicide, significant violence is also associated with crimes motivated by the need for drug users to purchase often expensive drugs. As mentioned earlier, a third distinct source of violence arises from illicit drug markets (a systemic, or structural relationship), in which violence is used as a tool. The relationship between drug markets, trafficking routes, organized criminal groups, anti-drug efforts and violence is being increasingly studied in an attempt to identify pat-

30 *Homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden: A first study on the European Homicide Monitor data* (2011).

Fig. 3.12: Homicide rates, by type of municipality, Colombia (1990-2008)



Source: Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013b).

terns of association and/or causality links, including reverse causality (i.e. more violence in a given region reduces opportunities for legal activities). Another objective is to underline the reality that lethal violence and drug trafficking often share underlying causes, such as weak rule of law and fragile institutions that can both enable illicit activities and provide impunity for violence.

The systemic effect of drugs on violence can take many forms at different levels, from the cultivation and production of illicit drugs through the trafficking process to the retail level. The violence associated with the production of drugs in some countries appears to be considerable. Recent studies have found, for example, that drug production activities in Colombia accounted for a significant share of the country's homicides in 2010.³¹ Competition between illegal armed groups, and with the Government, over control of territories suitable for coca cultivation and cocaine production can result in lethal violence. For example, as cocaine cultivation shifted from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia in the early 1990s, surges in violence occurred between competing factions involved in coca cultivation and cocaine production, and violence increased after 2000, particularly in

31 Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013a).

municipalities with significant coca cultivation³² (see figure 3.12).³³

The transit phase of transnational drug trafficking also generates a significant amount of crime and violence, as homicides are frequently associated with organizations involved in the movement of drugs.³⁴ It has been widely speculated that drug trafficking is responsible for the high levels of violence in Central America, but while there has been research into that particular nexus, no evidence can prove a direct link between the two crimes. For every area that has high levels of both drug trafficking and homicide, there are others with low levels of trafficking and high homicide, and yet others with low levels of homicide and high levels of trafficking.³⁵

As discussed in the *Global Study on Homicide 2011*,³⁶ it is likely that changes in drug markets drive lethal violence, rather than violence being driven by overall levels of trafficking flows. A recent study, giving a slightly different perspective, found that while interdiction efforts in Colombia (based on increased seizures starting in 2007) had an immediate effect on drug trafficking activities in Mexico, creating a negative supply shock, competition in drug trafficking activities in Mexico had an extended effect on violence, with a strong relationship between homicide rates and the number of cartels in a given municipality in 2007-2010. One of the key findings of the study is that the presence of each additional cartel in a particular location results in a doubling of the homicide rate, which suggests that the main channel relating the drug trade to violence is competition between cartels over the control of territory, as there was a milder effect on fighting between authorities and traffickers due to the supply shocks from Colombian seizures.³⁷

With regard to retail markets for illicit drugs, the literature on drug-related violence focuses largely on the Americas and suggests that there is strong

evidence that cocaine (including crack cocaine) was associated with homicide, particularly gun homicides related to drug retail markets in the 1980s and 1990s, in the United States.³⁸ This serves as a reminder of how specific such phenomena are to their particular context: in Western Europe, for example, the emergence of crack cocaine (such as in Spain and the United Kingdom) has not generated a similar upturn in violence.

32 Municipalities dedicated to coca cultivation with at least 10 hectares (on average) between 1990-2008 (using only the years for which cultivation figures are available). (Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013b).

33 Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013b). Pp. 4-5.

34 UNODC (2013). *World Drug Report*. P. 48; Organization of American States (2013). P. 75; UNODC (2011). *Global Study on Homicide*. Pp. 51-53.

35 Organization of American States (2013). P. 78.

36 UNODC (2011). *Global Study on Homicide*. Pp. 51-52.

37 Castillo, J.C., Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013).

38 Fryer, R.G. et al. (2013), in *Economic Inquiry* 51.



4. HOMICIDE, VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT

In countries with recent experience of conflict, it is often difficult to disentangle violence that is an after-effect of conflict, or a lower-intensity continuation of conflict, from violence related to other criminal activities. The formal end of an armed conflict does not necessarily translate into an immediate cessation of all hostilities, and attempts to distinguish between conflict and non-conflict violence need to account for the reality of situations in which various types of violence are often indistinguishable and overlapping.¹

Understanding the nature of lethal violence and crime in post-conflict² countries or countries emerging from conflict is important for clarifying the actual challenges those countries face, as well as for bolstering their stability in the aftermath. Reducing violence in such settings goes beyond the need to address the roots of the conflict, to include the prevention of surges in violence resulting from organized crime and interpersonal violence, which can flourish in settings with weak institutions and weak rule of law.

Homicides in those settings can result from violence linked to other criminal activities, interpersonal conflict or socio-political agendas, the three typologies put forth in chapter 2 of this study. A significant share of homicides in post-conflict settings is related to other criminal activities, which can flourish when law enforcement institutions are

weak. In addition to conventional crime, the incidence of organized crime-related violence is increasingly plausible in several countries with recent experiences of conflict, but it is difficult to quantify. Research has started to explore the relationship between post-conflict recovery and the onset of transnational organized crime and related violence,³ the perpetrators of which have proved adept at illicitly exploiting gaps in the rule of law. Examples of this include changes in drug trafficking routes to exploit post-conflict and vulnerable settings in West Africa in the mid-2000s,⁴ as well as the exploitation of natural resources and associated violence in several post-conflict countries.⁵ Criminal activities, including transnational organized crime, deplete the social and economic capital that could be used to develop the economy and improve social cohesion, and can contribute to violence that may trigger instability or a return to armed conflict.

Interpersonal violence in post-conflict settings, which often carries the legacy of a conflict, can easily escalate, particularly when an enduring sense of impunity pervades such situations. Violence may have become a way of life, a social norm, for people living in and through armed conflict. For instance, interpersonal disputes over land ownership and resources such as livestock can be particularly violent in States where non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms are weak or non-existent. In such contexts, both men and women can be victimized by violence of a physical and sexual nature, both within the family and the community

1 See Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011).

2 There are different interpretations of this term, but while “post-conflict” is, in effect, a process, for the purposes of this study, it refers to the aftermath of conflict, usually a post-war situation. It can, however, also apply to the aftermath of internal rebellions or other situations that do not fit as neatly into standard conceptions of war. This definition of a post-conflict State is from UNDP (2005). P. 178.

3 World Bank (2011). *World Development Report*, chapter 1.

4 See UNODC (2013b); and UNODC (2009).

5 See, for example, UNODC (2011b).

Violence and development

Despite the differing natures of conflict and crime, both are detrimental to security and development. A direct causal relationship is difficult to establish — in actuality, such a relationship runs both ways — but it has also been argued that violence is development in reverse^a in many post-conflict settings. According to a World Bank study, poverty reduction in countries affected by major violence is an average of almost one percentage point slower per year than in countries not affected by violence,^b which, after a few years, can be significant. This “development deficit” is particularly concentrated in vulnerable and conflict-affected States as, due to weak institutions, they are less likely to be able to absorb development inputs than States not affected by conflict.^c

The effects of violence are enduring: some research literature has shown that for countries having experienced civil war since 1960, an average of 14 years of peace is required to return to the growth paths prior to the conflict.^d There is something of a consensus among the academic and international communities that lethal violence is often rooted in contexts of poverty, deprivation, inequality and injustice, social marginalization and weak rule of law. This study's predecessor, the *Global Study on Homicide 2011*, demonstrated that lower levels of violent crime are generally related to higher levels of development, as well as to lower levels of income inequality.^e

Addressing the root causes of violence and crime, fostering development of the rule of law, supporting institutions of justice and mechanisms for conflict resolution are ways to reduce violence and support development. In countries coping with the legacies of conflict and its related fragility, this is a critical step in preventing a return to armed conflict.

^a Collier, P. (2004).

^b World Bank (2011).

^c UNDP (2010).

^d Hoefler, A., Billerbeck S. and S.S. Ijaz (2010), World Bank. P. 4.

^e For more, see UNODC (2011a), chapter 2; and UNODC (2007).

at large. Violence is often nourished by the ready availability and abundance of firearms and other weapons, not to mention the willingness of a desperate, traumatized, displaced and unemployed young population to use them — many of whom may already be hardened by the violence of the former conflict.



Homicide of a socio-political nature, which is often linked to power-related agendas, may also be dominant in some States with recent experiences of conflict. This is particularly true in countries where the causes of armed conflict have not been fully resolved and the distinction between conflict-related deaths and intentional homicides is particularly blurred. For example, recorded deaths due to intentional homicide may overlap with recorded civilian casualties attributed to the conflict, making it difficult to determine the types of policies and prevention efforts that need to be implemented from a criminal justice perspective.

There are several challenges to conducting research on crime and violence in post-conflict situations. For example, there is little to no pre-conflict baseline data available for the countries discussed in this chapter, and there is a reduced capacity of law enforcement and justice institutions to fulfil their duties, such as the registration of criminal offences and their statistical reporting. The countries analysed in this chapter have been selected as the presence of United Nations peacekeeping operations or missions⁶ has resulted in the availability of official statistics relating to their respective crime and violence situations.

Furthermore, perceptions of security have different benchmarks in countries emerging from conflict, as people may perceive high levels of crime and violence to be relatively low in comparison to during the conflict period, thus do not report being victimized by crime as such. However, information from survey data, including on perceptions of safety and security, can provide complementary insights. Also, due to the gradual strengthening of security and justice institutions in the countries analysed here, it is likely that better reporting and data collection processes over the years is resulting in reported increases in some crimes, or increased reporting and/or recording only in certain areas with access to services. As such, comparisons across countries and over time should therefore be made with caution. In spite of such challenges, this chapter attempts to provide insight into patterns and trends in homicidal violence and violent crime in countries that have recently experienced conflict.

⁶ During the preparation of this study, several United Nations Peacekeeping Operations were contacted for assistance with the collection of data. In particular, UNODC would like to gratefully acknowledge the support and data provided by MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNIPSIL (Sierra Leone), UNMIL (Liberia), UNMISS (South Sudan), UNAMA (Afghanistan) and UNAMI (Iraq).

Fig. 4.1: Homicide rates in selected countries emerging from conflict (2007-2013)




Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan; WHO (2014); Ministry of Interior, South Sudan (2012a and 2012b); UNDPKO-UNMISS, JMAC; UNDPKO-MINUSTAH; Sierra Leone Police; UNDPKO-UNMIL.

The countries analysed in this chapter have had different experiences of conflict in the years following the “official” end of their respective conflicts, yet all struggle with crime and its enablers as elements of the post-conflict setting. In some, security challenges are not only related to the conflict but also to an increase in levels of crime; in others, there has been a positive trend towards a decrease in violence and an increase in security, as perceived by the population.

Nevertheless, they do show some similar trends. For example, because of their weak institutions, all the countries analysed face challenges in asserting the rule of law. As elsewhere in the world, interpersonal violence (such as that driven by access to resources like land) accounts for a significant share of homicide cases, and this type of violence may be made more acute by weak rule of law and the population’s lack of trust in institutions. Also, as in non-conflict-affected countries, violence appears to be largely an urban phenomenon (see figure

Fig. 4.2: Homicide rates in national capitals versus rest of country, selected countries emerging from conflict (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNDPKO-MINUSTAH; Sierra Leone Police; UNDPKO-UNMIL; Ministry of Interior, South Sudan (2012a and 2012b); UNDPKO-UNMISS, JMAC; UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

4.2), which may be due to the increased instability and inequality linked to the influx of people to the major cities, either in search of employment or services, or because they were forced out of their more rural communities during the conflict. But given the presence of international organizations (often in the capital city) and the challenges facing security and infrastructure outside the major urban centres, such patterns may also be due to better recording of data in cities.

Experiences of violence in certain countries with high levels of conflict-related violence: Afghanistan and Iraq

It is extremely difficult to differentiate types and contexts of deadly violence in countries with recent experiences of violence. However, available data on civilian casualties⁷ in Afghanistan and Iraq show that civilians bear the brunt of violence emanating from still-warring parties: the population may be caught in the crossfire of armed operations between

7 As per the definition used in international humanitarian law (Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I (1977)), civilians are persons who are not members of military/paramilitary forces or members belonging to organized armed groups of a party to a conflict. Civilian casualties are the civilian victims of conflict, and they may be of two types: direct (resulting directly from armed conflict, including, for example, military operations, targeted killings, indiscriminate bombings, etc.) or indirect (casualties resulting from, for example, explosive remnants of war, deaths in cross-fire, etc.). For more, see the definition provided by UNAMA (2013).

government and anti-government forces; or may be victimized by violence perpetrated by governmental and non-governmental armed groups. But beyond deaths directly related to the conflict, there are also cases of intentional homicide that are contributing to the violent deaths in both those countries. Although data is scarce and it is not always possible to determine whether counts of civilian casualties and intentional homicides overlap, there is more to the story of lethal violence than purely conflict-related deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq, with criminal violence playing a role in that story.

Afghanistan

According to United Nations sources, between 2008 and 2013 the annual rate of civilian casualties in Afghanistan ranged between 8 and 10 per 100,000 population, with a peak in 2011. Over the same period, the responsibility for those deaths gradually switched, with anti-government elements⁸ accounting for just over half of all civilian casualties in 2008, while they were responsible for nearly 80 per cent in 2012 and 2013 (see figure 4.3).

Almost half of the civilian casualties in Afghanistan are the result of indiscriminate attacks, such as with


improvised explosive devices (IEDs), whereas around a quarter are the result of targeted killings of specific civilians on the basis of their employment or perceived support of the Government or international forces; a tactic aimed at asserting control over and terrorizing the population.⁹ In non-conflict situations, targeted killings of that nature would be considered socio-political homicides.

Data from the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan show a marked increase in the rate of intentional homicide since 2009, when data became available, from a rate of 4.0 to 6.5 per 100,000 population in 2012. In settings such as the non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan, the boundary between crime and conflict-related violence is particularly blurred. No information is available on the type of violent deaths included in the count of intentional homicide, and there is a possibility that a share of the homicide count includes some deaths counted among the civilian victims recorded by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The statistical count of wilful killings of civilians by parties to the conflict, an illegal action in any circumstance,¹⁰ is characterized by a number of operational and methodological challenges (see chapter 6).

Given the challenges of determining the nature of conflict versus non-conflict deaths in Afghanistan, no information is available on existing homicide typologies. That said, it appears that the feeling of insecurity amongst Afghans has increased slightly over the last few years, according to different population-based surveys. A recent UNODC survey noted that the percentage of the adult population that considered insecurity to be one of the most pressing challenges in the country increased from just over 50 per cent in 2009 to just under 60 per cent in 2012.¹¹

In another survey, Afghans reported that their daily security is more affected by conventional forms of crime (such as assault or livestock theft) than by attacks by anti-government or pro-government forces.¹² Available survey data suggest that the percentage of the population that has fallen victim to crime and violence has remained stable

Fig. 4.3: Rate of civilian casualties, by type of perpetrator, Afghanistan (2008-2013)



Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (2013).

⁸ “Anti-government elements” encompass all individuals and armed groups involved in armed conflict with or armed opposition against the Government of Afghanistan and/or international military forces. See UNAMA (2013).

⁹ UNAMA (2013). P. 4.

¹⁰ As per Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits the killing of civilians by Parties to the Conflict at anytime, anyplace, whatsoever. (See Geneva Conventions).

¹¹ UNODC (2013a).

¹² Asia Foundation (2012). Chapter 3.

over the last few years, though at a high level. According to data on offences reported to the police, the prevalence of other forms of crime has also risen over the last few years (for example, reported thefts have increased by 80 per cent and incidents of assault have more than doubled),¹³ indicating that other types of crime and violence are also affecting the safety and security of Afghans. Increased reporting could also demonstrate the increased capacity of the criminal justice system to record such offences, increased territorial coverage of recording, or growing trust in the criminal justice system's ability to respond to crime.


Iraq

As in Afghanistan, it is extremely challenging to determine the nature of violent deaths in Iraq. With terrorism, insurgency, ethnic and sectarian violence all interwoven, the violence in Iraq is complex and has led to an increase in instability. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), rising inter-sectarian tension is posing a major threat to stability and security in the country, much of it driven by armed opposition and terrorist groups.¹⁴ In addition, the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic has also contributed to increased sectarian tensions, most notably in the border regions.¹⁵ Such tensions may contribute to violence and, in extreme cases, lethal violence.

Iraq has been experiencing a surge in violence and terror attacks since early 2013, with most of the resulting deaths being of civilians. This increase in civilian casualties is a reversal of the overall declining trend since 2007, and the level is now higher than at any point since 2008 (see figure 4.4). Most of the killings are the result of coordinated bombings, which target civilian infrastructure such as markets and cafes, rather than government buildings.¹⁶

Casualties caused by the activities of armed groups and terrorism do not, however, provide the complete picture of violence experienced by the population of Iraq. In 2012, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated more than 2,600 intentional homicides in the country (a rate of 8.0

Fig. 4.4: Rate of civilian casualties, Iraq (2007-2013)



Note: Bars refer to data from UNAMI, with high and low estimates based on additional sources of information about civilian casualties in Iraq (Iraq Body Count and the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy).

*Note: 2013 data are based on statistics for January-August 2013.

Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) (2013).

per 100,000 population).¹⁷ No information is available on the type of violent deaths included in the estimate of intentional homicides, and a share of the civilian victims of violent deaths may be included in both the estimate of intentional homicides and in those of civilian casualties. Data on other types of violence and crime, such as extortion, kidnapping, robbery and assault, are limited, although reporting has suggested that minorities continue to be targeted in such acts of violence.¹⁸

The violence in both Afghanistan and Iraq is arguably a symptom of transition as the two countries struggle to establish and solidify new national identities that bridge the many divides working to undermine them. Measuring civilian casualties and reported homicide cases is one way to quantify the levels of violence in Afghanistan and Iraq, but such measures are preliminary steps in addressing the public safety and security concerns of the population.

¹³ Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan (2013).

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council (2013a). S/2013/408.

¹⁵ Kobler, M. (2013). *Briefing of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq Martin Kobler to the United Nations Security Council*.

¹⁶ United Nations News Centre (2013).

¹⁷ WHO (2014).

¹⁸ United Nations Security Council. (2013a). S/2013/408. Para. 35

A snapshot of violence in a situation of entrenched conflict: Somalia

Afflicted by armed conflict for over 20 years, Somalia has seen the nature of violence change over time. There is no official data on crime and violence in Somalia, but some surveys⁴ conducted throughout the country in 2010 provide valuable information on perceptions of public safety and security, as well as on the extent of killings, in a context of ongoing sectarian violence. The surveys were conducted during one of the final years of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government, prior to the establishment of the new constitution in 2012.

Map 4.1: Cities surveyed, Somalia (2010)



Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

In Mogadishu, most of the violence appeared to be related to the conflict, with firearms playing a key role in much of it. Some 4 per cent of survey respondents noted that a household member had been killed in the previous year; assaults were also common, with 1 in 10 respondents falling victim to at least one physical assault or attack in the previous year. Private dwellings did not provide


shelter from violence, as most sexual violence was reported to have occurred in homes, with over half of reported cases being perpetrated by armed groups, a quarter by individual criminals and 10 per cent by government agents. The level of firearm-related assault in Mogadishu was also reported to be high: two-thirds of all assaults were committed with a firearm.

In other cities, the population experienced different levels and patterns of violence. In Las Anod, for example, most respondents perceived that their district had become safer in the past year and that most of the violence was interpersonal in nature. The survey respondents described homicides as being largely revenge killings and compensation-related disputes, and land-related conflict was deemed the primary source of violence in the district. Similarly, in Burao, there was an overwhelming perception of safety, and much of the violence appeared to be of the interpersonal type, with little of it triggered by crime or involving organized armed groups.

Higher levels of violence were experienced in Galkayo, a known investment and financing hub for piracy, where 6 per cent of respondents reported that a member of their households had been a victim of homicide in the previous year, rising to 12 per cent among internally displaced persons. Most of those killings were attributed to traditional revenge killing, which is often not considered a crime, but rather a legitimate form of achieving justice. The prevalence of firearms contributed to the intensity and lethality of the violence.

The dynamics of violence in a country that has experienced entrenched conflict for decades are different across the surveyed districts, but a few commonalities are evident, such as the use of firearms, the use of lethal violence for revenge and the elevated levels of interpersonal violence. Respondents in all cities also indicated a very low level of trust in criminal justice and security organizations, and, consequently, very low shares of crimes were reported to authorities for proper investigation and sanctioning. The lack of faith in formal authorities bodes ill for the establishment of the rule of law.

⁴The information presented in this box is based on crime and victimization surveys conducted by the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention in Burao, Bossaso, Galkayo and Las Anod, as well as six districts in Mogadishu from 2009 to 2010. These regions include concentrations of population, and each face different security challenges, varying between conflict, post-conflict, and crime-related victimization. For more, see OCVP (2010).

Map 4.2: Homicide rate, by State, South Sudan (2013)

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
 Note: 2013 data are based on statistics for January-May 2013.

Source: UNDPKO-UNMISS.

Examples of countries with high and increasing levels of violence and instability not directly related to the conflict: South Sudan and Haiti

South Sudan

South Sudan¹⁹ seceded from Sudan in July 2011 and is still consolidating its transition to independence. Much of the violence in the country is linked to resources such as land and livestock, as well as to crime and ongoing clashes between various armed groups, and to inter-clan disputes. In addition, ongoing inter-communal violence and residual armed group activity from the conflict often result in large-scale displacement, increasing the vulnerability of the population.²⁰ Other sources of insecurity include the proliferation of small arms, increasing urbanization and limited economic opportunities for the country's very young and very poor population.²¹

Reliable statistics for observing and analysing trends are not yet available, and the available data

should be interpreted with caution in relation to its accuracy and coverage.²² Until recently, there was no mechanism for collecting data on crime in South Sudan and it is likely that most crime is under-reported. However, it is possible to identify "hot spots" of crime and violence. Based on data from the Ministry of Interior and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the national homicide rate in 2012 was estimated to be 13.9 per 100,000 population, whereas the 2013 rate is estimated to be 21.3 per 100,000 population.²³ The increase in 2013 has been driven by violence in Jonglei State and in the Wunlit Triangle (Lakes, Warrap and Unity States), where homicide rates more than doubled in the first half of 2013 from those observed in 2012, from 25 to over 60 per 100,000 population, ten times the global average homicide rate (See map 4.2).

19 The data on which this analysis of South Sudan is based were finalized prior to the violence and civil unrest of December 2013.

20 g7+ (2013a).

21 National Bureau of Statistics, South Sudan (2012).

22 The United Nations Police of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) are cataloguing crime statistics, and have detailed monthly data available by State since December 2012.

23 These data are based and projected on six months of data from both December 2011-May 2012 and January-May 2013, as collected by the Ministry of Interior, South Sudan (2012a and 2012b) and the UNDPKO-UNMISS Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) (2013).

The majority of this increase is associated with the escalation of cattle rustling/raiding, a region-specific form of crime that bridges two homicide typologies: those linked to crime and to interpersonal conflicts. Much of South Sudan is rural and cattle are considered indicators of wealth and social standing. As such, rustling can be a means to obtain a wife through accumulating money to pay a “bride price”, and can also symbolize the mark of an adolescent’s transition to maturity. Additionally, during the dry season, pastoralists move their cattle towards water resources, which may bring communities competing for scarce resources into closer contact with one another.²⁴ Cattle rustling and its associated reprisals has been a long-standing source of communal violence in the region, but has only recently begun to be considered as constituting a type of crime,²⁵ and one which often involves organized criminal groups as well as the increasing use of firearms. The country is awash in small arms following the years of conflict — an estimated 327,000 small arms²⁶ were in circulation in 2012 — and cattle raiders can be better armed than law enforcement officers. Attacks related to cattle raids can claim hundreds of lives,²⁷ destroy entire communities and exacerbate inter-communal tensions, particularly in the Wunlit Triangle where this form of violence is most prevalent.²⁸ Increasingly carried out also for commercial and political reasons, such raids may be facilitated by weak rule of law in this newly independent country.²⁹

Outside the Wunlit Triangle, violence is driven by different factors. Jonglei State, where much of the violence linked to armed conflict is still occurring, also has a high rate of homicide, above 35 per 100,000 population in 2012 and 2013. Most of the killings in Jonglei are linked to occasional confrontations between the army and rebel groups,

but episodes of civil unrest and protest have also resulted in violence.³⁰ In Juba, the capital of South Sudan, high levels of unemployment and increasing urban migration have increased competition for scarce resources such as land, fuelling interpersonal and, at times, inter-communal rivalries.³¹ Juba accounts for the vast majority of all violent crime occurring in Central Equatoria State, including over 90 per cent of the reported rapes and robberies.³²

Haiti

Haiti’s vulnerability to political instability has been noted for decades. The United Nations has been directly involved in the country since the first peacekeeping mission deployed in 1993, following a coup in 1991.³³ Despite experiencing political volatility and a concomitant lack of stability, in addition to several natural disasters, all of which have weakened the country’s fragile institutions, Haiti routinely has one of the lowest reported homicide rates in the Caribbean (although it is still above the global average). All three homicide typologies occur to varying extents within the country, but concerns regarding gang-related homicides are most prominent.

The most recent wave of conflict-related violence erupted in February 2004, following months of deteriorating security, when armed conflict spread across the country as a coalition of rebel groups seized control over the north. Spikes in homicide and other violent crimes occurred from mid-2004 to late 2006 due to the actions of armed groups and gangs who frequently joined forces, notably in parts of the capital, Port-au-Prince.³⁴ Homicide rates and kidnappings increased in early 2008, partially due to a deterioration in economic conditions linked to the global economic crisis and political instability.³⁵ Already vulnerable to civil unrest and renewed gang activity,³⁶ Haitian institutions were further weakened by the devastating January 2010 earthquake, which hampered the country’s ability to combat lawlessness.

24 UNEP (2009).

25 See the 2008 Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) *Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa*, which defines “cattle rustling” as the “stealing or planning, organizing, attempting, aiding or abetting the stealing of livestock by any person from one country or community to another, where the theft is accompanied by dangerous weapons and violence.”

26 Small Arms Survey (2012).

27 For example, it is estimated that almost 70 per cent of homicides in Warrap in April 2013 were linked to cattle raids; in Lakes State it was over 80 per cent, and in Unity it was almost 90 per cent, according to data from UNDPKO-UNMISS. With such attacks, the annual rates of homicide in the Wunlit Triangle of South Sudan closely resembles homicide rates of countries with high levels of intentional killings.

28 United Nations Security Council (2013b). *S/2013/140*.

29 Yual, D. (2012); and Mbugua, J.K. (2012).

30 For example, see UN OCHA (2013).

31 UNDPKO-UNMISS, Radio Miraya (2013).

32 Data provided by UNDPKO-UNMISS, JMAC (2013).

33 UNDPKO. *MINUSTAH background*.

34 United Nations Security Council (2004). *S/2004/300*.

35 United Nations Security Council (2008). *S/2008/586*. Coinciding with the global economic crisis, Haiti saw rising prices for oil, food, and also experienced a decrease in remittances from Haitians living abroad. Haiti is the 20th most aid-dependent country in the world (see OECD (2012)).

36 United Nations Security Council (2009). *S/2009/129*.

Fig. 4.5: Rates of selected violent crimes, Haiti (2007-2013)


Source: UNDPKO-MINUSTAH and UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Haiti's homicide rate has doubled in recent years (from 5.1 per 100,000 in 2007 to 10.2 per 100,000 in 2012), but it decreased slightly in the first half of 2013.³⁷ The 2012 rate was half the homicide rate in the neighbouring Dominican Republic (22.1 per 100,000 in 2012) and only a quarter that in Jamaica (39.3 per 100,000 in 2012), but the increase remains notable. Other types of violent crime, such as reported rapes and kidnappings, increased in the aftermath of the earthquake, but the same decreasing pattern as for homicide can be seen as of 2013 (figure 4.5). The difference in homicide rates in comparison to other crimes may be due to better reporting and recording of lethal violence.

Moreover, Haiti's relatively low national homicide rate disguises nuances within the country, with most of the violence and gang activity concentrated in the country's urban centres, particularly Port-au-Prince and its surrounding metropolitan communes (see figure 4.6). In 2012, 75 per cent of the murders in Haiti took place in Port-au-Prince and firearms accounted for 87 per cent of them.³⁸ A recurrence of clashes between gangs, whose involvement in criminal and political vio-

³⁷ UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

³⁸ UNDPKO-MINUSTAH (2013).

Fig. 4.6: Homicide rates, Port-au-Prince and rest of Haiti (2011-2013)

Note: Data for 2013 are based on January-June 2013.

Source: UNDPKO-MINUSTAH and UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

lence in Haiti is deeply rooted, may explain such patterns.³⁹ Other than homicide, most other crime was also concentrated in Port au Prince. For example, 76 per cent of all recorded kidnappings during 2012 and the first half of 2013 took place in the capital.⁴⁰

Examples of homicide and violence in post-conflict countries with incremental gains in security and institution-building: Sierra Leone and Liberia

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone was embroiled in conflict from 1991-2002, which resulted in an estimated 70,000 casualties and 2.6 million people displaced, out of a population of just over 5 million.⁴¹ The war also affected the operations of the criminal justice institutions in the country, particularly through infrastructure destruction and the killing of personnel.⁴²

Sierra Leone is now demonstrating progress in fostering inclusive politics and conflict resolution,⁴³

³⁹ United Nations Security Council (2013c). S/2013/139.


⁴⁰ UNDPKO-MINUSTAH (2013).

⁴¹ UNDP (2006).

⁴² For more on the criminal justice system in Sierra Leone, see African Human Security Initiative (2009).

⁴³ For more, see g7+ (2013b).

Fig. 4.7: Rates of selected violent crimes, Sierra Leone (2004-2012)



Source: Sierra Leone Police (2011).


but it is still experiencing violence, particularly in its capital city, Freetown. The recorded homicide rate in Freetown increased from 5.7 per 100,000 in 2007 to 9.3 per 100,000 in 2011; the homicide rate also doubled in the north and increased in the east (see map 4.3), but official figures indicate that

the average homicide rate is relatively low at the national level. The elevated rate in the capital may, of course, indicate more reporting and better recording practices, given the greater concentration of criminal justice services in the city than elsewhere.

As in other developing countries, there is lack of data on social and economic conditions, but the Sierra Leone Police attribute much of the violence to unemployment and poverty, in addition to high population density, the number of single parent families, and high rates of drug use.⁴⁴ Many of the reasons for violence in Sierra Leone are thus legacies of the previous armed conflict, due to resettlement and issues related to the high levels of conflict-related deaths, such as population demographics and unstable family situations. The violence today may not be directly linked to the conflict, but the interpersonal causes of homicide are often rooted in the experiences of conflict.

The gradual improvement in the crime and security situation in Sierra Leone is confirmed by country-wide victimization survey data.⁴⁵ In 2008, property and livestock theft were the dominant crimes cited by respondents, whereas over 50 per cent of the population had experienced assault, armed robbery, housebreaking, property, crop or livestock theft in the previous year. Despite the

Map 4.3: Homicide rate, by sub-national region, Sierra Leone (2007 and 2011)



Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: Sierra Leone Police (2011).

⁴⁴ Sierra Leone Police (2011).

⁴⁵ Chikwanha, A.B. (2008), African Human Security Initiative.

high level of survey respondents who had experienced such crimes, the same survey reported that half of the respondents believed that the level of violent crime in their area had actually decreased in the last three years, and while the level of recorded homicide was relatively low, it was the most feared crime in the country. The challenges of policing the more rural areas resulted in some survey respondents turning to alternative forms of justice when they were victimized by crime.

Disarmament and demobilization of former combatants is an issue common to many post-conflict countries. For example, in Sierra Leone, a programme was implemented from 2003 to 2008 in order to reduce firearm availability,⁴⁶ which continued to be an enabling factor for violent crime. According to reported crime figures, there was a spate of armed robberies in the capital region in 2009-2010, which eventually declined due to improved measures to tackle crime by the police.⁴⁷

Liberia

Linked to neighbouring Sierra Leone by both geography and its role in that country's armed conflict, Liberia is emerging from civil wars that lasted from 1989-1996 and 1999-2003, and which included extreme acts of violence against civilians, including torture, rape, indiscriminate killings, beatings and abductions, as well as the use of child soldiers. The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission estimated that 250,000 people were killed and a million displaced during the conflicts.⁴⁸ Liberia's infrastructure and economy were devastated by the conflicts, and while the latter is now slowly recovering, the country remains one of the poorest and least developed in the world, ranking 174th out of 186 on the 2013 Human Development Index.⁴⁹

Due to the increased capacity of national authorities, some data on violent crime have become available in Liberia, but they should still be interpreted

Fig. 4.8: Rates of selected violent crimes, Liberia (2007-2012)



Source: UNDPKO-UNMIL and UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

with caution. These figures suggest that levels of reported crime in Liberia have been relatively constant over the last few years and, though the homicide rate has been routinely less than 5 per 100,000 population, other reported offences such as aggravated assault, rape and armed robbery have been at consistently higher levels (see figure 4.8).

According to a population survey undertaken in 2011,⁵⁰ most people felt safe and reported improvements in security during the previous year, with the majority stating that the Government was successful in reducing crime. The survey also found that in more than a third of criminal cases, the perpetrator was known to the victim, suggesting higher levels of interpersonal violence than homicide linked to other typologies.

Following the civil wars, firearms were widely available in Liberia, yet homicide by firearm occurred in less than 20 per cent of reported cases (see figure 4.9). By contrast, over 25 per cent of all homicides were committed with sharp objects,⁵¹ suggesting that the availability of sophisticated weaponry is not necessarily a characteristic of homicide in Liberia. Limited information is available

46 The "Arms for Development" programme, implemented in Sierra Leone from 2003-2008, was a community-based DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) programme that focused on youth-oriented policies, support for elections and access to education. One of its key aims was to control illicit arms trafficking and develop community-based approaches to weapons collections. Communities were offered incentives if they were declared "weapon-free". For more, see UNDP. *Arms for Development programme*, Sierra Leone.

47 Sierra Leone Police (2011).


48 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Liberia (2009).

49 UNDP. *Human Development Indicators: Liberia*.

50 Vinck, P, Pham, P. and T. Kreutzer (2011). Pp. 40-43.

51 UNDPKO-UNMIL (2013).

Fig. 4.9: Homicide mechanisms, Liberia (2012)



Source: UNDPKO-UNMIL.

on the motives behind homicides in Liberia, but mob justice was identified as the motivation in approximately 15 per cent of homicides recorded in 2012,⁵² which implies a lack of trust in the institutions tasked with implementing the rule of law.

Legacies of conflict can impact homicide and other violent crime

The data presented in this chapter show that in countries emerging from conflict, the path to peace is not necessarily a straight one,⁵³ nor is there always a clear distinction between crime-related and conflict-related violence. In many countries with recent experiences of conflict, a great deal of people still fear for their safety as a result of ongoing violence, in its many forms, and in some cases homicide levels are comparable to levels of civilian casualties. Instability and the legacies of conflict — the availability of weapons, broken social ties, displacement, trauma, large youth populations

The g7+ and the New Deal for engagement in fragile States

A recent initiative has focused on the links between security, justice and development, and the importance of measuring progress in these areas in the framework of conflict-affected countries. The *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* is an initiative of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, which brings together a group of conflict-affected States (the “g7+”), development partners and international organizations. At its core, the *New Deal* is built around five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), which are:

- Legitimate Politics — Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
- Security — Establish and strengthen people’s security
- Justice — Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice
- Economic Foundations — Generate employment and improve livelihoods
- Revenues and Services — Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery

The *New Deal* identifies the priority areas to be addressed in post-conflict settings and it outlines an agenda for more effective aid to fragile States based on the five PSGs: stronger alignment, mutual

accountability, more transparency and investments in country systems, and a shared approach to risk management. The combination of political, security, justice and development dimensions in one framework and the emphasis on monitoring progress against these five PSGs is unique and critically important in the *New Deal*.

As part of the monitoring and support system to assist countries in achieving the five PSGs, an interim list of indicators has been developed to measure progress. Some of the proposed indicators include, for example, “violent deaths per 100,000 population (conflict-related deaths and intentional homicides)” as an indicator to measure security, and the “extent of pre-trial detention” to measure justice. The use of such indicators in the countries of the *New Deal* can provide an important input into the discussions at the United Nations on the post-2015 development agenda. Issues such as peace, security, rule of law, justice and governance are not only relevant in the g7+ members, but are universal and relevant for all Member States of the United Nations.

⁵² The g7+ has 18 members (Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo). Its main objective is to share experiences, learn from one another and advocate for reforms to the way the international community engages in conflict-affected States.

Note: UNODC gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) in the drafting of this text.

⁵² UNDPKO-UNMIL(2013).

⁵³ For more, see World Bank (2011).

and influxes into urban areas — are risk factors for crime in all the countries studied in this chapter, as well as for all types of homicide. Such risk factors and the violence they may facilitate can undermine efforts towards peace-building and establishing the rule of law, which is fundamental for preventing organized crime from taking root and perpetuating the sense of insecurity and cycle of violence engendered by weak institutions.



5. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO HOMICIDE

Previous chapters in this study have focused on what is known about recorded homicide offences. This chapter focuses, however, on the response of criminal justice systems in terms of homicide cases solved by the police, persons arrested for and persons convicted of homicide.

Bringing the perpetrators of homicide to justice and preventing impunity for those responsible for lethal violence is a core responsibility of the State. Indeed, there is international recognition¹ that the State is required to provide judicial protection with regard to fundamental rights, including the right to life. An effective criminal justice system that ensures rigorous investigation, timely prosecution and fair adjudication of suspected homicide offenders is a pre-requisite for upholding the rule of law, as well as for achieving justice for homicide victims. The widespread impunity of perpetrators, on the other hand, fosters the kind of lawlessness that can facilitate more violence, recidivism, organized criminal activities and even contribute to the perpetration of more homicides.

Measuring the criminal justice response to homicide requires accurate and reliable data across the main law enforcement, judicial and correctional institutions involved (police, prosecution, courts and prisons). Data on individual offences and alleged offenders should be collected at each stage (a simplified overview of which is shown in figure 5.1) so that every case is followed through the system and performance indicators can be calculated. In practice, very few countries have such a recording system and, at the global level, only aggregated data on police-recorded offences and


suspected offenders, and court data on persons convicted, are available for a sufficient number of countries to allow at least a basic analysis.

Furthermore, data of this type do not give information about fundamental qualitative aspects of criminal justice administration, such as the quality of investigations, the right to legal aid, the fairness of procedures and the duration of trials, but they do provide an initial assessment of the capacity of countries' legal systems to deal with homicidal violence. As only limited data are available for Africa and Oceania, they are not included in the regional analysis, which exclusively focuses on Asia, the Americas and Europe.

Homicide cases: from investigation to sentencing

Once homicide cases are recorded by the police, law enforcement authorities conduct investigations that can eventually lead to the identification


Fig. 5.1: Statistical indicators relating to four phases in the criminal justice process



¹ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, article 3; *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, article 6.1.

Source: UNODC.

Fig. 5.2: Homicide clearance rate, by region (2007-2008 and 2011-2012)



Note: Regional figures represent weighted averages; data on two countries in Africa and Oceania are included in the global total but not shown separately. The homicide clearance rate is the percentage of homicides cleared by the police, divided by all homicides recorded by the police in the same year.
Source: UN-CTS.


of crime suspects on the basis of the evidence gathered. The first indication of the overall results of the police investigation of homicide cases can be drawn from the “homicide clearance rate”, which is the percentage of homicides “cleared” of all those homicides brought to the attention of the police. In most cases, this means that the police have identified and arrested one or several suspects for a particular homicide and that the case has been turned over to the prosecution service.²

At the global level, the homicide clearance rate is slightly above 60 per cent,³ which means that the police are not able to identify a suspect in a large portion of homicides. At 80 and 85 per cent, respectively, clearance levels are higher in Asia and

2 A case will normally be considered “cleared” when a suspect has been identified by name and charged. In addition, there are other circumstances that may qualify a case as “cleared”. For example, the police may “clear” a case because the suspect has died; the suspect is not criminally liable due to age or mental incapacity; evidence has been found that no crime was committed; or an identified suspect has made her- or himself untraceable.

3 This is based on data from 41 countries.

Fig. 5.3: Homicide clearance rate and police per 100,000 population, by level of homicide rate (2012 or latest year)




Note: Average figures represent un-weighted averages.
Source: UN-CTS.

Europe than in the Americas (about 50 per cent) (see figure 5.2). Several underlying reasons may account for these regional differences, such as the possibility that the higher homicide rates recorded in the Americas than in Europe and Asia may stretch the capacity of law enforcement institutions in the Americas to investigate each case thoroughly. Also influencing law enforcement’s ability to clear cases is the type or context of a particular homicide, as certain typologies, such as those perpetrated by gangs or organized criminal groups, tend to be more challenging to investigate than others.⁴

In countries for which data are available, homicide clearance rates tend to be lower where homicide levels are higher: in countries with very low homicide rates (less than 1 per 100,000 population), clearance rates average 92 per cent, while in countries with high homicide rates (above 10 per 100,000 population), clearance rates are as low as 52 per cent (see figure 5.3). It seems that a virtuous

4 Van Dijk, J. (2008). Pp. 157-158.

Fig. 5.4: Homicides, persons suspected and persons convicted of homicide per 100,000 population, by region (2011 or latest year)



■ Homicides
 ■ Persons suspected
 ■ Persons convicted


Note: Data on three countries in Africa and Oceania are included in the global total but not shown separately.
 Source: UN-CTS.

circle exists in countries with low homicide levels, where higher clearance rates can in turn act as a deterrent and lower homicide levels further.

Despite the fact that countries with high homicide rates actually have a greater number of police per 100,000 population, they have low homicide clearance rates. Therefore the size of the police force apparently has no direct impact on the clearance of homicide cases, but the fact that, as mentioned above, police resources can be really stretched in those countries should be taken into account. The “police to homicide” ratio gives an indication of the number of police officers compared to the number of homicides, which is greater than 500 in countries with low homicide rates, but is 25 times lower in countries with high homicide rates (20 police officers per homicide case).

Additional information on the outcome of the criminal justice process is provided by data relating

Fig. 5.5: Persons suspected and persons convicted per 100 homicides, by region (2011 or latest year)



■ Persons suspected
 ■ Persons convicted

Note: Data on three countries in Africa and Oceania are included in the global total but not shown separately.
 Source: UN-CTS.

to persons suspected⁵ and those convicted of homicide: at the global level, for every 100 homicide victims, 97 persons are suspected/arrested on homicide charges,⁶ while 43 are convicted of homicide (see figure 5.5).

When looking at the criminal justice process at the regional level, for every 100 homicide victims there are 53 suspects in the Americas, 151 in Asia

5 At the international level, there are different definitions and methodologies for counting persons suspected of a crime. For example, some countries count the number of persons arrested, while others also include persons suspected or cautioned.

6 Through the successive stages of the criminal justice process, the counting unit is shifted from offences to persons entering into contact with law enforcement and criminal justice authorities. The number of suspects can be higher or lower than the number of homicides (higher when more than one person is suspected of a homicide, or lower when a suspect is charged with more than one homicide or the police cannot identify a suspect), but the number of convictions is likely to be substantially lower than the number of homicide suspects; for many suspects charged with homicide, there will be no conviction because of a lack of evidence.


and 100 in Europe, while the number of persons convicted per 100 homicide victims is 24 in the Americas, 48 in Asia and 81 in Europe (see figure 5.5). Thus, in the Americas, where, on average, the homicide rate is high, the police are able to identify a suspect for slightly more than half of all homicide victims, but less than 50 per cent of those suspected are convicted, meaning that less than a quarter of homicides lead to a conviction. In Asia, where homicide rates are lower in general, on average there are multiple suspects for every homicide, yet only half of homicides end in a conviction. In Europe, there are as many suspects as there are homicides, with eight out of ten leading to a conviction; a high conviction rate by comparison.⁷

With a conviction rate of 24 per cent, the level of impunity for homicide in the Americas is rather high. This may be partly due to the fact that, as mentioned previously, the high volume of homicides are a drain on law enforcement and criminal justice resources. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 2 of this study, homicides in the Americas are often connected to organized crime or gang activity and usually have lower clearance and conviction rates compared to other homicide typolo-

gies such as intimate partner/family-related homicide or other types of interpersonal homicide. Other possible explanations include the corruption of officials by organized criminal groups and/or the fear of reprisals.

With 50 per cent more suspects than homicides, less than a third of whom are convicted, the situation in Asia is harder to explain. It could be related to reasons of recording and methodology, with the number of those questioned or interviewed regarding a particular homicide being included in the number of suspected persons, or a large number of suspects arrested without serious grounds, resulting in large numbers of suspects who are not to be prosecuted. But if this is a real difference, it may point to inefficiencies in the performance of the police and prosecution services. This phenomenon may also be due to the prevalent types of homicide in Asia as there may be a large share of homicides linked to typologies that involve more than one perpetrator, such as various types of domestic violence in which more than one family member perpetrates the offence. In India, for example, an average of two or more suspects are arrested for each homicide case, suggesting the involvement of accomplices.⁸

Fig. 5.6: Percentage distribution of persons convicted of homicide, by sex and by region (2012 or latest year)



Note: Data on four countries in Africa and Oceania are included in the global total but not shown separately.

Source: UN-CTS.

⁷ The conviction rate is the number of persons convicted of homicide divided by the number of homicides in the same year, per 100 homicides. Some limitations of this indicator, dictated by data availability, are that it uses “persons” as counting units (instead of cases) and that it is built using aggregated annual data even though homicide and its related trial can take place in different calendar years.

⁸ National Crime Records Bureau, India (2012). P. 148.

In Europe, the level of impunity is much lower and the vast majority of homicides lead to a conviction. This may be a reflection of the low homicide rates and the adequacy of law enforcement and criminal justice resources, as well as the greater proportion of interpersonal homicides, in which victim and perpetrator are often known to each other, increasing the likelihood that an investigation will establish a clear link between the perpetrator and the crime. For example, in Finland, 90 per cent of all homicide victims between 2003 and 2011 were known to the offender.⁹


The vast majority of homicide suspects in all regions are male. Available data indicate that this general pattern is also the case for homicide convictions, with men accounting for an average of 95 per cent of all persons convicted of homicide in 53 countries for which data are available (see figure 5.6).

Trends in the criminal justice response to homicide

A way to monitor the efficiency of criminal justice systems in relation to the management of homicide cases is to consider trends in homicide as well as corresponding developments in the levels of people suspected and convicted of homicide. This analysis should not be considered indicative of the overall performance of the system — as stated earlier, qualitative aspects of criminal justice administration should also be accounted for — but it can shed light on whether its resources are being used efficiently.

Over the last few years, the gap between the number of homicides and the number of convictions has been widening in the Americas.¹⁰ The police seem to be able to identify suspects even though the number of homicides has increased, but the number of convictions does not follow the rising trend (see figure 5.7). In Asia,¹¹ the criminal justice response to homicide did not change significantly between 2003 and 2011; the gap between homicide cases and convictions increased slightly, with a suspect being convicted in less than half of all homicide cases. In Europe, both the

Fig. 5.7: Homicides, persons suspected of homicide and persons convicted of homicide per 100,000 population, by region (2003-2011)




Source: UN-CTS.

⁹ Lehti, M. (2013), in *Henkirikoskatsaus, Verkkokatsaus 29/2013 (Homicide Review, Web review 29/103)*.

¹⁰ Countries in the Americas for which consistent time series are available include Canada, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico.

¹¹ Countries in Asia for which consistent time series are available include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Hong Kong, China, India, Israel, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia.

Fig. 5.8: Homicide conviction rate, by region (2003-2011)




Note: The conviction rate is the number of persons convicted of homicide divided by the number of homicides in the same year, per 100 homicides.

Source: UN-CTS.

homicide and suspect rate have declined by almost half since 2003, while the rate of persons convicted of homicide has declined by 30 per cent. This means that the gap between homicides committed and convictions has narrowed, with the majority of homicide investigations leading to a conviction.

A direct way to monitor the efficiency of the criminal justice system is to examine time trends in homicide conviction rates, which are very diverse at the regional level (see figure 5.8). A decreasing trend shows that the performance of the criminal justice system is deteriorating and that improved capacities, resources and procedures are needed. The increasing trend recorded in Europe indicates that the region's criminal justice systems have been increasingly efficient in dealing with homicides. This is no doubt also connected to the low levels of homicides recorded in Europe. On the other hand, although Asia is also characterized by low homicide rates, the conviction rate has gradually declined in that region. In the Americas, the increasing trend recorded up until 2007 has since reversed, as rising homicide trends have not been paralleled by similar levels of convictions, meaning that impunity related to homicide has grown in the Americas in recent years. The specific reasons for such phenomena need further investigation, but they could be due to issues related to a lack, or inefficient use, of resources, insufficient capacities or inappropriate legislation.

Fig. 5.9: Total prison population per 100,000 population, prisoners convicted of homicide per 100,000 population, and prisoners convicted of homicide as a percentage of all prisoners, selected regions (2012 or latest year)



Source: UN-CTS.


Prisoners sentenced for homicide

Among all the types of crime dealt with by the criminal justice system, homicides tend to make up only a marginal share of the total. In most countries, the share of persons convicted of homicide is usually well below 1 per cent of all those convicted of crime. However, the combination of the relative levity of sentences for less serious crimes and the long duration of prison sentences for homicide offenders means that, at any given point in time, homicide offenders can make up a significant share of the total prison population. This share depends on a number of factors, such as the overall rate of persons convicted of homicide and other crimes, the severity with which the crim-

Homicide in prison

Less visible but no less problematic are cases of violent deaths among prisoners. In line with States' heightened duty to ensure and respect the right to life in custodial settings, international standards and United Nations human rights bodies call upon prison administrations to initiate and/or facilitate prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all incidents of death in custody or shortly following release, including with independent forensic or post mortem examinations, as appropriate.^a In spite of this principle, relevant information is often scarce, but some indications emerge from available data on deaths in prison settings. In many countries there is a substantial death rate per 100,000 prison inmates (which includes both natural causes of death as well as those resulting from external causes), which is very high, especially considering the relatively young age structure of the prison population (see figure 5.10). Among external causes, rates of homicide appear to be a bigger problem in prisons in the Americas (57 per 100,000 prisoners), than in Europe (2 per 100,000 prisoners), where suicide appears to be the main non-natural cause of death of inmates.

Fig. 5.10: Total deaths, homicides and suicides of prisoners per 100,000 prison population, selected regions and sub-regions (2012)



Source: UN-CTS.

When comparing data for the seven countries in the Americas for which data on deaths, homicide and suicide of prisoners are available, the homicide rate per 100,000 prisoners is three times higher than the homicide rate in the general population.^b In the other regions, there does not appear to be a major difference between the homicide rate in the prison setting and in the total population, although more information would be needed to come to definite conclusions in this regard.

^a United Nations General Assembly (1988); ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights (1995) E.CN.4/1995/34, Para. 926g.

^b In the same seven countries, the average homicide rate is 19.1 per 100,000 population.

inal justice system deals with offenders guilty of different types of offence, variations in sentencing policies and possibilities of parole.

Available data on homicide offenders in prison indicate that in some countries with high homicide rates, such as selected countries in South America, there can be a substantial number of homicide offenders in prison per 100,000 population.¹² Yet, irrespective of different levels of homi-

cide, the share of homicide offenders among the total prison population is not markedly different across regions. In Europe and the Americas, it is between 7 and 10 per cent, while it is lower in Asia (see figure 5.9). In terms of prison management, high shares of homicide offenders pose specific management challenges to prison administrations.

—
dor; Panama; Paraguay; and the United States of America. In Asia, data on homicide offenders in prison are available for: Armenia; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; and the State of Palestine.

¹² In the Americas, data are available for: Costa Rica; El Salva-



6. DATA CHALLENGES


Gaps in data availability

Data presented in this report cover all United Nations Member States (193) and a number of territories/autonomous entities (26). In most cases, they are derived from national data repositories generated by either the criminal justice or the public health system. In the former, data are generated by law enforcement authorities in the process of recording and investigating a criminal case; in the latter, statistical information is produced by health authorities certifying the cause of death of individuals.¹ For reasons related to the preservation of both public health and safety, national authorities typically devote all due attention to recording and investigating deaths due to violent and external causes. Consequently, either (or both) of these sources are the best possible options available to produce statistical information on homicide.²

In the case of the 70 countries where neither of these sources is available, homicide data included in this study are derived from estimates produced by the World Health Organization (WHO),³ which are based on a standardised statistical model used to produce data on all causes of death, and which provide the only available and comparable figure on intentional homicides. While the use of a standardised model ensures a certain consistency, the underlying assumptions and inferences used to derive these estimates are often very weak compared to the data based on completed administra-

tive records, thus affecting the overall quality of homicide statistics. The data quality of homicide reported for these countries will improve only when proper registration systems are put in place and/or national data repositories are made accessible. In comparison to the data used in the *Global Study on Homicide 2011*, the availability of country data based on administrative records has improved incrementally in Africa, the Americas and Oceania, while it has slightly deteriorated in Asia.

Fig. 6.1: Percentage of countries for which homicide data are produced by national registration systems, by region (comparing UNODC *Global Study on Homicide 2011* and 2013)




1 See UNODC (2011). Pp. 83-85.

2 For more information about the differences between public health and criminal justice sources, see the Methodological Annex.

3 World Health Organization (2014).


Source: UNODC *Global Study on Homicide 2011* and 2013.

Fig. 6.2: Percentage of countries with homicide data produced by national registration systems (criminal justice and public health) reported or available to UNODC, by region (2012)



Source: UNODC *Global Study on Homicide 2011 and 2013*.

Fig. 6.3: Percentage of countries reporting to the UN-CTS, by region (UN-CTS 2011 and 2012)



Source: UN-CTS.


The respective availability of data on homicides produced by the two types of sources (public health and criminal justice systems) can vary significantly by region, but overall the number of countries able to produce criminal justice data is greater than those that produce public health homicide statistics. For instance, data produced by national registration systems on homicide from criminal justice sources are available for over 90 per cent of countries in Europe, while public health data are available for just under 80 per cent of them (see figure 6.2). The two sources show bigger differences in availability in Asia, Africa and Oceania than elsewhere, as registry-based public health data are not readily available in those regions.

The lack of national homicide data (from either criminal justice or public health systems) and the need to use model-based data for the aforementioned 70 countries is the result of two challenges: a) limited capacity to establish or maintain a national registration system of crimes and/or deaths; and b) weak reporting channels transmitting national data to international organizations.

The UNODC annual collection of crime data (the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, UN-CTS) has significantly improved its coverage in recent years, but it still suffers from large data gaps in certain regions. The percentage of countries reporting data in 2012 was 50 per cent (covering 75 per cent of the global population), with the lowest response rates in Africa and Oceania (see figure 6.3). In order to produce data series on homicide that cover the entire globe, UNODC complemented the information provided by Member States through the UN-CTS with data from other national official sources.

In addition to the data gaps relating to total homicide counts, there is still a considerable gap in the availability of disaggregated data. As the *Global Study on Homicide 2013* demonstrates, further improvements in the availability and quality of data related to the victim, the perpetrator(s), the relationship between them, the context and the motivation behind the killing are needed to help gain a better understanding of what triggers violent crime, who is most at risk, and the elements

Fig. 6.4: Number of countries for which disaggregated data on intentional homicide produced by national registration systems are available (2010 and 2012)



*Note: Time series data is available from 1995 to 2011/2012. For 9 countries in Africa, time series data is available from 2004 to 2011/2012.
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).


that can facilitate homicide, so that preventative and reduction-oriented policies can be better targeted. Since the publication of the *Global Study on Homicide 2011*, improvements in the availability of data produced by national registration systems on such disaggregations have been made across the board, with the exception of disaggregated data on killing mechanisms (see figure 6.4).⁴

Data quality issues

Two key elements of data quality are important from a statistical perspective: a) the accuracy of the data (i.e. how closely data represent the reality of the situation); and b) the international comparability of the data. “Accuracy” relates to how close the homicide count is to the standard definition of intentional homicide. Discrepancies with the “true value” can be due to weaknesses in data collection

⁴ The reduced availability of data on killing mechanisms is largely due to the more stringent criteria used in the selection process for data included in the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset, particularly in relation to the timeliness of data. For more information, see Methodological annex.

Fig. 6.5: Standard deviation between criminal justice and public health sources for homicide data in countries where data from both sources are available, by region (2012)




Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

systems, such as incomplete coverage of the events and/or misrepresentation of the data. Assessing data accuracy is challenging in any statistical field, since the “true” value typically remains unknown but, as intentional homicide is often recorded by both criminal justice and public health sources, this independent registration of (largely) the same phenomenon can provide an indirect evaluation of the accuracy of the data by way of comparing these sources.⁵ In the Americas, Europe and Oceania, the two sources usually match when they are both available, suggesting a high degree of accuracy of homicide data in those regions (see figure 6.5). The situation is different in Africa, however, where large discrepancies between the two sources (in the three countries where data from both sources are available) point to doubtful data quality. These discrepancies are probably due to differences in recording practices or different coverage of the two systems.

⁵ The assumption made is that accuracy is greater when independent and separate sources produce similar data.

Fig. 6.6: Classification of violent deaths



Source: UNODC.

The second element, the international comparability of homicide data, depends to a large extent on the definition used to record intentional homicide offences. Intentional homicide is currently defined at the international level by UNODC as “unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person”; a definition containing three elements characterizing an intentional homicide:

1. The killing of a person by another person (objective element);
2. The intent of the perpetrator to kill or seriously injure the victim (subjective element);
3. The intentional killing is against the law, which means that the law considers the perpetrator liable for the unlawful death (legal element).

The specificities of intentional homicide can be understood better when placed in the broad context of violent deaths (figure 6.6).⁶ The scheme shows that non-conflict violent deaths are distinguished from deaths that are a direct result of war

or conflict, or those that are self-inflicted (suicides). At the next level, some types of wilful killings, such as killings in self-defence and those deriving from legal interventions,⁷ are distinguished from intentional homicide because they are considered justifiable due to mitigating circumstances, while non-intentional homicides are considered a separate offence due to the lack of intent to kill another person. Deaths occurring during situations of civil unrest are particularly challenging to categorize, and this challenge has yet to be addressed from a statistical perspective (see page 104/105).

As definitions used by countries to record data on intentional homicide are often quite close to the definition used by UNODC,⁸ national statistical data on homicide are highly comparable at the

6 Violence is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as the “intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development, or deprivation.”(World Health Organization (2002)).

7 Such are killings by the police or other law enforcement agents in the course of arresting or attempting to arrest lawbreakers, while maintaining order, or during other legal actions where they are caused by use of force by law enforcement acting in accordance with the United Nations (1990) *Basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials* (A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1). Killings resulting from the excessive use of force in law enforcement or through the excessive use of force in self-defence are either considered intentional homicides or non-negligent non-intentional homicide and should therefore be counted as such. For more, see section on Unlawful killings by law enforcement authorities in chapter 2.3 of this study.

8 According to UN-CTS (2012), 69 countries report that their definition for statistical purposes correspond to the standard indicated by UNODC in 2011, while 17 report that their definition is not fully compliant with this standard definition.

international level. Some notable discrepancies exist, however, in the way some specific categories of intentional killings are treated or classified. Inclusions and exclusions from the recording of what constitutes an “intentional homicide” may differ across countries. For example, some countries in the Americas record deaths due to legal interventions and homicides committed in self-defence as “intentional homicide”; other countries may include deaths which are not part of the standard definition, such as those related to armed conflict and non-intentional homicides (i.e. accidental or non-voluntary homicides, or “collateral” deaths). Reviewing such practices can help to improve international comparability of homicide data.

Addressing challenges in the quality and availability of homicide data

Different regions face different challenges and there are several key elements to consider en route to better quality, comparable data, including the need to develop and implement a standard definition for intentional homicide, as well as improve national and international systems of data collection.

The development of a standard definition for more comparable data

The standard definition used by UNODC to collect homicide data provides a good reference for standardizing data across countries. However, some nuances can make a significant difference in the homicide count and its interpretation in some countries, several of which have not yet been clearly addressed in a more detailed statistical definition of intentional homicide. The development of an internationally agreed definition of intentional homicide for statistical purposes is one of the objectives of the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS), a statistical standard requested by the United Nations Statistical Commission and the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.⁹ Once finalized, the ICCS will create a comprehensive definitional framework that will improve the standardization and comparability of data on crime.¹⁰

⁹ ECOSOC CCPCJ (2013). E/RES/2013/37; ECOSOC, Statistical Commission (2012). E/2012/24. P. 7(d).

¹⁰ The ICCS is currently under development and it builds on the “Principles and framework for an international classification of crimes for statistical purposes” produced by UNODC-UNECE and endorsed by the Conference of European Statisticians in 2012. The ICCS is scheduled to be presented to the United Nations Statistical Commission and the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, for approval in 2015.

Table 6.1: First level categories of the ICCS (Rev.2.1)

Categories for Level 1	
1	Acts leading to death or intending to cause death
2	Acts causing harm or intending to cause harm to the person
3	Injurious acts of a sexual nature
4	Acts against property involving violence against a person
5	Acts against property only
6	Acts involving controlled psychoactive substances or other drugs
7	Acts involving fraud, deception or corruption
8	Acts against public order or authority
9	Acts against public safety and state security
10	Acts against the natural environment
11	Other criminal acts not elsewhere classified

Source: UNODC.

The ICCS will be an event-based classification system, in which crimes will be described in terms of actions rather than legal provisions. A factual description of each item will be provided, with an explanation of what actions (which may relate to different crime offences in different countries) are included/excluded from such a categorization. The classification is then built in a hierarchical structure, with a number of successive levels.

With respect to intentional homicide, the ICCS will provide international guidance on three main aspects:

a) The definition of intentional homicide and identification of types of killings to be considered under this definition

While all national legislations include the offence of intentional homicide, they can define it in different ways. Additionally, penal codes in some countries may consider some of the unlawful deaths purposefully inflicted on a person by another person under different headings and, consequently, statistical data organized according to those legislations may provide separate counts for different types of homicide. Examples of specific homicide-related offences may include infanticides, “honour killings”, dowry deaths, femicides, serious assaults leading to death or thefts followed by the killing of the victim. Another example is violent death due to terrorism: from a conceptual perspective, the notion of “intentional homicide” is broad enough to encompass deaths caused by terrorist acts, and whilst perpetrators may face

additional charges, such as acts of terrorism, acts against the State, or even crimes against humanity, the core act still concerns the intentional killing of other persons. From a statistical point of view, all such cases should be included in the count of intentional homicide, since they conform to its standard definition. The ICCS will clarify the types of killings that should be included or excluded from the total count of intentional homicide.

b) The development of comprehensive and policy-relevant data disaggregations of intentional homicide related to victims and perpetrators, as well as the context in which the homicide occurs

Total counts and rates of homicide can provide a better insight into the nature of violent crime if they are disaggregated by a number of characteristics, and the ICCS will offer a framework which countries can follow to break-down the data in a standardized manner. The three typologies of homicide presented in this study (homicide related to other criminal activities, interpersonal homicide and socio-political homicide) will provide a basis for discussion and further development in the ICCS, with the purpose of advocating for the production of policy-relevant homicide indicators.

c) A clarification of the statistical treatment of violent deaths that occur in the context of war and civil unrest

Two of the most challenging categories of violent deaths to identify as “intentional homicide” are those that occur during operations of war or in situations of civil unrest. Consistently with the definition of intentional homicide, killings directly associated with operations of war are not considered to be intentional homicides, which poses two methodological challenges to ensuring that a separate and accurate count is made for, respectively, direct conflict deaths and intentional homicides:

- To establish clear criteria to identify what constitutes an armed conflict for the purpose of producing statistics
- To establish clear criteria to determine which violent deaths are directly associated with armed conflicts and are not intentional homicides.

In the case of the first challenge, this distinction has been made in international humanitarian law, which distinguishes between two types of armed conflict: (1) international armed conflicts, which exist wherever there is a resort to armed force between States; and (2) non-international armed

conflicts, which occur whenever there is protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.¹¹ While international armed conflicts are, in principle, more easily determined, in many situations of protracted disorder within countries it can be difficult to establish clear borders between non-international armed conflicts and “civil unrest”. Two elements that may determine the difference are: a) the threshold of intensity of hostilities (i.e. when hostilities are of a collective character, or when the government uses military force rather than police force against insurgents); and b) the degree to which the armed groups are organized (i.e. non-governmental groups involved in the conflict must be considered “parties to the conflict” in that they possess organized armed forces under a certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain military operations).¹²

In the case of the second challenge, a distinction needs to be made between deaths directly related to the conflict (i.e. directly attributable to actions constituting part of the armed conflict) and other violent acts leading to death that occur during a period of armed conflict but are not part of that conflict and should thus be classified according to the criteria used for any other killing. For example, killings committed by a party not involved in the conflict should not be considered as directly related to the conflict, and they should be analysed as any other killing, irrespective of the conflict situation, and classified into existing typologies of violent death (intentional homicide, non-intentional homicide, etc.) according to standard definitions. The most difficult issue to disentangle concerns cases when a third party (a person not party to the conflict) is purposefully killed by a party to the conflict. Such cases are common in conflict situations today, where civilians are explicitly targeted by warring parties, as part of inherent conflict strategy. From a statistical point of view, the characterization of such violent deaths — whether to ascribe them to the conflict or consider them as intentional homicides — has not yet been resolved, and there are different recording practices across national and international agencies.

Violent deaths in the context of civil unrest, i.e. during a situation of confrontation between two or

¹¹ This definition was used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (1995), and Common articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

¹² International Committee of the Red Cross (2008).

The road map to improve crime statistics

In 2013, the United Nations Statistical Commission and the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice agreed^a on a *road map to improve the quality and availability of crime statistics*, and the improvement of data related to intentional homicide can be seen in this larger context.^b The road map identifies three main ways to improve the availability and quality of data on crime:

1) *Development of new standards*

One of the limiting factors in the measurement and comparability of crime statistics across countries is the lack of methodological standards. Building the ICCS is a major element identified in the road map to work towards a global framework for treating statistical data on crime, but other methodological tools also need further development, such as those for measuring complex crimes like transnational organized crime, corruption, cybercrime, etc. There is also a need to mainstream gender into crime statistics better, as there are significant differences in how crime affects men and women, as well as disparities in gender with regard to how crime is committed and how offenders are prosecuted and convicted.

2) *Improvement of national capacity and coordination*

In many countries, the production of statistical data on crime is at an early stage of development, often due to a lack of coordination amongst responsible agencies, a lack of implementation of statistical standards and a lack of capacity to

^a See ECOSOC Statistical Commission (2013). E/CN.3/2013/11; and ECOSOC CCPCJ (2013). E/RES/2013/37.

^b See ECOSOC (2012). E/RES/2012/18.

develop and implement various data collection tools such as surveys. There is a need to harmonize concepts and procedures and to establish national mechanisms for coordinating the collection and dissemination of crime data. National statistical offices have a key role to play in such coordination, and capacity building programmes at the regional and international level can do much to help provide a uniform approach and promote standardization for data collection tools and statistical classification approaches.

3) *Better international data collection and analyses*

In addition to coordination within countries, there is a need for improvement in international data collection and analysis. The appointment of national focal points may prove useful in generating higher response rates to the UN-CTS, while other collaborations and joint collections with regional organizations would further enhance data availability and analysis. International data repositories reporting on crime, such as the UNODC Homicide Statistics dataset, are increasingly necessary to expand global knowledge about crime. Additional forms of crime, such as violence against women, would also benefit from a global repository. Better analysis of data available in such repositories, as well as better dissemination of resulting analysis may trigger processes at the national and international levels to enhance the quality and coverage of such data.

The road map to improve crime statistics lays a foundation for future endeavours to improve the quality and availability of crime statistics at both the national and international level. However, the implementation of its objectives and proposed actions require dedicated efforts in capacity building, coordination and collaboration amongst national agencies and subsequently within regional organisations, to enhance the information available to develop more targeted crime reduction and prevention policies.

more parties that does not amount to an internal conflict, also pose specific statistical challenges, as no international statistical standard is currently addressing this issue. From a theoretical perspective, one approach would be to consider each violent death during civil unrest according to the general definition of intentional homicide. This would imply that deaths caused by law enforcement forces that can be validly described as “legal interventions” should not be considered intentional homicides. On the other hand, if such deaths are caused by law enforcement officials

acting with excessive force, they should be considered intentional or non-intentional homicides, according to the circumstances. An alternative approach would be to consider all violent deaths during civil unrest (irrespective of perpetrator, victim, modality of the killing, etc.) as a stand-alone category (similar to conflict deaths).

The purpose of the ICCS is to define any form of crime, including homicide. As such, it is expected that pending issues related to the statistical treatment of some violent deaths in situations of con-

flict and civil unrest will be resolved, so that clear guidance can be given for producing comprehensive and comparable statistics on intentional homicides and other violent deaths in such situations.

The improvement of national systems of data collection

Law enforcement authorities may collect and store detailed information on crime events, victims and perpetrators, but this wealth of information is much less frequently translated into statistical data through the use of harmonized concepts and statistical processes.

In the case of intentional homicide, a good practice is to establish ad hoc data collections in order to complement and standardize information derived from police reports and to ensure complete coverage. For example, Australia has a national homicide monitoring programme, and detailed data collections on homicide also exist in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden.¹³ Ad hoc data collections on homicide, such as that in Finland, generate information that can be used not only for operational and strategic planning in the guidance of police work, but also to inform criminal investigations and support policies to prevent homicides. Such data collections can generate very specific data on victims and perpetrators that can help identify those most at risk of homicide and which influencing or enabling factors contribute to the crime.

Given the multi-faceted institutional response required to deal with homicide, more than one organization will often manage data on homicide. Coordination of homicide data among responsible agencies and national stakeholders can greatly improve the quality and consistency of national data. Basic steps that can facilitate this coordination include the exchange of information, harmonization of methodologies, and the sharing of aggregated data amongst national agencies. National-level coordination can also generate integrated systems to collect and harmonize information on individual homicide cases, and result in more comprehensive and consistent information available from a country. Standardized systems, based on standardized definitions and classification schemes, allow for the collection and sharing of information amongst national agencies with regards to individual incidents, perpetrators and victims, but they require proper IT systems which

can facilitate the reporting and sharing of data both within and outside countries. While the concrete forms and mechanisms to improve coordination at the national level depend on national circumstances, national statistical offices can play a key role in coordinating and promoting statistical standards.

The establishment of national observatories on crime and/or violence has proven to be an effective tool to improve the coverage and standardization of crime data. Such observatories are typically established by, or in close collaboration with, local, national or regional governments, and sometimes in public-private partnerships with support from various donors. Designed to monitor trends and patterns based on crime or violence data from either public health or criminal justice sources, they often incorporate survey data and NGO reporting into their analysis.¹⁴ There are several national and local violence observatories in Latin America, which monitor citizen security, gender-based violence and other forms of violence, such as youth or political violence. For example, the National Autonomous University of Honduras has established a violence observatory that collects data from all States of Honduras and publishes a biannual homicide report with coordinated inputs from the national police, the Ministry of Public Safety and the medical forensics agency (For more, see <http://iudpas.org/>). While such observatories are not yet as well established in Africa, several have begun collecting and analysing data to complement official statistics.

The improvement of international data collection

While UNODC is the focal point for statistics related to crime and criminal justice within the United Nations system,¹⁵ the UN-CTS is the current reference for standardized definitions. As mentioned previously, the response rate to the UN-CTS is close to 50 per cent of countries. Data collection on crime is a complex process that involves several agencies and institutions (police, prosecution, courts, prisons) within United Nations Member States. In order to improve not only the response rate but also the consistency of data recorded in the UN-CTS, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) requested United Nations Member

¹³ See: *Homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden: A first study on the European Homicide Monitor data* (2011).

¹⁴ For a comprehensive review of various types and modus operandi of crime/violence observatories, see Gilgen, E. and L. Tracey (2011), Geneva Declaration Secretariat.

¹⁵ ECOSOC SC (2012). E/2012/24. P. 7(d).

Harmonization of homicide data: the case of Chile

In many countries, there are multiple criminal justice and public health institutions recording data on homicide, using a variety of different indicators and definitions specific to their individual purposes. This is also the case in Chile, where several sources of data on homicide are available in independent systems of data collection. The diversity and variability between these sources is but one national-level example of the challenges extant in determining the overall “national” count of intentional homicides. For the purposes of international comparison, based on standardized definitions, Chile was able to effectively coordinate between its various agencies through exchanges of information and discussion to produce internationally comparable data, based on timeliness and coverage of the data. As a result, data from the Subsecretarías de Prevención del Delito was selected as the best source of data matching the standardized definition of intentional homicide.

Table 6.2: Homicide counts in Chile, by counting unit and national recording institute (2005-2011)

Institute	Counting unit	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Carabineros	Cases	562	564	555	534	555	473	492	483
Policía de Investigaciones	Cases	755	504	502	671	705	714	810	n/a
Ministerio Público	Offences	n/a	1314	1310	1472	1585	1359	1463	1320
Subsecretarías de Prevención del Delito	Cases	568	587	574	557	594	487	543	483
Subsecretarías de Prevención del Delito	Victims	576	590	616	588	630	541	636	550
Servicio Nacional de la Mujer	Cases of femicide	n/a	n/a	54	57	53	49	40	34
Departamento de Estadísticas e Información de Salud	Victims	946	924	786	756	903	779	785	n/a
Servicio Médico Legal	Victims	911	836	819	802	903	743	n/a	n/a

Source: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013).

States to appoint a national focal point to act as the coordinator of the different institutions providing data to the UN-CTS, to ensure their quality and completeness. While 110 countries have thus far appointed focal points, gaps remain in the provision of complete and consistent data in the UN-CTS.

In order to give countries further support and assistance with the coordination of crime-related statistical information, both within States and within regions, several global and regional initiatives have been implemented. For example, UNODC has partnered with the Organization of American States (OAS) to facilitate data reporting from the Americas, and with Eurostat to coordinate data collection in Europe. Moreover, UNODC and the WHO are strengthening coordination efforts between them in order to improve the integration of the two main international sources for data (criminal justice and public health) on intentional homicide.

The establishment of regional partnerships to support countries in improving crime statistics

Several regional partnerships are supporting countries to improve their capacity to improve crime statistics. Many of these recent initiatives are providing technical assistance and building capacity within regions particularly affected by crime and violence, and are developing best practices with regard to statistics, particularly crime-related statistics.

The Center of Excellence in Statistical Information on Governance, Crime, Victimization and Justice, based in Mexico City, is a joint initiative of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico (INEGI) and UNODC (for more information, see http://www.cdeunodc.inegi.org.mx/UNODC_English.html). Based on international best practices, the Center serves as a focal point for knowledge and contributes to capacity building on statistical information in the region,

by working with countries to improve the quality and availability of data and analysis of statistical information. The Center focuses its efforts on promoting systems for crime statistics, developing and implementing victimization surveys (both population and business), and on serving as a bridge between regional and global statistical processes on crime and justice.

The Regional System of Standardised Indicators in Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security (RIC), established in 2008, is a project funded by the Inter-American Development Bank, which functions as a coordinating system for the sharing of information and good practices on statistical indicators relating to crime and security issues between over 200 public institutions in 19 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Through the RIC process, countries benefit from technical assistance and training to improve data and information systems, and receive assistance with standardizing definitions, mechanisms and technologies to produce and share information. It also provides a forum for sharing good practices and developing public policies on common security challenges (For more, see <http://seguridadyregion.com/>).

The Strategy for Harmonisation of Statistics in Africa (SHaSA) is a collaborative effort between the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the African Union Commission and the African Development Bank, funded by the United Nations Development Programme, to support the African integration agenda and enhance coordination and collaboration between national statistical offices, regional statistical organizations and development partners. Not limited to crime statistics, the SHaSA indeed covers all aspects of political, economic, social and cultural integration for Africa. The initiative focuses on the production of quality statistics, coordination of statistical production, development of sustainable institutional capacity for statistics and the facilitation of quality decision-making (For more, see <http://ea.au.int/fr/sites/default/files/SHaSA%20-EN.pdf>).



7. METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX

Data sources

The *Global Study on Homicide 2013* makes extensive use of the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset,¹ which has been compiled in order to provide users with comprehensive data covering all aspects of homicide discussed in this study. In all, the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset presents data for 219 countries and territories.

As explained below, a variety of national and international sources of homicide data have been considered and, in order to present accurate and comparable statistics, data have been selected which conform as much as possible to the definition of intentional homicide used by UNODC for statistical purposes: “unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person”.

Data included in the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset are sourced from either criminal justice or public health systems. In the former, data are generated by law enforcement or criminal justice authorities in the process of recording and investigating a crime event, whereas in the latter, data are produced by health authorities certifying the cause of death of an individual.² There is generally good agreement between the sources, but there are also occasional differences (see chapter 6: Data challenges). While acknowledging such differences, all efforts have been made to ensure the greatest possible consistency in the use of data from the two types of source,³ which are detailed below.⁴

1 The UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset is available at <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html>.

2 For a thorough discussion on the two sources, see: UNODC, *Global Study on Homicide 2011*.

Criminal justice data

Data regularly collected by UNODC through the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS) comprise national statistics on a number of conventional crimes, which are collected by police, prosecution, court and prison authorities. Police-recorded data on intentional homicides from the UN-CTS are used in this study, which include, where available, complementary data on homicide victims by sex and age, by killing mechanism (firearms, sharp objects and others) and by perpetrator/context of the crime (family/intimate partner, organized crime, gang, robbery, other, or unknown context). Data also include homicides in the most populous city of each country. In 2011, data collected through the UN-CTS included homicide cases cleared by the police for the first time.

Data collected through publicly available sources and produced by national government sources (police, National Statistical Office, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, etc.) have been used to complete data series for those countries for which UN-CTS data were not available, and for those variables not included in the UN-CTS collection, such as sub-national data.

Data collected and compiled by other international and regional agencies have also been

3 For example, while it can be appropriate to compare time trends from the two different sources (criminal justice and public health) under the assumption that they both adequately capture changes in homicide levels, it is not recommended to form a time series for a given country by joining separate criminal justice and public health data from different years.

4 Detailed information on sources used at country level is provided in the Statistical annex.

reviewed and used, where appropriate, including data from Eurostat, the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank (through the Regional System of Standardised Indicators in Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security (RIC) project) and various other United Nations agencies, such as the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).

Public health data

At the country level, all deaths should be recorded and their cause explored and certified by public health authorities. National definitions and classifications used for this purpose are usually in line with the World Health Organization (WHO) “International Classification of Diseases (ICD)”, the international standard diagnostic classification for epidemiological and clinical use. The current version (ICD-10) offers a detailed framework for the classification of causes of death, covering all known diseases and external factors, including violence. Deaths recorded with ICD codes X85-Y09 (injuries inflicted by another person with intent to injure or kill) generally correspond to the definition of intentional homicide discussed above.

At the international level, data on homicides from public health sources are derived from databases on deaths by cause managed by the WHO, including through some of its regional offices.⁵ Data presented in the Global Health Estimates produced by the WHO⁶ include estimates for countries without available vital registration data. Such estimates are based on a statistical model developed by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), which estimates deaths by cause at the country level on the basis of a number of covariates, while taking into account available statistical data. IHME estimates have been used by the WHO for various causes of death (including interpersonal violence) with reference to 2012 death data.⁷ In the forthcoming WHO Global

Health Estimates (2014) dataset, estimates made through statistical modelling have been produced for around 70 per cent of all countries, most of which are located in Africa and Asia. These WHO data have been used for several countries in this study in relation to total numbers of homicide and homicides by sex.

Furthermore, for a number of countries, data on distribution of homicide by age and sex, as well as by killing mechanism, have been sourced from the Global Health Data Exchange (GDHx) provided by IHME.⁸ These breakdowns of cause of death categories by age, sex and killing mechanism at the country level have also been produced through statistical modelling.

Data validation process

The following considerations have been taken into account when deciding what data to include in the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset:

- The primary source of data is an official institution/organization.⁹
- The definitions used to produce data are in line with the homicide definition used in the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset. For example, where detailed data were available, counts of violent deaths from manslaughter have been excluded from the count of intentional homicides, as have attempted homicides.
- In cases where multiple data series were available for the same country, follow-up with the country and/or an analysis of official reports and research literature has been carried out to determine the selection of the data series.

Data review by Member States

In order to ensure the quality of data used in the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset, a process of technical consultation with Member States was undertaken before the finalization of the dataset. All country data on homicide were made available to United Nations Member States for a review of their quality and accuracy. Com-

⁵ World Health Organization (2014); WHO Mortality Database (last accessed in June 2013) which compiles mortality data by age, sex, and cause of death, as reported by WHO Member States from their civil registration systems; the Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO) Regional Core Health Data Initiative dataset (last accessed in June 2013); and WHO-Europe’s European Health for All Database (last accessed in June 2013). It should be noted that 2008 data from WHO is not comparable to the 2012 Causes of Death dataset due to changes in estimation procedures.

⁶ World Health Organization (2014).

⁷ For WHO Mortality by Cause of Death methodology, see

Department of Health Statistics and Informatics, WHO (2011).

⁸ See IHME (2012).

⁹ Due to the unavailability of data from official sources, for three countries NGO-based sources were used for certain years.

ments were received from a number of Member States and were addressed before the finalization of the Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset.

Selection of reference data for the analyses presented in this study

As a result of the data collection and validation process, typically two or more time series (i.e. criminal justice and public health) became available for the total intentional homicide count in each country. It has therefore been necessary to select the most appropriate reference counts of homicide levels for 2011-2012 and for trend data to be used in the analyses shown in this study. The following criteria have been used to select the reference series of homicide counts for each country:

- *Adherence to the standard definition of homicide:* The degree of adherence to the standard definition of homicide and resulting international comparability are considered most important, thus preference has been given to data produced by the criminal justice system.
- *Coverage:* In cases where criminal justice data were not available, or where the coverage was poor (as determined, for example, by comparison with neighbouring countries or other official sources of information), preference has been given to public health data.¹⁰
- *Timeliness:* The timeliness of the available data has also been considered. The year 2010 was considered the cut-off point for “the most recent” year. For example, if a country had a time series that included data only up to 2009, this time series has not been selected as the reference data upon which analysis has been conducted. In cases where data more recent than/equal to 2010 were not available, data from a previous year have been used. This was the case for 14 countries/territories for which the WHO (2014) estimates were not available.
- Percentage of male and female homicides (2000-2012)
- Percentage of homicides by mechanism (2000-2012)
- Intentional homicide counts and rates in the most populous city of each country (2000-2012)
- Intentional homicide by context (intimate partner/family-related, organized crime/gang-related) by sex (2000-2012)
- Intentional homicide related to robberies by sex (latest years).

Procedures for calculating rates, regional aggregates and disaggregations by specific variables

Data used for homicide rates at the country level

On the basis of the selection criteria discussed above, available data sources have been considered and a reference series has been selected for each country in relation to 2012 or the latest available year. Homicide rates have been calculated based on population estimates from the United Nations Population Division.¹¹

Subject to data availability, a long and continuous time series of homicide counts and rates has been compiled, making use of the same data source for each country.

Global, regional and sub-regional homicide counts, rates and range estimates

The global, regional and sub-regional counts for total homicides have been calculated as the sum of country-level homicide counts provided by the reference series selected at the national level. Global, regional and aggregated rates have been calculated as population-weighted averages.

These “point estimates” (single year) are accompanied, when relevant, by an indication of their uncertainty, which considers the variability between criminal justice and public health data for each country. Taking into account that two homicide counts are generally available for each country (one criminal justice and one public health; although only one source is available in some countries), two additional estimates are built for each region. The lower estimate in the range is determined by the sum of the lower homicide

Contents of the Homicide Statistics Database


The following data series have been included in the Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset, for the countries/territories where data were available:

- Intentional homicide counts (1995-2012)
- Intentional homicide rates (1995-2012)

¹⁰ This was the case especially for many countries in Western, Eastern and Middle Africa, where criminal justice data are less available and present issues of under-coverage.

¹¹ United Nations Population Division (2012).


Map 7.1: Countries/territories, by type of source for homicide counts and time series (2012 or latest year)



Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

Map 7.2: Countries/territories, by latest year available for homicide count



Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).

counts for each country (from either criminal justice or public health sources). Similarly, the upper estimate is calculated as the sum of the higher homicide counts for each country (from either criminal justice or public health sources). Bigger discrepancies between criminal justice and public health data produce larger range estimates at the regional and sub-regional levels, indicating the level of uncertainty associated with total homicide counts at the sub-regional, regional, and thus global, levels.

Data used to calculate homicide counts and rates at the sub-national level

Data at the sub-national level are available for most countries in the Americas and Europe, as well as a small number of countries in Africa, parts of Asia and Oceania. For Europe, data has been sourced from Eurostat and disaggregated according to the NUTS (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) regional classification. Sub-national homicide rates for countries in the Americas (excluding the Caribbean) have been compiled from a number of sources, predominantly reflecting criminal justice data. For other regions, data on sub-national homicide rates were provided by national sources.

Data used to calculate city homicide rates

Data on homicide in a country's most populous city is provided to UNODC through the annual UNODC Survey on Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS). City populations are often provided in the UN-CTS as well, but if not, national census data from the latest year, or population data sourced from the United Nations Population Division, have been used to calculate the city homicide rate.

Data used to calculate homicide by age and sex

Data on victims of homicide by age and sex have been compiled from various sources, using similar criteria adopted for the selection of the reference data. The selected percentage distribution by age and sex available from those sources was then applied to the homicide count of the country reference series in order to ensure consistency between total homicides and number of homicides by age and sex.

Data used for types of homicides

Data on organized crime/gang-related homicides, intimate partner/family-related homicides and

homicides linked to other criminal activities are sourced from criminal justice data produced by national authorities. Data have been compiled according to national practices and definitions, which are generally linked to national legislations. Comparisons between countries should therefore be conducted with caution.

Data used for the estimation of global figures on intimate partner/family-related homicides

Data on intimate partner/family-related homicides, disaggregated by sex, are sourced from 52 national and international criminal justice sources along with data on total homicide by sex. The following procedure computes regional and global counts and rates for victims of intimate partner/family-related homicide, by sex:

- Country level data on male homicide, female homicide, male intimate partner/family-related homicide and female intimate partner/family-related homicide victims are aggregated at the regional level for countries where all such data are available.
- From these absolute numbers, for each indicator per region, percentage shares of intimate partner/family-related homicide victims are calculated by sex.
- The percentage share is applied to the total number of homicide victims by sex in each region.
- These regional totals are summed to produce a global estimate of intimate partner/family-related homicide victims, both total and by sex.

The regional and global intimate partner/family-related homicide rates are calculated by using counts of these intimate partner/family-related homicide victims and population estimates from the United Nations Population Division.

Data used for killing mechanism

Data on victims of homicide by different mechanisms, predominantly firearms and sharp objects, are compiled from a variety of sources, using similar criteria adopted for the selection of the reference series. The latest percentage distribution of homicide victims by mechanism available from those sources has been applied to the homicide count of the reference series for each country in order to ensure consistency between total homicides and number of homicides by killing mechanism.

Data used for post-conflict countries

The countries selected for analysis in chapter 4 were chosen based on data availability, predominantly as a result of the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping or stability mission, or United Nations country office, that has data collection and monitoring in place. In several of those countries, there was no reporting available for any crime-related statistics prior to the establishment of an international presence and monitoring capacity. In addition to the well-known limitations of data on reported crime,¹² such limitations are all the more relevant in post-conflict settings. Comparisons, both across time and especially cross-country, should always be made with caution.

Afghanistan and Iraq data

Data for civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq have been provided by the human rights reporting section of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). Each Mission has a set of definitions used for “civilian casualty”, as well as different recording methods for incidents, perpetrators and victims.

South Sudan data

The collection and analysis of crime data in South Sudan is nascent, and the United Nations Development Programme, working with the South Sudan National Police Force, has begun to collect nation-wide crime statistics, collate them and provide some analysis. Data is available for December 2011-May 2012, the six-month timeframe used as the basis for estimating the 2012 homicide rate at the national and sub-national level for South Sudan.

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), through its Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), has also taken the initiative to collect data specifically on violent crime. These data are collected and collated by the JMAC on a monthly basis and made available to UNODC for categorization and analysis for the months of January-June 2013. These data form the basis for calculating the 2013 homicide rate for South Sudan on a national and sub-national basis. Sub-national population data for the States of South Sudan have been taken from the 2008 Sudan census in order to calculate sub-national homicide rates.

¹² See, for example: ECOSOC (2012). E/RES/2012/18.

The collection of data and analysis for South Sudan were completed prior to the violent clashes of December 2013, and the estimated 2013 homicide rate does not include the victims of those events.

Data for Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone

For Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset contains data provided directly by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the Sierra Leone Police through the United Nations Project Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which have been used as received. In Sierra Leone, the most recent sub-national population estimates available are from the 2004 national census and they have been used to calculate sub-national homicide rates for 2007 and 2011.

Availability of homicide data produced by national registration systems

The following table presents countries and territories for which recent data (since 2005) on homicide produced by national registration systems are available at the international level.¹³ The table shows the latest available year, the number of years for which criminal justice (CJ) and public health (PH) data are available, as well as available disaggregations by sex, age, firearms and intimate partner/family-related homicide. Availability refers to data collected by UNODC, either directly from countries or through other international/regional organizations.

¹³ National registration systems refer to criminal justice or public health institutions publishing data on homicide.

Table 7.1: Data on homicide produced by national registration systems since 2005, as available to UNODC

Region	Sub-region	Country/territory	Latest available year	Number of CJ data points (years)	Number of PH data points (years)	Sex disaggregation available	Age disaggregation available	Firearm data available	Intimate partner/family-related homicide data available
Africa	Eastern Africa	Burundi	2011	4					
Africa	Eastern Africa	Kenya	2012	8					
Africa	Eastern Africa	Malawi	2012	8		YES			
Africa	Eastern Africa	Mauritius	2012	4	6	YES	YES	YES	YES
Africa	Eastern Africa	Mayotte	2009	4					
Africa	Eastern Africa	Mozambique	2009	5					
Africa	Eastern Africa	Réunion	2009	5	3	YES			
Africa	Eastern Africa	Rwanda	2008	4					
Africa	Eastern Africa	Seychelles	2006	1	5	YES			
Africa	Eastern Africa	South Sudan	2012	1		YES		YES	
Africa	Eastern Africa	Uganda	2011	7		YES		YES	
Africa	Eastern Africa	Zambia	2010	6					
Africa	Eastern Africa	Zimbabwe	2008	4					
Africa	Middle Africa	Cameroon	2007	2					
Africa	Middle Africa	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2010	6					
Africa	Middle Africa	Sao Tome and Principe	2011	6				YES	YES
Africa	Northern Africa	Algeria	2011	7				YES	
Africa	Northern Africa	Egypt	2011	7	7	YES	YES	YES	YES
Africa	Northern Africa	Morocco	2012	8	1	YES			
Africa	Northern Africa	Sudan	2008	2					
Africa	Southern Africa	Botswana	2009	3					
Africa	Southern Africa	Lesotho	2010	4					
Africa	Southern Africa	Namibia	2012	5				YES	
Africa	Southern Africa	South Africa	2012	8	5	YES		YES	YES
Africa	Western Africa	Burkina Faso	2008	4					YES
Africa	Western Africa	Cabo Verde	2012	5	3				
Africa	Western Africa	Côte d'Ivoire	2008	2					
Africa	Western Africa	Ghana	2009	3					
Africa	Western Africa	Guinea	2007	1					
Africa	Western Africa	Liberia	2012	6					
Africa	Western Africa	Nigeria	2008	4					
Africa	Western Africa	Senegal	2010	2					
Africa	Western Africa	Sierra Leone	2012	8				YES	

Region	Sub-region	Country/territory	Latest available year	Number of CJ data points (years)	Number of PH data points (years)	Sex disaggregation available	Age disaggregation available	Firearm data available	Intimate partner/family-related homicide data available
Americas	Caribbean	<i>Anguilla</i>	2008	4	4	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	Antigua and Barbuda	2012	7	5				
Americas	Caribbean	<i>Aruba</i>	2010		6	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	Bahamas	2012	8	4	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	Caribbean	Barbados	2012	8	4	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	<i>British Virgin Islands</i>	2006		1	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	<i>Cayman Islands</i>	2009		4	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	Cuba	2010		6	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	Dominica	2010	6	6	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	Dominican Republic	2012	8	2	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	Caribbean	Grenada	2012	8	4	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	Caribbean	<i>Guadeloupe</i>	2009	5	5	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	Haiti	2012	6					
Americas	Caribbean	Jamaica	2012	8	1	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	Caribbean	<i>Martinique</i>	2009	5	4	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	<i>Montserrat</i>	2008		3	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	<i>Puerto Rico</i>	2012	7	6	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	Saint Kitts and Nevis	2012	8	6	YES		YES	
Americas	Caribbean	Saint Lucia	2012	7	3				
Americas	Caribbean	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	2012	8	6	YES		YES	YES
Americas	Caribbean	Trinidad and Tobago	2012	8	4	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	Caribbean	<i>Turks and Caicos Islands</i>	2009		3	YES			
Americas	Caribbean	<i>United States Virgin Islands</i>	2010		6	YES			
Americas	Central America	Belize	2012	8	5	YES		YES	
Americas	Central America	Costa Rica	2012	8	7	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	Central America	El Salvador	2012	8	5	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	Central America	Guatemala	2012	8	5	YES		YES	
Americas	Central America	Honduras	2012	8		YES	YES	YES	
Americas	Central America	Mexico	2012	7	8	YES		YES	
Americas	Central America	Nicaragua	2012	8	7	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	Central America	Panama	2012	8	5	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	Northern America	<i>Bermuda</i>	2012	8	3	YES		YES	

Region	Sub-region	Country/territory	Latest available year	Number of CJ data points (years)	Number of PH data points (years)	Sex disaggregation available	Age disaggregation available	Firearm data available	Intimate partner/family-related homicide data available
Americas	Northern America	Canada	2012	8	5	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	Northern America	<i>Greenland</i>	2009	5					
Americas	Northern America	<i>Saint Pierre and Miquelon</i>	2009	4	3	YES			
Americas	Northern America	United States of America	2012	8	6	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	South America	Argentina	2010	6	6	YES		YES	
Americas	South America	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2012	8				YES	
Americas	South America	Brazil	2012	6	6	YES			
Americas	South America	Chile	2012	8	5	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	South America	Colombia	2012	8	8	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	South America	Ecuador	2012	8	6	YES			
Americas	South America	<i>French Guiana</i>	2009	5	4	YES			
Americas	South America	Guyana	2012	8	5	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	South America	Paraguay	2012	8	6	YES		YES	
Americas	South America	Peru	2012	8	6			YES	
Americas	South America	Suriname	2009	5	5				
Americas	South America	Uruguay	2012	8	3	YES	YES	YES	YES
Americas	South America	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	2012	8	5				
Asia	Central Asia	Kazakhstan	2012	8	6			YES	
Asia	Central Asia	Kyrgyzstan	2011	7	6	YES		YES	
Asia	Central Asia	Tajikistan	2011	7	1	YES		YES	
Asia	Central Asia	Turkmenistan	2006	2					
Asia	Central Asia	Uzbekistan	2008	4	1				
Asia	Eastern Asia	China	2010	6					
Asia	Eastern Asia	<i>China, Hong Kong SAR</i>	2012	8	5	YES	YES	YES	YES
Asia	Eastern Asia	<i>China, Macao SAR</i>	2010	6		YES			
Asia	Eastern Asia	Japan	2011	7	5	YES			
Asia	Eastern Asia	Mongolia	2011	7		YES	YES	YES	YES
Asia	Eastern Asia	Republic of Korea	2011	7	5			YES	YES
Asia	Eastern Asia	<i>Taiwan Province of China</i>	2011	7					
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Brunei Darussalam	2009	5					
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Cambodia	2009	5					
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Indonesia	2012	4					

Region	Sub-region	Country/territory	Latest available year	Number of CJ data points (years)	Number of PH data points (years)	Sex disaggregation available	Age disaggregation available	Firearm data available	Intimate partner/family-related homicide data available
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Lao People's Democratic Republic	2010	1					
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Malaysia	2010	4	2				
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Myanmar	2007	3					
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Philippines	2012	8	1	YES			
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Singapore	2012	8	7	YES	YES	YES	YES
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Thailand	2011	7	2				
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Timor-Leste	2010	6					
Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Viet Nam	2006	2					
Asia	Southern Asia	Afghanistan	2012	4					
Asia	Southern Asia	Bangladesh	2012	7					
Asia	Southern Asia	Bhutan	2010	6					
Asia	Southern Asia	India	2012	8		YES		YES	YES
Asia	Southern Asia	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	2009	1					
Asia	Southern Asia	Maldives	2008	2	3			YES	
Asia	Southern Asia	Nepal	2012	7					
Asia	Southern Asia	Pakistan	2012	8					
Asia	Southern Asia	Sri Lanka	2011	7	1				
Asia	Western Asia	Armenia	2012	8	5	YES		YES	YES
Asia	Western Asia	Azerbaijan	2010	6		YES		YES	YES
Asia	Western Asia	Bahrain	2011	7	5			YES	
Asia	Western Asia	Cyprus	2012	8	7	YES	YES	YES	YES
Asia	Western Asia	Georgia	2010	6	4	YES		YES	YES
Asia	Western Asia	Israel	2012	8	5				YES
Asia	Western Asia	Jordan	2011	7	1	YES			
Asia	Western Asia	Kuwait	2012	5	5	YES			
Asia	Western Asia	Lebanon	2010	6					
Asia	Western Asia	Oman	2011	3	1				
Asia	Western Asia	Qatar	2008	4	5				
Asia	Western Asia	Saudi Arabia	2007	3					
Asia	Western Asia	<i>State of Palestine</i>	2012	1	2				
Asia	Western Asia	Syrian Arab Republic	2010	6					
Asia	Western Asia	Turkey	2011	7	4	YES			

Region	Sub-region	Country/territory	Latest available year	Number of CJ data points (years)	Number of PH data points (years)	Sex disaggregation available	Age disaggregation available	Firearm data available	Intimate partner/family-related homicide data available
Asia	Western Asia	United Arab Emirates	2006	2					
Asia	Western Asia	Yemen	2010	6					
Europe	Eastern Europe	Belarus	2010	6	3			YES	
Europe	Eastern Europe	Bulgaria	2012	8	7	YES	YES	YES	
Europe	Eastern Europe	Czech Republic	2012	8	8	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Eastern Europe	Hungary	2012	8	5	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Eastern Europe	Poland	2011	7	6			YES	
Europe	Eastern Europe	Republic of Moldova	2012	8	7	YES		YES	
Europe	Eastern Europe	Romania	2012	8	6	YES		YES	YES
Europe	Eastern Europe	Russian Federation	2012	5	6				
Europe	Eastern Europe	Slovakia	2012	8	4			YES	
Europe	Eastern Europe	Ukraine	2010	6	6	YES		YES	
Europe	Northern Europe	Denmark	2012	7	2	YES	YES	YES	
Europe	Northern Europe	Estonia	2011	7	6	YES			
Europe	Northern Europe	Finland	2012	8	6	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Northern Europe	Iceland	2012	8	5	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Northern Europe	Ireland	2012	8	6	YES			
Europe	Northern Europe	Latvia	2012	8	6	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Northern Europe	Lithuania	2012	8	6	YES		YES	YES
Europe	Northern Europe	Norway	2011	7	6	YES	YES	YES	
Europe	Northern Europe	Sweden	2012	8	8	YES	YES	YES	
Europe	Northern Europe	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2011	7	6	YES	YES		YES
Europe	Southern Europe	Albania	2012	8		YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Southern Europe	Andorra	2010	4				YES	YES
Europe	Southern Europe	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2011	7		YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Southern Europe	Croatia	2012	8	6	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Southern Europe	Greece	2011	7	6	YES			
Europe	Southern Europe	Italy	2012	8	5	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Southern Europe	<i>Kosovo (in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99)</i>	2010	3					
Europe	Southern Europe	Malta	2012	8	6	YES	YES	YES	YES

Region	Sub-region	Country/territory	Latest available year	Number of CJ data points (years)	Number of PH data points (years)	Sex disaggregation available	Age disaggregation available	Firearm data available	Intimate partner/family-related homicide data available
Europe	Southern Europe	Montenegro	2012	8	4	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Southern Europe	Portugal	2012	8	4			YES	
Europe	Southern Europe	Serbia	2012	8	7	YES	YES	YES	
Europe	Southern Europe	Slovenia	2012	8	6	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Southern Europe	Spain	2012	8	6	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Southern Europe	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	2011	7	6	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Western Europe	Austria	2012	8	6	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Western Europe	Belgium	2012	8	2				
Europe	Western Europe	France	2012	8	5				
Europe	Western Europe	Germany	2011	7	6	YES	YES		YES
Europe	Western Europe	Liechtenstein	2011	8		YES		YES	
Europe	Western Europe	Luxembourg	2011	7	5	YES	YES	YES	YES
Europe	Western Europe	Monaco	2008	4				YES	
Europe	Western Europe	Netherlands	2011		8	YES		YES	
Europe	Western Europe	Switzerland	2011	7	6	YES	YES	YES	
Oceania	Australia and New Zealand	Australia	2012	8	1	YES	YES	YES	YES
Oceania	Australia and New Zealand	New Zealand	2012	8	4	YES	YES	YES	YES
Oceania	Melanesia	Fiji	2008	4	1				
Oceania	Melanesia	New Caledonia	2009	4					
Oceania	Melanesia	Papua New Guinea	2010	6					
Oceania	Melanesia	Solomon Islands	2008	4					
Oceania	Micronesia	<i>Guam</i>	2011	7					
Oceania	Polynesia	<i>French Polynesia</i>	2009	4					
Oceania	Polynesia	Tonga	2012	8		YES		YES	YES



8. STATISTICAL ANNEX

Abbreviations

Source type:

CJ Criminal Justice

PH Public Health

Data sources:

CTS Data are provided to UNODC annually by national police, national statistical offices or other competent national authorities through the United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS). Detailed information can be found on <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html>.

Eurostat The statistical office of the European Union. Offences recorded by the police.

Interpol International Criminal Police Organization.

NGO (a-c) Non-governmental organization: (a) Mayra Brea de Cabral and Edylberto Cabral (2009), "Violence in the Dominican Republic: nature, recent developments and prospects for control". Authors calculations based on data from the national police and the Attorney General of the Dominican Republic (b) Annita Montoute and David Anyanwu (2009), "Situational Analysis of Gun Related Crime in the Caribbean: The Case of Trinidad & Tobago; Antigua & Barbuda; St Vincent & the Grenadines and St. Lucia". Prepared for the Coalition for Development and the Reduction of Armed Violence (c) The Venezuelan Program of Action and Education in Human Rights (PROVEA).

NSO National Statistical Office.

OAS Organization of American States — Observatory on Citizen Security. Number of offences of intentional homicide recorded by the police.

OCAVI Observatorio Centroamericano sobre Violencia - The Central American Observatory on Violence. Sourced from national police data.

PAHO Pan American Health Organization's Core Health Data System.

SES Regional System of Standardized Citizen Security and Coexistence Indicators.

Transmonee UNICEF Transmonee Database. Innocenti Research Centre, Florence.

UN-PKO Peacekeeping Operation.

UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

WHO World Health Organization Global Health Estimates 2014: draft homicide estimates for year 2012.

WHO-MDB World Health Organization Mortality Database.

Country/territory	Source	Indicator	Year												
			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Lesotho	CTS/NSO	Rate								45.8	38.1	36.3	38.0		
		Count								895	752	723	764		
Namibia	National police/Interpol	Rate	20.0	18.3	17.7		17.6			16.8	18.1	14.4	13.9	17.2	
		Count	380	353	346		352			354	388	314	308	388	
South Africa	National police	Rate	48.5	47.0	46.7	42.3	39.5	38.4	39.3	37.3	36.1	33.1	31.0	30.0	31.0
		Count	21,758	21,405	21,553	19,824	18,793	18,528	19,202	18,487	18,148	16,834	15,940	15,609	16,259
Swaziland	WHO	Rate													33.8
		Count													
AFRICA															
Western Africa															
Benin	WHO	Rate													8.4
		Count													
Burkina Faso	WHO	Rate													8.0
		Count													
Cabo Verde	Judicial police	Rate								6.4	6.2	10.7	15.1	10.3	
		Count								31	30	52	74	51	
Côte d'Ivoire	WHO	Rate													13.6
		Count													
Gambia	WHO	Rate													10.2
		Count													
Ghana	WHO	Rate													6.1
		Count													
Guinea	WHO	Rate													8.9
		Count													
Guinea-Bissau	WHO	Rate													8.4
		Count													
Liberia	UN-PKO	Rate								2.8	4.8	3.8	3.3	3.9	3.2
		Count								100	177	145	129	161	135
Mali	WHO	Rate													7.5
		Count													
Mauritania	WHO	Rate													5.0
		Count													
Niger	WHO	Rate													4.7
		Count													
Nigeria	WHO	Rate													20.0
		Count													
Senegal	WHO	Rate													2.8
		Count													
Sierra Leone	CTS/National police	Rate					2.3	1.9	1.9	2.5	3.3	2.8	2.8	3.2	1.9
		Count					112	99	101	134	184	158	163	187	113
Togo	WHO	Rate													10.3
		Count													

Country/territory	Source	Indicator	Year												
			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
AMERICAS															
Caribbean															
Anguilla	NSO	Rate	9.0	0.0	17.1	16.6	8.1	7.9	31.0	30.4	7.5				
		Count	1	0	2	2	1	1	4	4	1				
Antigua and Barbuda	OAS	Rate	6.4	8.9	6.2	6.2	4.9	3.6	13.2	20.1	18.7	18.5	6.9	11.2	
		Count	5	7	5	5	4	3	11	17	16	16	6	10	
Aruba	WHO-MDB/PAHO	Rate			5.3	4.1	2.0	12.0	9.9	5.9	4.9	3.9	3.9		
		Count			5	4	2	12	10	6	5	4	4		
Bahamas	CTS/OAS	Rate	24.9	14.2	16.8	15.8	13.6	15.8	18.2	22.8	21.0	24.5	26.1	34.7	29.8
		Count	74	43	52	50	44	52	61	78	73	87	94	127	111
Barbados	CTS/OAS	Rate	7.5	9.3	9.3	12.2	8.1	10.6	12.7	9.8	9.0	6.8	11.1	9.6	7.4
		Count	20	25	25	33	22	29	35	27	25	19	31	27	21
British Virgin Islands	WHO-MDB/PAHO	Rate	0.0	4.7	4.6	9.0	17.8		8.4						
		Count	0	1	1	2	4		2						
Cayman Islands	WHO-MDB/PAHO	Rate	9.6	4.9	0.0	7.4	12.3		2.0	3.9	7.6	14.7			
		Count	4	2	0	3	6		1	2	4	8			
Cuba	WHO	Rate												4.2	
		Count												477	
Dominica	CTS/OAS	Rate	2.9	1.4	12.9	11.4	11.4	11.3	7.1	9.9	9.9	18.3	21.1		
		Count	2	1	9	8	8	8	5	7	7	13	15		
Dominican Republic	NGO (a)/SES/CTS	Rate	14.0	12.4	14.3	21.0	24.3	25.6	22.6	22.0	24.6	24.0	24.7	24.8	22.1
		Count	1,210	1,095	1,279	1,902	2,239	2,394	2,144	2,111	2,394	2,375	2,474	2,513	2,268
Grenada	CTS/OAS	Rate	14.8	5.9	13.7	8.8	5.8	10.7	11.6	10.6	15.4	6.7	9.6	3.8	13.3
		Count	15	6	14	9	6	11	12	11	16	7	10	4	14
Guadeloupe	National police	Rate					5.9	5.2	5.4	6.4	7.1	7.9			
		Count					26	23	24	29	32	36			
Haiti	UN-PKO	Rate								5.1	5.2	6.1	6.8	9.1	10.2
		Count								486	498	598	677	914	1,033
Jamaica	CTS/National police/OAS	Rate	34.4	43.7	39.8	36.8	55.2	62.4	49.7	58.5	59.5	61.6	52.6	41.1	39.3
		Count	887	1,139	1,045	975	1,471	1,674	1,340	1,583	1,618	1,682	1,442	1,133	1,087
Martinique	National police	Rate					4.8	4.8	5.8	5.8	4.3	2.7			
		Count					19	19	23	23	17	11			
Montserrat	WHO-MDB/PAHO	Rate	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.9	20.6	20.4				
		Count	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1				
Puerto Rico	National police	Rate	18.3	19.7	20.6	20.8	21.1	20.5	19.9	19.6	21.6	24.0	26.5	26.5	26.5
		Count	695	747	781	787	797	771	748	731	807	894	983	978	978
Saint Kitts and Nevis	National police/OAS/CTS	Rate	6.6	13.0	10.7	21.0	22.7	16.3	34.1	31.7	45.0	52.2	40.1	64.2	33.6
		Count	3	6	5	10	11	8	17	16	23	27	21	34	18
Saint Lucia	OAS	Rate	14.7	21.4	26.2	22.3	22.6	24.8	25.6	17.0	22.6	22.3	24.8	21.6	26.5
		Count	23	34	42	36	37	41	43	29	39	39	44	39	39
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	NGO (b)/OAS/CTS	Rate	18.5	11.1	18.5	16.6	25.8	21.1	11.9	33.0	14.7	18.3	22.9	19.2	25.6
		Count	20	12	20	18	28	23	13	36	16	20	25	21	28

Country/territory	Source	Indicator	Year												
			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Trinidad and Tobago	OAS/GTS	Rate	9.5	11.9	13.4	17.8	20.1	29.8	28.5	29.8	41.6	38.3	35.6	26.4	28.3
		Count	120	151	171	229	260	386	371	391	547	506	473	352	379
Turks and Caicos Islands	WHO-MDB/PAHO	Rate	0.0	0.0	11.3	0.0	0.0	0.0			6.8	6.6			
		Count	0	0	2	0	0	0			2	2			
United States Virgin Islands	WHO-MDB/PAHO	Rate	22.1	25.8	37.8	28.5	34.2	32.5	40.0	40.1	42.1	46.9	52.6		
		Count	24	28	41	31	37	35	43	43	45	50	56		
AMERICAS															
Central America															
Belize	CTS/OAS	Rate	17.2	26.1	34.6	25.9	29.8	29.8	33.0	33.9	35.1	32.2	41.8	39.2	44.7
		Count	41	64	87	67	79	81	92	97	103	97	129	124	145
Costa Rica	CTS/Ministry of Justice/SES	Rate	6.4	6.4	6.3	7.2	6.6	7.8	8.0	8.3	11.3	11.4	11.3	10.0	8.5
		Count	249	257	258	300	280	335	351	369	512	525	527	474	407
El Salvador	National police/CTS	Rate	39.3	36.9	37.0	36.4	45.8	62.2	64.4	57.1	51.7	70.9	64.1	69.9	41.2
		Count	2,341	2,207	2,224	2,197	2,773	3,778	3,928	3,497	3,179	4,382	3,987	4,371	2,594
Guatemala	CTS/National police/OAS	Rate	25.9	28.1	30.9	35.1	36.4	42.1	45.3	43.4	46.1	46.5	41.6	38.6	39.9
		Count	2,904	3,230	3,631	4,237	4,507	5,338	5,885	5,781	6,292	6,498	5,960	5,681	6,025
Honduras	OCAVI/NSO	Rate	50.9	54.8	55.8	61.4	53.8	46.6	44.3	50.0	60.8	70.7	81.8	91.4	90.4
		Count	3,176	3,488	3,623	4,073	3,639	3,212	3,118	3,588	4,455	5,280	6,236	7,104	7,172
Mexico	NSO	Rate	10.3	9.8	9.5	9.3	8.5	9.0	9.3	7.8	12.2	17.0	21.8	22.8	21.5
		Count	10,737	10,285	10,088	10,087	9,329	9,921	10,452	8,867	14,006	19,803	25,757	27,213	26,037
Nicaragua	National police/OAS	Rate	9.3	10.4	10.6	11.9	12.0	13.4	13.1	12.8	13.0	14.0	13.5	12.5	11.3
		Count	476	537	554	635	646	729	722	714	736	802	785	738	675
Panama	National police	Rate	9.8	9.8	12.0	10.4	9.3	10.8	10.8	12.7	18.4	22.6	20.6	20.3	17.2
		Count	299	306	380	338	308	364	371	444	654	818	759	759	654
AMERICAS															
Northern America															
Bermuda	CTS/National police	Rate	0.0	4.8	1.6	3.1	1.6	3.1	4.7	4.7	7.7	9.3	10.8	12.3	7.7
		Count	0	3	1	2	1	2	3	3	5	6	7	8	5
Canada	CTS/OAS	Rate	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.6
		Count	489	553	523	549	550	594	559	539	555	540	492	529	543
Greenland	NSO	Rate	23.1	30.2	21.2	8.8	19.3	17.6	17.6	3.5	10.6	19.4			
		Count	13	17	12	5	11	10	10	2	6	11			
Saint Pierre and Miquelon	National police	Rate							0.0	0.0	16.5	16.5			
		Count							0	0	1	1			
United States of America	National police/CTS	Rate	5.5	6.6	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.6	5.8	5.6	5.4	5.0	4.7	4.7	4.7
		Count	15,586	19,033	16,229	16,528	16,148	16,740	17,309	17,128	16,465	15,399	14,722	14,661	14,827
AMERICAS															
South America															
Argentina	Ministry of Justice/CTS/OAS	Rate	7.2	8.2	9.2	7.6	5.9	5.5	5.3	5.3	5.8	5.5	5.5		
		Count	2,653	3,048	3,453	2,876	2,259	2,115	2,052	2,071	2,305	2,215	2,237		
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	National police	Rate						7.0	6.3	8.1	8.6	8.4	10.4	10.0	12.1
		Count						654	598	787	850	835	1,052	1,029	1,270

Country/territory	Source	Indicator	Year																	
			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012					
Brazil	Anuario Brasileiro de Seguranca Publica	Rate													23.5	23.9	23.0	22.2	23.4	25.2
		Count													44,625	45,885	44,518	43,272	46,177	50,108
Chile	CTS/NSO	Rate				3.2				3.5	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.2	3.7	3.1
		Count				513				576	590	616	588	630	541	636	550	636	636	550
Colombia	National police/CTS	Rate	66.5	68.6	68.9	53.8	44.8	39.6	36.8	34.7	33.0	33.7	32.3	33.6	30.8	30.8	30.8	30.8	30.8	30.8
		Count	26,540	27,840	28,387	22,526	19,036	17,086	16,119	15,423	14,911	15,454	15,013	15,803	14,670	14,670	14,670	14,670	14,670	14,670
Ecuador	CTS/OAS/SES/National police	Rate	14.6	13.0	14.6	14.6	17.7	15.4	17.0	15.9	18.0	17.8	17.6	15.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4
		Count	1,833	1,658	1,906	1,937	2,390	2,121	2,385	2,273	2,607	2,625	2,638	2,345	1,924	1,924	1,924	1,924	1,924	1,924
<i>French Guiana</i>	National police	Rate					29.8	22.3	20.1	13.1	14.5	13.3								
		Count					58	45	42	28	32	30								
Guyana	NSO/CTS	Rate	9.9	10.6	18.9	27.3	17.3	18.7	20.0	14.9	20.4	15.0	17.8	16.4	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0
		Count	74	79	142	206	131	142	153	115	158	117	140	130	135	135	135	135	135	135
Paraguay	OAS/CTS	Rate	18.6	24.1	24.6	22.6	20.9	18.2	15.5	12.8	13.4	12.9	11.5	10.0	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.7
		Count	995	1,314	1,372	1,285	1,209	1,076	934	783	833	821	741	657	649	649	649	649	649	649
Peru	CTS/National police/OAS	Rate	5.0	4.9	4.2	4.9	5.6	11.0	11.2	10.4	11.6	10.3	9.3	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.6
		Count	1,302	1,294	1,136	1,316	1,526	3,057	3,141	2,934	3,332	2,969	2,709	2,850	2,865	2,865	2,865	2,865	2,865	2,865
Suriname	WHO	Rate																		6.1
		Count																		33
Uruguay	Ministry of Interior/SES	Rate	6.4	6.6	6.9	5.9	5.8	5.7	6.1	5.8	6.6	6.7	6.1	5.9	7.9	7.9	7.9	7.9	7.9	7.9
		Count	214	218	231	197	194	188	203	194	221	226	205	199	267	267	267	267	267	267
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	NGO (c)/CTS/OAS	Rate	32.9	32.0	38.0	44.0	37.0	37.3	45.1	47.6	51.9	48.9	45.0	47.8	53.7	53.7	53.7	53.7	53.7	53.7
		Count	8,022	7,960	9,617	11,342	9,719	9,964	12,257	13,156	14,589	13,985	13,080	14,098	16,072	16,072	16,072	16,072	16,072	16,072
ASIA																				
Central Asia																				
Kazakhstan	CTS/Transmonee	Rate	16.0	14.8	13.5	13.5	14.0	12.0	11.4	10.8	10.5	10.2	8.7	8.8	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.8
		Count	2,325	2,160	1,967	1,991	2,091	1,804	1,729	1,656	1,642	1,604	1,387	1,420	1,263	1,263	1,263	1,263	1,263	1,263
Kyrgyzstan	UNECE/CTS	Rate	8.7	7.7	8.2	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.0	20.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1
		Count	430	386	411	421	420	419	422	426	429	419	1,072	494	494	494	494	494	494	494
Tajikistan	Transmonee/CTS	Rate	4.6	3.7	2.8	2.5	2.1	2.3	2.8	1.9	1.4	1.3	2.4	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
		Count	283	233	180	164	142	157	194	132	100	97	181	126	126	126	126	126	126	126
Turkmenistan	WHO	Rate																		12.8
		Count																		660
Uzbekistan	WHO	Rate																		3.7
		Count																		1,060
ASIA																				
Eastern Asia																				
China	CTS/NSO	Rate			2.0	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
		Count			26,276	24,393	24,711	20,770	17,973	16,119	14,811	14,667	13,410	13,410	13,410	13,410	13,410	13,410	13,410	13,410
China, Hong Kong SAR	CTS/National police	Rate	0.6	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
		Count	38	66	69	52	45	34	35	18	36	47	35	17	27	27	27	27	27	27
China, Macao SAR	CTS/NSO	Rate	5.1	2.2	2.9	2.2	1.5	2.3	2.2	1.6	1.9	1.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
		Count	22	13	13	10	7	11	11	8	10	10	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

Country/territory	Source	Indicator	Year														
			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	WHO	Rate															5.2
		Count															1,293
Japan	CTS	Rate			0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3
		Count			697	699	643	619	574	646	506	465	442				
Mongolia	CTS	Rate			13.9	13.3	15.8	13.1	11.3	8.1	8.2	8.8	9.7				
		Count			343	333	398	336	293	212	219	239	266				
Republic of Korea	CTS	Rate															0.9
		Count															427
Taiwan Province of China	NSO	Rate	5.1	4.8	5.1	4.7	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.5	3.6	3.2	3.0			
		Count	1,132	1,072	1,156	1,057	910	903	921	881	803	832	743	686			
ASIA																	
South-Eastern Asia																	
Brunei Darussalam	WHO	Rate															2.0
		Count															8
Cambodia	WHO	Rate															6.5
		Count															964
Indonesia	CTS	Rate	1.1		0.7	0.6					0.6	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.6		0.6
		Count	2,204		1,635	1,419					1,372	1,311	1,058	1,467	1,456		
Lao People's Democratic Republic	WHO	Rate															5.9
		Count															392
Malaysia	WHO	Rate															2.3
		Count															652
Myanmar	WHO	Rate															15.2
		Count															8,044
Philippines +	CTS/National police	Rate	7.4	7.4	8.1	7.8	7.5	7.5	7.1	6.5	6.4	6.9	9.5	9.1	8.8		
		Count	5,735	5,852	6,553	6,436	6,344	6,434	6,196	5,739	5,820	6,368	8,897	8,674	8,484		
Singapore	CTS/National police	Rate	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2		
		Count	37	30	22	24	21	21	17	18	27	20	19	16	11		
Thailand	National police	Rate	8.2	8.0	7.1	10.0	6.6	7.3	7.1	6.7	6.0	5.6	5.5	5.0			
		Count	5,142	5,020	4,538	6,434	4,273	4,806	4,687	4,435	3,974	3,703	3,654	3,307			
Timor-Leste	UN-PKO	Rate					2.4	4.6	4.8	6.0	3.3	3.0	3.6				
		Count					23	46	49	62	35	32	39				
Viet Nam	WHO	Rate															3.3
		Count															3,037
ASIA																	
Southern Asia																	
Afghanistan	NSO	Rate															4.0
		Count															983
Bangladesh	National police	Rate	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.8	2.5	2.9	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.7			
		Count	3,343	3,678	3,503	3,471	3,902	3,592	4,166	3,863	4,099	4,219	3,988	4,169			
Bhutan	NSO	Rate	3.2	3.3	3.2	0.8	2.4	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.7				
		Count	18	19	19	5	15	11	9	8	7	8	12				

Country/territory	Source	Indicator	Year												
			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
India	National police	Rate	4.5	4.3	4.2	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
		Count	47,368	45,487	44,855	40,029	41,941	41,206	41,426	41,521	41,899	41,542	42,299	43,741	43,355
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	WHO	Rate													4.1
		Count													3,126
Maldives	WHO	Rate													3.9
		Count													13
Nepal	NSO	Rate	2.7	3.6	3.6	3.1	3.8	3.6	2.5	3.4	3.4	3.0	3.0	2.9	
		Count	635	848	858	757	936	913	633	893	889	804	818	786	
Pakistan	NSO	Rate	6.2	6.5	6.3	6.1	6.3	6.1	6.2	6.4	7.2	7.3	7.6	7.9	7.7
		Count	8,906	9,528	9,396	9,346	9,719	9,631	10,048	10,556	12,059	12,491	13,208	13,860	13,846
Sri Lanka	CTS/National police	Rate				6.7	7.0	6.1	10.2	8.2	7.3	4.7	3.6	3.4	
		Count				1,310	1,377	1,221	2,045	1,663	1,488	958	745	707	
ASIA															
Western Asia															
Armenia	CTS	Rate					2.7	1.9	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.8	1.5	2.2	1.8
		Count					83	58	79	77	83	83	44	65	54
Azerbaijan	CTS/Transmonee	Rate	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.8	2.1		
		Count	226	218	212	183	201	192	190	176	168	164	194		
Bahrain	CTS/National police	Rate				0.4	0.9	0.5	0.7	0.4	0.5	1.1	0.9	0.5	
		Count				3	7	4	7	4	6	13	11	7	
Cyprus	CTS	Rate					1.6	1.9	1.4	1.2	0.8	1.7	0.7	0.8	2.0
		Count					16	20	15	13	9	19	8	9	23
Georgia	Transmonee/CTS	Rate	5.0	5.6	6.3	6.6	6.6	9.0	7.3	7.5	6.0	4.8	4.3		
		Count	239	263	292	302	298	403	323	330	263	210	187		
Iraq	WHO	Rate												8.0	
		Count												2,628	
Israel	CTS/NSO	Rate	2.4	3.6	3.6	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.7	1.8	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.8
		Count	147	223	227	195	173	166	182	125	136	128	145	151	134
Jordan	CTS/NSO	Rate						1.3	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.7	2.0	
		Count						67	100	98	100	91	109	133	
Kuwait	WHO	Rate												0.4	
		Count												12	
Lebanon	National police	Rate					3.2	3.9	2.1	2.6	6.0	1.9	2.2		
		Count					123	156	85	108	252	81	95		
Oman	CTS/NSO	Rate		0.6	0.6					0.7	0.7		1.1		
		Count		13	15					18	18		34		
Qatar	WHO	Rate												1.1	
		Count												23	
Saudi Arabia	WHO	Rate												0.8	
		Count												234	
State of Palestine	WHO	Rate												7.4	
		Count												312	

Country/territory	Source	Indicator	Year														
			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		
Syrian Arab Republic	NSO	Rate	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.4	2.2	
		Count	357	376	368	405	426	430	446	533	529	476	463				
Turkey	CTS/UNECE	Rate				4.3	4.4	4.9	4.6	3.7	3.3	3.3	2.7	2.6			
		Count				2,837	2,914	3,305	3,168	2,540	2,320	2,366*	1,923*	1,866*			
United Arab Emirates	WHO	Rate															2.6
		Count															
Yemen	CTS/NSO	Rate	4.0			3.7	3.3	4.7	4.3	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.8				
		Count	697			704	646	945	895	850	874	990	1,099				
EUROPE																	
Eastern Europe																	
Belarus	CTS/Transmonee	Rate	10.1	9.8	10.0	9.0	8.4	8.5	7.6	6.8	5.7	5.0	5.1				
		Count	1,013	969	989	879	815	825	734	649	541	473	486				
Bulgaria	CTS/Eurostat	Rate				3.2	3.2	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.0	2.0	1.7	1.9		
		Count				247	244	199	186	177	172	150	147	128	141		
Czech Republic	National police	Rate	1.8	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.9	1.0	0.8	1.0		
		Count	181	142	149	163	134	108	130	126	114	94	103	86	105		
Hungary	CTS	Rate	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.2	2.1	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.3		
		Count	205	254	203	228	209	164	174	154	146	139	133	142	132		
Poland	CTS/Eurostat	Rate	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.2			
		Count	855	776	716	662	633	555	490	525	460	493	436	449			
Republic of Moldova	CTS	Rate	10.5	10.1	10.1	8.2	7.2	7.9	7.1	5.9	6.5	6.8	7.5	8.6	6.5		
		Count	433	410	399	319	277	296	262	217	236	246	267	304	229		
Romania	CTS	Rate	2.5	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.7		
		Count	560	597	563	551	516	457	438	416	470	397	404	335	378		
Russian Federation	CTS	Rate									11.6	11.1	10.1	9.6	9.2		
		Count										16,617	15,954	14,574	13,826	13,120	
Slovakia	Transmonee/CTS	Rate	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.3	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.4		
		Count	143	129	138	146	122	106	89	89	94	84	89	96	75		
Ukraine	CTS	Rate				7.6	7.3	6.4	6.3	5.7	5.2	4.7	4.3				
		Count				3,618	3,475	3,025	2,931	2,639	2,438	2,194	1,988				
EUROPE																	
Northern Europe																	
Denmark	CTS	Rate	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.8	1.0	0.5	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8		
		Count	58	52	56	65	43	53	29	39	54	47	42	46	47		
Estonia	CTS/Eurostat	Rate	10.5	10.1	10.5	11.0	6.8	8.5	6.9	7.1	6.4	5.4	5.4	5.0			
		Count	143	137	142	147	91	113	91	93	84	70	70	65			
Finland	CTS	Rate	2.9	3.0	2.5	2.0	2.8	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.1	1.6		
		Count	148	156	132	105	146	117	119	130	133	120	116	114	89		
Iceland	Eurostat/CTS	Rate	1.8	0.4	1.4	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.9	0.3		
		Count	5	1	4	0	3	3	0	2	0	1	2	3	1		
Ireland	CTS/National police/NSO	Rate	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.7	1.3	1.5	1.8	1.1	1.3	1.2	0.9	1.2		
		Count	37	52	52	45	30	52	62	78	50	56	53	42	54		

Country/territory	Source	Indicator	Year												
			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Latvia	CTS	Rate	10.0	9.3	9.2	8.8	8.0	5.7	5.8	4.3	4.6	5.1	3.3	3.3	4.7
		Count	238	219	214	202	181	126	128	94	99	108	70	69	97
Lithuania	CTS	Rate					10.3	11.3	8.9	8.7	9.5	8.1	7.1	6.9	6.7
		Count					343	372	288	277	298	252	219	211	202
Norway	CTS/Eurostat	Rate	1.1	0.8	1.0	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	2.2	
		Count	49	37	46	51	36	33	33	30	34	29	29	111	
Sweden	National Council for Crime Prevention	Rate	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.2	0.9	1.0	1.2	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.7
		Count	96	87	101	85	107	79	88	107	77	87	91	81	68
United Kingdom	Eurostat/CTS	Rate	1.7	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.0	
		Count	1,002	1,039	1,201	1,039	983	896	863	873	760	714	753	653	
EUROPE															
Southern Europe															
Albania	CTS	Rate						4.8	3.0	3.3	2.9	2.7	4.0	4.5	5.0
		Count						154	95	105	93	85	127	142	157
Andorra	CTS/Interpol	Rate				1.3			0.0	1.3	1.3				
		Count				1			0	1	1				
Bosnia and Herzegovina	CTS	Rate									1.8	1.5	1.3		
		Count									71	56	51		
Croatia	Ministry of Interior	Rate	2.3	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.9	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.4	1.1	1.2
		Count	101	81	73	67	83	66	68	61	67	49	62	48	51
Greece	CTS/Eurostat	Rate	0.7	1.2	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.7	
		Count	81	132	94	122	111	132	110	128	139	144	179	184	
Italy	CTS	Rate	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9
		Count	766	709	644	719	720	610	625	631	615	590	529	552	530
Kosovo (in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99)	Eurostat	Rate									4.4	3.2	3.6		
		Count									77	56	64		
Malta	Eurostat/CTS	Rate	1.0	1.5	1.5	0.0	1.7	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.4	0.9	0.9	0.7	2.8
		Count	4	6	6	0	7	4	0	4	6	4	4	3	12
Montenegro	CTS	Rate								1.9	3.9	3.4	2.4	3.4	2.7
		Count								12	24	21	15	21	17
Portugal	Eurostat/CTS	Rate	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.8	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2
		Count	116	105	119	149	144	133	155	185	124	130	124	114	122
San Marino	WHO	Rate													0.7
		Count													x
Serbia	Eurostat/CTS	Rate	2.2	2.4	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.2
		Count	228	243	200	176	164	147	156	171	140	145	123	132	111
Slovenia	CTS	Rate	1.8	1.4	1.8	1.1	1.4	1.0	0.6	1.2	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.7
		Count	36	28	36	21	27	20	12	24	10	13	15	16	14
Spain	Eurostat/CTS	Rate	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8
		Count	553	577	564	587	520	518	476	482	426	399	390	387	364
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	CTS/Eurostat	Rate	2.3	2.7	2.9	3.4	2.3	2.1	2.2	2.0	1.7	1.7	2.0	1.4	
		Count	47	55	60	70	49	44	46	42	35	35	43	30	

Country/territory	Source	Indicator	Year													
			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
EUROPE																
Western Europe																
Austria	CTS/Eurostat	Rate	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.9
		Count	82	70	65	50	59	54	61	45	45	43	43	53	71	77
Belgium	CTS/Eurostat	Rate	2.1	2.7	3.1	2.2	2.6	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.6
		Count	212	282	319	230	268	221	221	211	203	189	187	206	182	182
France	CTS/Eurostat	Rate	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.0
		Count	1,051	1,047	1,119	987	990	976	879	826	839	682	675	743	665	665
Germany	Eurostat/CTS	Rate	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
		Count	1,015	925	955	859	868	869	808	757	722	706	690	662	662	662
Liechtenstein	Eurostat/CTS	Rate	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.8	0.0	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Count	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
Luxembourg	Eurostat/UNECE/CTS	Rate	0.9	2.0	1.4	0.7	0.4	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.6	1.0	2.0	0.8	0.8	0.8
		Count	4	9	6	3	2	4	9	7	8	5	10	4	4	4
Monaco	CTS	Rate	3.1			3.0	3.0	2.9	0.0	0.0	0.0					
		Count	1			1	1	1	0	0						
Netherlands	NSO	Rate	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
		Count	180	202	195	202	191	174	128	143	150	154	144	143	143	145
Switzerland	CTS/Eurostat	Rate	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6
		Count	69	86	86	73	78	75	60	51	54	51	52	46	46	46
OCEANIA																
Australia and New Zealand																
Australia	Eurostat/CTS/NSO	Rate	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.1
		Count	362	347	366	341	302	259	281	255	261	263	230	244	254	254
New Zealand	CTS/National police	Rate	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.5	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9
		Count	52	51	60	44	45	61	49	48	51	67	43	39	41	41
OCEANIA																
Melanesia																
Fiji	WHO	Rate														4.0
		Count														35
New Caledonia	National police	Rate						3.4	5.1	4.6	3.3					
		Count						8	12	11	8					
Papua New Guinea	CTS/National police	Rate	8.6	7.9	8.3	10.5	5.2	9.9	9.8	8.1	9.2	10.4	10.4			
		Count	465	436	470	609	309	603	610	520	603	697	713			
Solomon Islands	WHO	Rate														4.3
		Count														24
Vanuatu	WHO	Rate														2.9
		Count														7
OCEANIA																
Micronesia																
Guam	National police	Rate	1.3	5.1	1.3	5.1	5.7	4.4	6.9	0.6	3.2	1.9	2.5			
		Count	2	8	2	8	9	7	11	1	5	3	4			

Country/territory	Source	Indicator	Year															
			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012			
Kiribati	WHO	Rate																8.2
		Count																8
Marshall Islands	WHO	Rate																4.7
		Count																2
Micronesia (Federated States of)	WHO	Rate																4.6
		Count																5
Nauru	WHO	Rate																1.3
		Count																x
Palau	WHO	Rate																3.1
		Count																x
OCEANIA																		
Polynesia																		
Cook Islands	WHO	Rate																3.1
		Count																
French Polynesia	National police	Rate										1.2	2.7	3.4	0.4			
		Count										3	7	9	1			
Niue	WHO	Rate																3.6
		Count																x
Samoa	WHO	Rate																3.6
		Count																7
Tonga	CTS/National police	Rate	1.0	6.1	6.1	6.0	2.0	4.0	7.9	1.0	3.9	7.7	1.0	1.9	1.0			
		Count	1	6	6	6	2	4	8	8	1	4	8	1	2	1		
Tuvalu	WHO	Rate																4.2
		Count																x

x due to small population size the estimated count is less than 2

* CTS Victims data are continued using UNECE trend data

+ In 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP) implemented a new crime reporting system wherein crime data for 2009 was set as the baseline for future research, study and comparison. Thus, crime statistics since 2009 cannot be compared with data collected in previous years (2008 and earlier).

Table 8.2: Percentage of male and female intentional homicide victims, by country/territory (latest available year)

Country/territory	Source		Year	Males	Females
AFRICA					
Eastern Africa					
Burundi	PH	IHME	2010	70.4%	29.6%
Comoros	PH	IHME	2010	70.6%	29.4%
Djibouti	PH	IHME	2010	72.3%	27.7%
Eritrea	PH	IHME	2010	74.4%	25.6%
Ethiopia	PH	IHME	2010	77.2%	22.8%
Kenya	PH	IHME	2010	76.6%	23.4%
Madagascar	PH	IHME	2010	71.6%	28.4%
Malawi	CJ	National police	2012	87.5%	12.5%
Mauritius	CJ	CTS	2011	76.5%	23.5%
Mozambique	PH	IHME	2010	75.8%	24.2%
<i>Réunion</i>	PH	WHO-MDB	2008	75.0%	25.0%
Rwanda	PH	IHME	2010	70.9%	29.1%
Seychelles	PH	IHME	2010	79.3%	20.7%
Somalia	PH	IHME	2010	73.9%	26.1%
South Sudan	CJ	National police	2012	82.5%	17.5%
Uganda	CJ	CTS	2008	86.2%	13.8%
United Republic of Tanzania	PH	IHME	2010	73.0%	27.0%
Zambia	CJ	National police	2010	77.8%	22.2%
Zimbabwe	PH	IHME	2010	71.8%	28.2%
AFRICA					
Middle Africa					
Angola	PH	IHME	2010	81.2%	18.8%
Cameroon	PH	IHME	2010	75.5%	24.5%
Central African Republic	PH	IHME	2010	85.6%	14.4%
Chad	PH	IHME	2010	71.2%	28.8%
Congo	PH	IHME	2010	83.9%	16.1%
Democratic Republic of the Congo	PH	IHME	2010	80.8%	19.2%
Equatorial Guinea	PH	IHME	2010	82.5%	17.5%
Gabon	PH	IHME	2010	83.9%	16.1%
Sao Tome and Principe	PH	IHME	2010	74.6%	25.4%
AFRICA					
Northern Africa					
Algeria	PH	IHME	2010	84.0%	16.0%
Egypt	CJ	CTS	2011	87.8%	12.2%
Libya	PH	IHME	2010	76.8%	23.2%
Morocco	CJ	CTS	2009	87.8%	12.2%
Sudan	PH	IHME	2010	85.3%	14.7%
Tunisia	PH	IHME	2010	77.0%	23.0%

Country/territory	Source		Year	Males	Females
AFRICA					
Southern Africa					
Botswana	PH	IHME	2010	76.0%	24.0%
Lesotho	PH	IHME	2010	74.0%	26.0%
Namibia	PH	IHME	2010	76.3%	23.7%
South Africa	CJ	National police	2011	84.6%	15.4%
Swaziland	PH	IHME	2010	77.9%	22.1%
AFRICA					
Western Africa					
Benin	PH	IHME	2010	71.1%	28.9%
Burkina Faso	PH	IHME	2010	67.2%	32.8%
Cabo Verde	PH	IHME	2010	74.5%	25.5%
Côte d'Ivoire	PH	IHME	2010	76.0%	24.0%
Gambia	PH	IHME	2010	68.9%	31.1%
Ghana	PH	IHME	2010	63.8%	36.2%
Guinea	PH	IHME	2010	69.4%	30.6%
Guinea-Bissau	PH	IHME	2010	70.6%	29.4%
Liberia	PH	IHME	2010	70.1%	29.9%
Mali	PH	IHME	2010	65.0%	35.0%
Mauritania	PH	IHME	2010	68.9%	31.1%
Niger	PH	IHME	2010	66.1%	33.9%
Nigeria	PH	IHME	2010	68.2%	31.8%
Senegal	PH	IHME	2010	74.8%	25.2%
Sierra Leone	PH	IHME	2010	76.8%	23.2%
Togo	PH	IHME	2010	71.5%	28.5%
AMERICAS					
Caribbean					
<i>Anguilla</i>	PH	PAHO	2009	100.0%	0.0%
Antigua and Barbuda	PH	IHME	2010	67.9%	32.1%
<i>Aruba</i>	PH	PAHO	2010	100.0%	0.0%
Bahamas	CJ	CTS	2011	87.4%	12.6%
Barbados	CJ	National police	2010	67.7%	32.3%
<i>British Virgin Islands</i>	PH	PAHO	2006	50.0%	50.0%
<i>Cayman Islands</i>	PH	PAHO	2009	87.5%	12.5%
Cuba	PH	PAHO	2010	75.0%	25.0%
Dominica	PH	PAHO	2010	87.5%	12.5%
Dominican Republic	CJ	CTS	2012	91.1%	8.9%
Grenada	CJ	CTS	2012	64.3%	35.7%
<i>Guadeloupe</i>	PH	PAHO	2009	84.2%	15.8%
Haiti	PH	IHME	2010	78.4%	21.6%
Jamaica	CJ	CTS	2011	89.5%	10.5%
<i>Martinique</i>	PH	PAHO	2009	72.7%	27.3%
<i>Montserrat</i>	PH	PAHO	2008	100.0%	0.0%
<i>Puerto Rico</i>	PH	PAHO	2010	94.1%	5.9%
Saint Kitts and Nevis	CJ	CTS	2010	90.5%	9.5%

Country/territory	Source		Year	Males	Females
Saint Lucia	PH	IHME	2010	79.7%	20.3%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	CJ	CTS	2010	88.0%	12.0%
Trinidad and Tobago	CJ	CTS	2011	91.7%	8.3%
<i>Turks and Caicos Islands</i>	PH	PAHO	2009	100.0%	0.0%
<i>United States Virgin Islands</i>	PH	PAHO	2010	87.5%	12.5%
AMERICAS					
Central America					
Belize	CJ	CTS	2011	90.3%	9.7%
Costa Rica	CJ	CTS	2012	87.7%	12.3%
El Salvador	CJ	CTS	2012	89.0%	11.0%
Guatemala	CJ	CTS	2009	88.9%	11.1%
Honduras	CJ	CTS	2011	93.2%	6.8%
Mexico	PH	NSO	2012	89.3%	10.7%
Nicaragua	PH	PAHO	2011	92.6%	7.4%
Panama	CJ	CTS	2012	94.6%	5.4%
AMERICAS					
Northern America					
<i>Bermuda*</i>	PH	WHO-MDB	2007	0.0%	0.0%
Canada	CJ	CTS	2011	69.8%	30.2%
<i>Saint Pierre and Miquelon*</i>	PH	WHO-MDB	2008	0.0%	0.0%
United States of America	CJ	National police	2012	77.8%	22.2%
AMERICAS					
South America					
Argentina	PH	PAHO	2010	83.6%	16.4%
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	PH	IHME	2010	77.3%	22.7%
Brazil	PH	IHME	2010	89.8%	10.2%
Chile	CJ	CTS	2011	81.9%	18.1%
Colombia	CJ	CTS	2011	91.6%	8.4%
Ecuador	PH	PAHO	2010	91.8%	8.2%
<i>French Guiana</i>	PH	PAHO	2009	81.8%	18.2%
Guyana	CJ	CTS	2011	60.0%	40.0%
Paraguay	CJ	CTS	2012	88.8%	11.2%
Peru	PH	IHME	2010	78.1%	21.9%
Suriname	PH	IHME	2010	75.3%	24.7%
Uruguay	CJ	CTS	2011	79.4%	20.6%
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	PH	IHME	2010	91.9%	8.1%
ASIA					
Central Asia					
Kazakhstan	PH	IHME	2010	82.1%	17.9%
Kyrgyzstan	CJ	CTS	2009	68.7%	31.3%
Tajikistan	CJ	CTS	2011	86.5%	13.5%
Turkmenistan	PH	IHME	2010	83.8%	16.2%
Uzbekistan	PH	IHME	2010	82.4%	17.6%

Country/territory	Source		Year	Males	Females
ASIA					
Eastern Asia					
China	PH	IHME	2010	78.1%	21.9%
<i>China, Hong Kong SAR</i>	CJ	CTS	2011	47.1%	52.9%
<i>China, Macao SAR</i>	PH	WHO-MDB	1994	60.0%	40.0%
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	PH	IHME	2010	77.1%	22.9%
Japan	CJ	CTS	2011	47.1%	52.9%
Mongolia	CJ	CTS	2011	77.4%	22.6%
Republic of Korea	CJ	CTS	2011	47.5%	52.5%
<i>Taiwan Province of China</i>	PH	IHME	2010	86.6%	13.4%
ASIA					
South-Eastern Asia					
Brunei Darussalam	PH	IHME	2010	54.1%	45.9%
Cambodia	PH	IHME	2010	75.3%	24.7%
Indonesia	PH	IHME	2010	80.3%	19.7%
Lao People's Democratic Republic	PH	IHME	2010	79.4%	20.6%
Malaysia	PH	IHME	2010	72.6%	27.4%
Myanmar	PH	IHME	2010	61.5%	38.5%
Philippines	CJ	CTS	2011	88.0%	12.0%
Singapore	CJ	CTS	2011	62.5%	37.5%
Thailand	PH	IHME	2010	87.7%	12.3%
Timor-Leste	PH	IHME	2010	73.1%	26.9%
Viet Nam	PH	IHME	2010	71.5%	28.5%
ASIA					
Southern Asia					
Afghanistan	PH	IHME	2010	87.0%	13.0%
Bangladesh	PH	IHME	2010	63.2%	36.8%
Bhutan	PH	IHME	2010	61.2%	38.8%
India	CJ	National police	2012	59.2%	40.8%
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	PH	IHME	2010	81.9%	18.1%
Maldives	PH	IHME	2010	63.3%	36.7%
Nepal	PH	IHME	2010	77.3%	22.7%
Pakistan	PH	IHME	2010	76.7%	23.3%
Sri Lanka	PH	IHME	2010	84.8%	15.2%
ASIA					
Western Asia					
Armenia	CJ	CTS	2012	64.8%	35.2%
Azerbaijan	CJ	CTS	2010	69.9%	30.1%
Bahrain	PH	IHME	2010	85.6%	14.4%
Cyprus	CJ	CTS	2012	77.3%	22.7%
Georgia	CJ	UNECE	2011	75.7%	24.3%
Iraq	PH	IHME	2012	68.3%	31.7%
Israel	PH	IHME	2010	72.8%	27.2%
Jordan	PH	WHO-MDB	2008	76.6%	23.4%
Kuwait	CJ	National Police	2010	83.6%	16.4%

Country/territory	Source		Year	Males	Females
Lebanon	PH	IHME	2010	79.5%	20.5%
Oman	PH	IHME	2010	73.3%	26.7%
Qatar	PH	IHME	2010	81.9%	18.1%
Saudi Arabia	PH	IHME	2010	66.7%	33.3%
<i>State of Palestine</i>	PH	IHME	2010	87.6%	12.4%
Syrian Arab Republic	PH	IHME	2010	84.0%	16.0%
Turkey	CJ	UNECE	2011	79.5%	20.5%
United Arab Emirates	PH	IHME	2010	86.8%	13.2%
Yemen	PH	IHME	2010	79.5%	20.5%
EUROPE					
Eastern Europe					
Belarus	PH	IHME	2010	67.7%	32.3%
Bulgaria	CJ	CTS	2012	82.3%	17.7%
Czech Republic	CJ	National police	2012	54.3%	45.7%
Hungary	CJ	CTS	2012	58.3%	41.7%
Poland	PH	IHME	2010	73.2%	26.8%
Republic of Moldova	CJ	CTS	2012	72.5%	27.5%
Romania	CJ	UNECE	2010	62.5%	37.5%
Russian Federation	PH	IHME	2010	75.5%	24.5%
Slovakia	PH	IHME	2010	68.0%	32.0%
Ukraine	CJ	UNECE	2010	68.6%	31.4%
EUROPE					
Northern Europe					
Denmark	CJ	CTS	2012	66.0%	34.0%
Estonia	CJ	UNECE	2010	76.6%	23.4%
Finland	CJ	CTS	2012	53.9%	46.1%
Iceland	CJ	CTS	2012	0.0%	100.0%
Ireland	CJ	NSO	2012	86.7%	13.3%
Latvia	CJ	CTS	2012	49.0%	51.0%
Lithuania	CJ	CTS	2012	73.8%	26.2%
Norway	CJ	CTS	2011	53.2%	46.8%
Sweden	CJ	UNECE	2010	68.1%	31.9%
United Kingdom (England and Wales)	CJ	National police/CTS	2011	70.3%	29.7%
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	CJ	CTS	2011	82.6%	17.4%
United Kingdom (Scotland)	CJ	CTS	2011	80.4%	19.6%
EUROPE					
Southern Europe					
Albania	CJ	CTS	2012	83.4%	16.6%
Andorra	CJ	CTS	2012	0.0%	0.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	CJ	CTS	2011	68.6%	31.4%
Croatia	CJ	CTS	2012	64.7%	35.3%
Greece	CJ	CTS	2009	93.4%	6.6%
Italy	CJ	CTS	2011	69.9%	30.1%
Malta	CJ	CTS	2012	75.0%	25.0%
Montenegro	CJ	CTS	2012	82.4%	17.6%

Country/territory	Source		Year	Males	Females
Portugal	PH	IHME	2010	70.2%	29.8%
San Marino*	PH	WHO-MDB	2005	0.0%	0.0%
Serbia	CJ	CTS	2012	64.9%	35.1%
Slovenia	CJ	CTS	2012	57.1%	42.9%
Spain	CJ	CTS	2012	65.7%	34.3%
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	CJ	CTS	2011	86.7%	13.3%
EUROPE					
Western Europe					
Austria	CJ	CTS	2012	59.8%	40.2%
Belgium	PH	IHME	2010	56.6%	43.4%
France	PH	IHME	2010	62.1%	37.9%
Germany	CJ	CTS	2011	52.7%	47.3%
Liechtenstein	CJ	CTS	2010	100.0%	0.0%
Luxembourg	CJ	CTS	2011	100.0%	0.0%
Netherlands	PH	NSO	2011	65.0%	35.0%
Switzerland	CJ	CTS	2011	50.0%	50.0%
OCEANIA					
Australia and New Zealand					
Australia	CJ	CTS	2012	67.3%	32.7%
New Zealand	CJ	CTS	2012	48.8%	51.2%
OCEANIA					
Melanesia					
Fiji	PH	IHME	2010	61.3%	38.7%
Papua New Guinea	PH	IHME	2010	73.7%	26.3%
Solomon Islands	PH	IHME	2010	74.8%	25.2%
Vanuatu	PH	IHME	2010	72.0%	28.0%
OCEANIA					
Micronesia					
Kiribati	PH	IHME	2010	69.4%	30.6%
Marshall Islands	PH	IHME	2010	81.3%	18.7%
Micronesia (Federated States of)	PH	IHME	2010	74.2%	25.8%
OCEANIA					
Polynesia					
Samoa	PH	IHME	2010	81.2%	18.8%
Tonga	CJ	National police	2012	0.0%	100.0%

* No homicide was recorded in the respective year.

Table 8.3: Percentage distribution of intentional homicides, by mechanism and by country/territory (2000-2012)

Country/territory	Source	Mechanism	Year							
			2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
AFRICA										
Eastern Africa										
Mauritius	CTS	Firearm %	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	
South Sudan	National police	Firearm %								14%
		Sharp object %								1%
		Other %								
Uganda	CTS	Firearm %	13%	14%	9%	13%	11%	19%		
AFRICA										
Middle Africa										
Sao Tome and Principe	CTS	Firearm %		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
AFRICA										
Northern Africa										
Algeria	CTS	Firearm %			5%	6%				
Egypt	CTS	Firearm %		39%	43%	49%	43%	23%	68%	
		Sharp object %		35%	36%	35%	37%	21%	19%	
		Other %		26%	20%	16%	20%	56%	13%	
AFRICA										
Southern Africa										
Namibia	National police	Firearm %				19%	18%	14%	13%	15%
South Africa	NIMMS	Firearm %			33%					
		Sharp object %			37%					
		Other %			30%					
AFRICA										
Western Africa										
Sierra Leone	CTS	Firearm %				70%				
AMERICAS										
Caribbean										
Bahamas	CTS	Firearm %	69%	54%	55%	63%	60%	73%	74%	
		Sharp object %	21%	21%	26%	30%	26%	19%	17%	
		Other %	10%	25%	19%	7%	14%	7%	9%	
Dominican Republic	CTS	Firearm %	64%	54%		70%	65%	65%	63%	64%
		Sharp object %				20%	24%	24%	25%	25%
		Other %				10%	11%	10%	12%	11%
Grenada	CTS	Firearm %	9%	8%	18%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
		Sharp object %	55%	50%	55%	88%	86%	90%	75%	71%
		Other %	36%	42%	27%	6%	14%	10%	25%	29%
Jamaica	CTS	Firearm %		75%	79%	77%	77%	76%	70%	
		Sharp object %		19%	16%	17%	17%	17%	19%	
		Other %		6%	5%	6%	6%	7%	11%	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	CTS	Firearm %					85%	81%	88%	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	CTS	Firearm %	22%	31%	58%		30%	36%		
		Sharp object %	43%	46%	31%		15%	44%		
		Other %	35%	23%	11%		55%	20%		
Trinidad and Tobago	CTS	Firearm %		73%	77%	79%	72%	75%	71%	
		Sharp object %		15%	13%	12%	16%	13%	16%	
		Other %		12%	10%	9%	12%	12%	13%	

Country/territory	Source	Mechanism	Year								
			2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
AMERICAS											
Central America											
Belize	CTS	Firearm %	51%	40%				48%	62%	67%	
		Sharp object %								33%	
		Other %								0%	
Costa Rica	SES/CTS	Firearm %		62%	61%	68%	64%	66%	63%	64%	
		Sharp object %		24%	24%	20%	22%	18%	19%	19%	
		Other %		14%	14%	12%	14%	16%	18%	16%	
El Salvador	CTS	Firearm %	77%	78%	80%	67%	76%	73%	70%	62%	
		Sharp object %			12%	13%	15%	15%	18%	21%	
		Other %			8%	21%	10%	12%	12%	17%	
Guatemala	CTS	Firearm %	79%	78%	83%	83%	83%				
Honduras	SES	Firearm %				79%	81%	83%	84%		
		Sharp object %				15%	14%	11%	10%		
		Other %				6%	5%	5%	6%		
Mexico	CTS	Firearm %	29%	31%	39%	39%	55%	55%	57%		
Nicaragua	CTS	Firearm %							52%		
		Sharp object %							48%		
		Other %							0%		
Panama	CTS/National police	Firearm %	59%	68%	65%	79%	82%	77%	76%	74%	
		Sharp object %	26%	16%	21%	13%	11%	15%	16%	17%	
		Other %	15%	16%	14%	7%	7%	8%	8%	10%	
AMERICAS											
Northern America											
Canada	CTS	Firearm %	36%	33%	35%	35%	32%	34%	29%		
		Sharp object %	32%	35%	34%	35%	37%	31%	36%		
		Other %	32%	31%	32%	29%	31%	35%	34%		
United States of America	CTS	Firearm %	61%	59%	59%	58%	60%	60%	59%	60%	
		Sharp object %	11%	11%	11%	11%	12%	12%	12%	11%	
		Other %	28%	30%	30%	31%	28%	28%	30%	30%	
AMERICAS											
South America											
Argentina	CTS	Firearm %	44%	43%	46%	48%					
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	CTS	Firearm %	2%	1%				7%			
Chile	CTS	Firearm %	39%	12%	7%	9%	25%	23%	27%		
		Sharp object %						41%	32%		
		Other %						36%	41%		
Colombia	National Institute of Forensic Medicine	Firearm %	70%	72%	71%	71%	78%	78%	77%		
		Sharp object %	10%	11%	11%	13%	13%	14%	14%		
		Other %	20%	17%	17%	16%	9%	8%	9%		
Ecuador	CTS	Firearm %	81%	69%							
Guyana	CTS	Firearm %					10%	21%	25%		
		Sharp object %							45%		
		Other %							30%		
Paraguay	CTS	Firearm %	60%	63%	61%	62%	57%	62%	61%	64%	
Peru	CTS	Firearm %	20%	17%	20%	16%	18%				
Uruguay	CTS	Firearm %							49%		
		Sharp object %							34%		
		Other %							18%		

Country/territory	Source	Mechanism	Year							
			2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
ASIA										
Central Asia										
Kazakhstan	CTS	Firearm %	5%	4%	5%	5%	7%	7%	7%	7%
Kyrgyzstan	CTS	Firearm %	1%	1%	2%	3%	4%	3%	1%	
Tajikistan	CTS	Firearm %	13%	27%	14%	9%	16%	10%	10%	
ASIA										
Eastern Asia										
<i>China, Hong Kong SAR</i>	CTS	Firearm %	3%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%		
		Sharp object %	38%	43%	17%	19%	36%	26%		
		Other %	59%	54%	83%	81%	64%	74%		
Mongolia	CTS	Firearm %	4%	2%	5%	6%	5%	2%	2%	
		Sharp object %			40%	30%	39%	32%	35%	
		Other %			55%	65%	57%	66%	64%	
Republic of Korea	CTS	Firearm %							2%	
ASIA										
South-Eastern Asia										
Brunei Darussalam	CTS	Firearm %	0%	0%						
Singapore	CTS	Firearm %	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
ASIA										
Southern Asia										
India	CTS	Firearm %	14%	13%	12%	10%	7%	7%		
Maldives	CTS	Firearm %			67%	100%				
Nepal	CTS	Firearm %	12%	13%						
ASIA										
Western Asia										
Armenia	CTS	Firearm %	12%	20%	29%	22%	11%	23%	9%	11%
		Sharp object %	34%	27%	29%	30%	33%	32%	26%	
		Other %	53%	53%	43%	48%	57%	45%	65%	
Azerbaijan	CTS	Firearm %	9%	9%	13%	7%		13%		
		Sharp object %						17%		
		Other %						70%		
Bahrain	CTS	Firearm %			25%	0%				
Cyprus	CTS	Firearm %	50%	33%	23%	33%	26%	13%	33%	52%
		Sharp object %							33%	26%
		Other %							33%	22%
Georgia	CTS	Firearm %	23%	25%	14%	17%	16%	13%		
Jordan	CTS	Firearm %	39%							
Lebanon	CTS	Firearm %	5%	36%						
<i>State of Palestine</i>	CTS	Firearm %	72%							
Turkey	CTS	Firearm %	15%	17%						
EUROPE										
Eastern Europe										
Belarus	CTS	Firearm %	1%	1%	3%	3%	2%			
Bulgaria	CTS	Firearm %	22%	24%	31%	30%	29%	22%	32%	18%
		Sharp object %	5%	25%	20%	17%	15%	18%	24%	35%
		Other %	73%	52%	49%	53%	56%	61%	44%	48%
Czech Republic	National police/CTS	Firearm %	14%	12%	14%	15%	15%	6%	10%	10%
		Sharp object %			41%	48%	41%	45%	47%	
		Other %			44%	37%	44%	49%	42%	
Hungary	CTS	Firearm %	14%	6%	8%	8%	5%	11%	8%	7%
		Sharp object %	37%	40%	38%	37%	40%	35%	46%	36%
		Other %	49%	54%	54%	55%	55%	54%	46%	57%

Country/territory	Source	Mechanism	Year							
			2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Poland	CTS	Firearm %	10%	10%	10%	7%	7%	7%	4%	
Republic of Moldova	CTS	Firearm %	5%	5%	3%	3%	3%	2%	4%	5%
Romania	CTS	Firearm %	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%	3%	2%
Slovakia	CTS	Firearm %	11%	18%	20%	19%	17%	19%	14%	19%
Ukraine	CTS	Firearm %	3%	3%	3%	3%	5%			
EUROPE										
Northern Europe										
Denmark	CTS	Firearm %	21%	28%	18%	11%	26%	26%	34%	
Finland	CTS	Firearm %	25%	10%	18%	23%	20%	12%	14%	19%
		Sharp object %	47%	39%	35%	34%	43%	45%	43%	35%
		Other %	28%	51%	46%	44%	38%	43%	43%	46%
Iceland	CTS	Firearm %	0%	0%	50%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
		Sharp object %						50%	33%	100%
		Other %						50%	67%	0%
Latvia	CTS	Firearm %	10%	3%	4%	8%	5%	6%		
Lithuania	CTS	Firearm %	3%	3%	3%	1%	3%	1%	1%	
Sweden	CTS	Firearm %						16%		
		Sharp object %						43%		
		Other %						41%		
United Kingdom (England and Wales)	CTS	Firearm %		8%	7%	6%	7%	10%	7%	
		Sharp object %		38%	37%	40%	35%	37%	39%	
		Other %		54%	56%	54%	58%	54%	54%	
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	CTS	Firearm %	23%	0%	14%	4%	17%	13%	22%	
		Sharp object %				33%	24%	26%	35%	
		Other %				63%	59%	61%	43%	
United Kingdom (Scotland)	CTS	Sharp object %	37%	43%	47%	52%	53%	54%	58%	
		Other %	63%	57%	53%	48%	47%	46%	42%	
EUROPE										
Southern Europe										
Albania	CTS	Firearm %	57%	56%	63%	60%	67%	69%	61%	
		Sharp object %		14%	12%	12%	16%	16%	19%	
		Other %		31%	25%	28%	16%	15%	20%	
Andorra	CTS	Firearm %			0%	100%	0%	0%		
		Sharp object %			0%	0%	0%	100%		
		Other %			0%	0%	100%	0%		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	CTS	Firearm %	26%	25%	55%	12%	49%	46%	14%	
		Sharp object %						23%	8%	
		Other %						30%	78%	
Croatia	CTS	Firearm %	47%	50%	47%	38%	35%	45%	27%	31%
		Sharp object %						26%	35%	37%
		Other %						29%	39%	31%
Italy	National police	Firearm %					41%			
		Sharp object %					27%			
		Other %					32%			
Malta	CTS	Firearm %	25%	0%	50%	83%	0%	50%	0%	42%
		Sharp object %	50%	0%	0%	0%	50%	25%	33%	25%
		Other %	25%	0%	50%	17%	50%	25%	67%	33%
Montenegro	CTS	Firearm %			67%	33%	52%	47%	76%	
		Sharp object %							14%	
		Other %							10%	

Country/territory	Source	Mechanism	Year							
			2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Portugal	CTS	Firearm %	51%	52%	29%	44%	34%	35%	20%	37%
Serbia	CTS	Firearm %	25%	29%	25%	35%	31%	28%	20%	12%
		Sharp object %	28%	17%	15%	14%	19%	26%	18%	17%
		Other %	47%	53%	61%	51%	50%	46%	62%	71%
Slovenia	CTS	Firearm %	55%	25%	38%	20%	15%	40%	63%	29%
		Sharp object %	20%	42%	33%	50%	54%	13%	6%	43%
		Other %	25%	33%	29%	30%	31%	47%	31%	29%
Spain	CTS	Firearm %	12%	13%	14%	16%	23%	18%	14%	14%
		Sharp object %						40%	36%	39%
		Other %						42%	50%	47%
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	CTS	Firearm %	55%	54%	62%	49%	37%	65%	63%	
		Sharp object %		26%	12%	23%	31%	16%	7%	
		Other %		20%	26%	29%	31%	19%	30%	
EUROPE										
Western Europe										
Austria	CTS	Firearm %	8%	11%	11%	7%	9%	9%	10%	
		Sharp object %	30%	26%	33%	31%	34%	36%	38%	
		Other %	62%	63%	57%	62%	56%	55%	53%	
Germany	CTS	Firearm %	24%	24%						
Liechtenstein	CTS	Firearm %	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	
		Sharp object %	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
		Other %	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
Luxembourg	CTS	Firearm %		11%	29%	13%	40%	0%	0%	
		Sharp object %			14%	13%	20%	70%	50%	
		Other %			57%	75%	40%	30%	50%	
Monaco	CTS	Firearm %	0%	0%						
Netherlands	NSO	Firearm %	31%	24%	28%	25%	27%	23%	34%	
Switzerland	CTS	Firearm %					47%	25%	48%	
		Sharp object %					24%	38%	28%	
		Other %					29%	37%	24%	
OCEANIA										
Australia and New Zealand										
Australia	CTS/NSO	Firearm %	13%	15%	13%	11%	13%	17%	17%	17%
		Sharp object %	36%	38%	43%	43%	41%			
		Other %	51%	47%	44%	46%	46%			
New Zealand	CTS	Firearm %	15%	18%	13%	14%	16%	16%	8%	7%
		Sharp object %			33%	27%	25%	40%	41%	34%
		Other %			54%	59%	58%	44%	51%	59%
OCEANIA										
Melanesia										
Solomon Islands	CTS	Firearm %	0%	0%	0%	0%				
OCEANIA										
Polynesia										
Tonga	National police	Firearm %	0%	0%	0%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Table 8.4: Intentional homicide count and rate per 100,000 population in most populous city, by country/territory (2005-2012)

Country/territory	City	Source	Indicator	Year							
				2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
AFRICA											
Eastern Africa											
Kenya	Nairobi	CTS	Count	196	177	121	117	133	140	191	209
			Rate	7.0	6.1	4.1	3.9	4.4	4.5	6.1	6.1
Mauritius	Port Louis	CTS	Count	8	5	8	14	11	12	8	
			Rate	5.4	3.4	5.4	9.4	7.4	8.1	5.4	
Mozambique	Maputo	CTS	Count	104	75	92	53	39			
			Rate	9.7	6.9	8.4	4.8	3.5			
South Sudan	Juba	UN-PKO	Count								132
			Rate								12.0
Uganda	Kampala	CTS	Count				401	459	360		
			Rate				13.4	15.3	12.0		
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	NGO	Count	362							
			Rate	12.8							
Zambia	Lusaka	National police	Count	121	129	162	46	142	121		
			Rate	8.9	9.0	10.8	2.9	8.6	7.0		
AFRICA											
Middle Africa											
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Kinshasa	UN-PKO	Count							163	
			Rate							1.6	
Sao Tome and Principe	Sao Tome	CTS	Count		2	2	2	3			
			Rate		3.6	3.6	3.6	5.3			
AFRICA											
Northern Africa											
Algeria	Algiers	CTS	Count	21	22	38	47	35	31	40	
			Rate	0.8	0.8	1.4	1.7	1.3	1.1	1.4	
Egypt	Cairo	CTS	Count	21	44	62	93	74	200	271	
			Rate	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.7	1.8	2.4	
Morocco	Casablanca	CTS	Count	44	30	41	36	52			
			Rate	1.2	0.8	1.1	1.0	1.4			
Sudan	Khartoum	CTS	Count				263				
			Rate				5.0				
AFRICA											
Southern Africa											
Botswana	Gaborone	CTS	Count					36			
			Rate					16.1			
Lesotho	Maseru	CTS	Count			146	136	141			
			Rate			64.1	59.7	61.9			
South Africa	Cape Town	National police	Count	1,797	2,016	2,018					
			Rate	55.4	61.0	59.9					
AFRICA											
Western Africa											
Ghana	Accra	National police	Count				46	48			
			Rate				1.3	1.3			
Liberia	Monrovia	UN-PKO	Count			46	68	58	50		
			Rate			4.8	7.0	5.9	4.9		
Sierra Leone	Freetown	CTS	Count			52	72				
			Rate			5.8	8.0				
AMERICAS											
Caribbean											
Bahamas	Nassau	CTS	Count	33	48	60	57	71	78	110	
			Rate	13.3	19.3	24.1	22.9	28.5	31.3	44.2	
Dominican Republic	Santo Domingo	CTS	Count								661
			Rate								29.1
Haiti	Port au Prince	UN-PKO	Count			294	162	297	495		
			Rate			23.8	13.1	24.1	40.1		

Country/territory	City	Source	Indicator	Year							
				2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Jamaica	Kingston	CTS	Count Rate	331 50.8	565 86.7	727 111.5	641 98.3	632 97.0	441 67.7	328 50.3	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Basseterre	National police/CTS	Count Rate	5 32.5	4 25.6	8 50.6	8 50.0	12 73.2	6 35.5	17 131.6	
Trinidad and Tobago	Port of Spain	CTS	Count Rate	117 21.4	99 18.1	86 15.7	164 30.0	127 23.2	93 17.0	94 17.2	
AMERICAS											
Central America											
Belize	Belize City	CTS	Count Rate	44 74.2	42 68.7	41 65.1	47 72.5	54 81.0	70 102.1	74 105.1	
Costa Rica	San José	CTS	Count Rate		46 13.6	65 19.1	93 27.1	80 23.1	68 19.5	61 21.2	55 17.7
El Salvador	San Salvador	CTS	Count Rate							277 89.9	157 52.5
Guatemala	Guatemala City	CTS/National police	Count Rate	1,098 111.4	1,161 115.7	1,239 121.3	1,172 112.8	1,272 120.3	1,253 116.6		
Honduras	Tegucigalpa	SES	Count Rate				674 62.5	805 73.0	1,046 92.9	1,175 102.2	
Mexico	Mexico City	CTS	Count Rate	698 7.9	649 7.3	714 8.0	713 8.0	747 8.4	811 9.2	779 8.8	
Nicaragua	Managua	CTS	Count Rate	162 11.7	178 14.1				236 18.7		
Panama	Panama City	CTS	Count Rate	257 15.9	247 14.9	305 18.1	465 27.0	610 34.6	549 30.6	530 60.2	492 53.1
AMERICAS											
Northern America											
Canada	Toronto	CTS	Count Rate	99 1.9	96 1.8	103 1.9	101 1.8	84 1.5	79 1.4	78 1.3	
United States of America	New York City	CTS	Count Rate	539 6.5	596 7.1	496 5.9	523 6.3	471 5.6	536 6.4	515 6.3	419 5.1
AMERICAS											
South America											
Argentina	Buenos Aires	CTS	Count Rate	130 4.3	116 3.8	119 3.9	139 4.6	150 4.9			
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	La Paz	CTS	Count Rate	46 5.5	44 5.2						
Brazil	Sao Paulo	Secretaria de Seguranca Publica	Count Rate	2,684 24.7	1,770 16.2	1,648 15.0	1,322 11.9	1,301 11.6	1,263 11.2	1,069 9.4	1,621 14.2
Chile	Santiago de Chile	CTS	Count Rate	253 4.5	221 3.9	278 4.8	224 3.8	250 4.2	205 3.4	239 3.9	
Colombia	Bogotá	National Institute of Forensic Medicine	Count Rate	1,689 24.0	1,336 18.6	1,401 19.3	1,466 19.9	1,649 22.1	1,743 23.0	1,654 21.6	1,281 16.5
Ecuador	Quito	CTS/SES	Count Rate	229 11.4	277 13.8		239 11.9	223 11.1	290 14.4	230 11.4	
Paraguay	Asuncion	CTS	Count Rate	68 13.1	55 10.6	69 13.3	105 20.2	57 11.0	48 9.2		
Peru	Lima	CTS	Count Rate	500 6.2	484 5.9	712 8.4	563 6.5	497 5.7			
Uruguay	Montevideo	CTS/Ministry of Interior	Count Rate		90 6.8	86 6.5	107 8.0	112 8.4	107 8.0	112 8.4	
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Caracas	NGO	Count Rate	1,926 88.0	2,218 107.0	2,710 130.5	2,653 127.0	2,550 122.0			
ASIA											
Central Asia											
Kazakhstan	Almaty	CTS	Count Rate	173 13.6	164 12.6	130 9.8	170 12.6	134 9.7	125 8.9	140 9.7	127 8.6
Kyrgyzstan	Bishkek	CTS	Count Rate	130 16.5	104 12.9	93 11.2	89 10.5	80 9.2	88 9.9	81 9.0	
Tajikistan	Dushanbe	CTS	Count Rate	38 6.0	29 4.5	26 4.0	19 2.9	19 2.9	24 3.7	23 3.6	
Turkmenistan	Ashkhabad	CTS	Count Rate	33 3.6	33 3.5						

Country/territory	City	Source	Indicator	Year								
				2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
ASIA												
Eastern Asia												
<i>China, Hong Kong SAR</i>	Hong Kong	CTS	Count Rate	34 0.5	35 0.5	18 0.3	36 0.5	47 0.7	35 0.5	17 0.2	27 0.4	
Japan	Tokyo	CTS	Count Rate	47 0.4	55 0.4	55 0.4	83 0.6	54 0.4	39 0.3	32 0.2		
Mongolia	Ulan Bator	CTS	Count Rate	157 16.8	152 15.6	143 14.1	111 10.5	98 8.9	119 10.5	140 11.9		
Republic of Korea	Seoul	CTS	Count Rate		199 1.9	219 2.1	221 2.1	250 2.4	294 2.8	83 0.8		
ASIA												
South-Eastern Asia												
Brunei Darussalam	Bandar Seri Begawan	CTS	Count Rate	0 0.0	1 0.7							
Indonesia	Jakarta	CTS	Count Rate				67 0.7	75 0.8	86 0.9	74 0.8		
Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur	CTS	Count Rate	47 3.0	70 4.4							
Myanmar	Yangon	NSO	Count Rate		114 2.9							
Philippines	Quezon City	CTS	Count Rate	239 10.3	188 8.1	151 6.5	119 5.1	123 5.3				
Singapore	Singapore	CTS	Count Rate	21 0.5	17 0.4	18 0.4	27 0.6	20 0.4	19 0.4	16 0.3	11 0.2	
Thailand	Bangkok	CTS	Count Rate	311 4.3	327 4.4	283 3.7	252 3.2	225 2.8	219 2.7			
Timor-Leste	Dili	UN-PKO	Count Rate						17 11.3			
ASIA												
Southern Asia												
Bangladesh	Dhaka	CTS	Count Rate	231 3.6	344 5.3							
India	Mumbai	CTS	Count Rate	212 1.2	239 1.3	230 1.2	210 1.1	217 1.1	228 1.2			
Maldives	Male	CTS	Count Rate			8 6.7	6 5.0					
Nepal	Kathmandu	CTS	Count Rate	172 19.2	166 18.5							
Sri Lanka	Colombo	National police	Count Rate		66 2.6	55 2.2	55 2.2	31 1.2				
ASIA												
Western Asia												
Armenia	Yerevan	CTS	Count Rate						17 1.5	20 1.8	19 1.7	
Azerbaijan	Baku	CTS	Count Rate	70 3.7	70 3.6	67 3.3	67 3.3		70 3.3			
Cyprus	Nicosia	CTS	Count Rate	3 1.0	8 2.6	3 1.0	3 1.0	3 1.0	4 1.3	2 0.6	5 2.0	
Georgia	Tbilisi	CTS	Count Rate	141 13.1	86 7.8	90 8.2	56 4.9	57 5.0	39 3.4			
Israel	Tel Aviv	CTS	Count Rate	24 6.1	15 3.8	17 4.3	18 4.6					
Jordan	Amman	CTS	Count Rate	23 1.5	40 1.8							
Kuwait	Kuwait City	CTS	Count Rate	8 1.0	9 1.1	12 1.3	11 1.2	11 1.2				
Oman	Muscat	CTS	Count Rate			4 0.6	4 0.6					
Qatar	Doha	CTS	Count Rate			5 1.3	4 1.1					
<i>State of Palestine</i>	Hebron	CTS	Count Rate	17 3.2								

Country/territory	City	Source	Indicator	Year								
				2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
Syrian Arab Republic	Aleppo	CTS	Count Rate			155 2.9	131 2.5					
Turkey	Istanbul	CTS	Count Rate	923 7.3	842 6.7	656 5.2	596 4.7					
United Arab Emirates	Dubai	CTS	Count Rate	25 1.9	20 1.5							
Yemen	Sanaa	CTS	Count Rate	96 5.5	102 5.5	93 4.7	81 3.9	83 3.8				
EUROPE												
Eastern Europe												
Belarus	Minsk	CTS	Count Rate	85 4.8	87 4.9	49 2.7	56 3.1	48 2.6				
Bulgaria	Sofia	CTS	Count Rate	38 3.1	27 2.2	24 1.9	27 2.2	26 2.1	20 1.6	20 1.5	24 1.8	
Czech Republic	Prague	CTS	Count Rate	15 1.2	21 1.7	21 1.7	15 1.2	18 1.5	16 1.3	10 0.8	18 1.4	
Hungary	Budapest	CTS	Count Rate	31 1.8	30 1.8	17 1.0	26 1.5	36 2.1	32 1.9	32 1.8	28 1.6	
Poland	Warsaw	CTS	Count Rate	37 2.2	36 2.1	37 2.2	25 1.5	35 2.0	27 1.6	36 2.1		
Republic of Moldova	Chishinau	CTS	Count Rate	57 7.3	56 7.2	51 6.5	36 4.6	43 5.5	42 5.3	35 4.4	41 5.2	
Romania	Bucharest	CTS	Count Rate	27 1.4	25 1.3	22 1.1	17 0.9	20 1.0	22 1.1	17 0.9	21 1.1	
Russian Federation	Moscow	CTS	Count Rate	766 7.1	767 7.0	629 5.7	626 5.6	481 4.2	483 4.2	439 3.8		
Slovakia	Bratislava	CTS	Count Rate	11 2.6	15 3.5	16 3.8	10 2.3	9 2.1	8 1.9	14 3.2	12 2.9	
Ukraine	Kiev	CTS	Count Rate	129 4.8	129 4.8	99 3.6	102 3.7	118 4.2	91 3.2			
EUROPE												
Northern Europe												
Denmark	Copenhagen	CTS/Eurostat	Count Rate	13 1.2	9 0.8	7 0.6	8 0.7	13 1.1	4 0.3	16 1.3	14 1.1	
Estonia	Tallinn	CTS/Eurostat	Count Rate	40 10.1	21 5.3	35 8.8		29 7.3	22 5.5			
Finland	Helsinki	CTS	Count Rate	13 2.3	14 2.5	10 1.8	16 2.8	7 1.2	12 2.0	14 2.4	12 2.0	
Iceland	Reykjavik	CTS	Count Rate	2 1.0	0 0.0	2 1.0	0 0.0	1 0.5	1 0.5	3 1.5	1 0.5	
Ireland	Dublin	Eurostat	Count Rate	29 2.6	33 2.7	31 2.5	26 2.0	29 2.1	30 2.0			
Latvia	Riga	CTS	Count Rate	35 4.8	46 6.3	29 4.0	30 4.2	37 5.2	23 3.3	18 2.7	26 4.0	
Lithuania	Vilnius	CTS	Count Rate	43 7.8	32 5.8	41 7.4	58 10.4	30 5.4	26 4.7	22 4.1	19 3.5	
Norway	Oslo	CTS	Count Rate	9 1.6	9 1.6	8 1.4	12 2.1	7 1.2	5 0.9	19 3.2		
United Kingdom (England and Wales)	London	CTS	Count Rate	177 2.4	160 2.1	161 2.1	155 2.1	118 1.6	133 1.8	100 1.3		
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	Belfast	CTS	Count Rate	13 4.9	11 4.1	6 2.2	4 1.5	7 2.6	9 3.3	3 1.1		
United Kingdom (Scotland)	Glasgow	CTS	Count Rate	31 5.4	32 5.5	31 5.3	23 3.9	20 3.4	30 5.1	12 2.0		
EUROPE												
Southern Europe												
Albania	Tirana	CTS	Count Rate	24 5.7	19 4.5	21 5.0	18 4.3	25 6.0	33 7.9	28 6.7		
Andorra	Andorra la Vella	CTS	Count Rate			0 0.0	0 0.0	1 2.7	1 2.5	1 2.7		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Sarajevo	CTS	Count Rate	9 1.8	10 2.0	10 2.0	10 2.0					

Country/territory	City	Source	Indicator	Year							
				2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Croatia	Zagreb	CTS	Count	16	11	6	15	5	10	11	10
			Rate	2.1	1.4	0.8	1.9	0.6	1.3	1.4	1.3
Greece	Athens	CTS	Count	49	43	68	69	70	82	86	
			Rate	1.4	1.3	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.4	
Italy	Rome	CTS	Count	34	26	29	28	29	9	27	24
			Rate	1.3	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.3	1.0	0.9
Malta	Valletta	CTS	Count	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
			Rate	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.9	0.0	0.0
Montenegro	Podgorica	CTS	Count	12	11	7	7	8	7	7	7
			Rate	6.5	5.9	3.7	3.6	4.1	3.5	3.5	3.5
Portugal	Lisbon	CTS	Count	15	17	12	9	4	6	5	13
			Rate	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.6
Serbia	Belgrade	CTS	Count	48	50	50	40	24	23	37	22
			Rate	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.5	1.5	1.4	2.2	1.3
Slovenia	Ljubljana	CTS	Count	4	1	3	0	1	3	4	2
			Rate	1.5	0.4	1.1	0.0	0.4	1.1	1.4	0.7
Spain	Madrid	CTS	Count	36	37	34	39	32	28	21	28
			Rate	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.6	0.9
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Skopje	CTS	Count	15	19	21	13	12	14	11	
			Rate	2.9	3.6	4.0	2.5	2.3	2.6	2.1	
EUROPE											
Western Europe											
Austria	Vienna	CTS	Count	22	18	20	15	19	17	25	24
			Rate	1.3	1.1	1.2	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.5	1.4
Belgium	Brussels	CTS	Count	32	37	20	44	33	31	24	30
			Rate	3.1	3.6	1.9	4.1	3.0	2.8	2.1	2.6
France	Paris	CTS	Count	34	29	33	35	25	41	40	41
			Rate	1.6	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.1	1.8	1.8	1.8
Germany	Berlin	CTS	Count	60	50	42	42	61	37	35	
			Rate	1.8	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.8	1.1	1.0	
Liechtenstein	Vaduz	CTS	Count	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
			Rate	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Luxembourg	Luxembourg	Eurostat/CTS	Count	1	4	3	3	5	0	3	
			Rate	1.1	4.2	3.2	3.2	5.3	0.0	3.2	
Monaco	Monte Carlo	CTS	Count	1	1	0	0				
			Rate	2.8	2.8	0.0	0.0				
Netherlands	Amsterdam	Eurostat	Count	24	17	27	11	24	10	12	
			Rate	3.2	2.3	3.6	1.5	3.2	1.3	1.5	
Switzerland	Zürich	CTS	Count					4	11	1	
			Rate					1.1	3.0	0.3	
OCEANIA											
Australia and New Zealand											
Australia	Sydney	NSO	Count	51	62	49					
			Rate	1.2	1.4	1.1					
New Zealand	Auckland	CTS	Count	19	23	11	20	15	17	14	10
			Rate	1.4	1.7	0.8	1.4	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.7
OCEANIA											
Melanesia											
Solomon Islands	Honiara City	CTS	Count	3	12	19	11				
			Rate	5.2	20.8	33.0	19.1				
OCEANIA											
Polynesia											
Tonga	Nuku'alofa	National police	Count	4	8	1	3	4	1	2	1
			Rate	17.0	33.8	4.2	12.5	16.5	4.1	8.1	4.0

Fig. 8.1: Homicide rates: Most populous city rate versus national rate, Africa (2012 or latest year)




Fig. 8.2: Homicide rates: Most populous city rate versus national rate, Americas (2012 or latest year)




Fig. 8.3: Homicide rates: Most populous city rate versus national rate, Asia (2012 or latest year)





Fig. 8.4: Homicide rates: Most populous city rate versus national rate, Europe (2012 or latest year)





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